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Abstract
This dissertation is an attempt to understand the politics of welfare inclusion and
exclusion in an authoritarian developing country—China. This dissertation empirically
focuses on the expansion of two Chinese pension programs—the residency-based pen-
sion program and the employment-based pension program—across mainland China’s 31
provinces over 2005-2015 and examines local variation in the composition of beneficiaries
and the types of benefits of the pension programs.
This dissertation argues that the different membership composition of political insid-
ers—a group of individuals who have right to political representation or participation
in a geopolitical community and to whom state actors are held accountable—is key to
understanding the variation in welfare inclusion strategies evidenced by subnationally
different pension expansion patterns. When political insiders overlap largely with those
who secure stable employment positions (labor market insiders), a narrow yet generous
welfare inclusion mechanism based on one’s employment positions develops. This wel-
fare regime selectively benefits those who have both political and labor market power.
When political insiders do not largely overlap with labor market insiders, a broader yet
shallow welfare regime that distributes welfare benefits on the basis of citizenship de-
velops, encompassing political insiders who lost their positions as labor market insiders.
Structural changes including labor informalization and growing labor mobility play a
pivotal role in changing the extent to which political and labor market insiders overlaps
and thereby inducing changes in welfare inclusion strategies.
Applying this theory in the Chinese contexts, the changing level of overlap between
individuals with local citizenship defined by their hukou registration (political insiders)
xv
and those who have formal and secure employment positions (labor market insiders) is
the key to explain the emergence of dual pension regimes and subnationally diverging
coverage of the two pension programs—employment-based pension program and the
residency-based pension program. In places where most informal employment positions
are passed onto local residents and the long-maintained overlap between political and
labor market insiders is shattered, welfare programs that encompass a broader segment
of society with modest benefits develop. These localities experience a rapid expansion
of the residency-based pension program. In places where a large number of informal
employment are externalized to non-local workers coming across different provinces
and the overlap between political and labor market insiders remains intact, on the other
hand, the employment-based pension regime persists.
This dissertation project tests these propositions both qualitatively and quantitatively.
On the qualitative side, I conducted interviews with government officials, labor NGO
activists, firm managers, and scholars in Beijing, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Guangdong, and
Sichuan provinces during the fall of 2015 and spring of 2016. On the quantitative side,
I analyzed two data sets. First, I compiled a dataset of pension coverage and other de-
mographic and economic aspects of mainland China’s 31 provinces over the period of
2005-2015. The second is individual-level survey data of Chinese labor dynamics con-
ducted in 2012 and 2014 matched by yearbook statistics on the local political economy.
xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation is an attempt to understand the politics of welfare inclusion and
exclusion in an authoritarian developing country—China. This dissertation empiri-
cally focuses on the development and expansion of two Chinese pension programs—the
residency-based pension program and the employment-based pension program—across
space and over time. I track local variation in the scope and composition of beneficia-
ries and the types of benefits they receive. I explain the subnational variation in welfare
inclusion strategies focusing on the diverging membership composition of political insid-
ers—those who have right to political representation and participation in a geopolitical
community and to whom local state actors are held accountable—of each locality. Struc-
tural changes, such as labor informalization and labor mobility, are the main factors
that shuffle the composition of political insiders and thereby induce changes in welfare
inclusion strategies.
Among many social insurance programs, this dissertation focuses on pension (old-
age social insurance). Pension touches upon the most serious political and social chal-
lenge that China faces. The Chinese population is aging rapidly, at a rate that ranks the
fastest in the world. The working-age population is expected to drop from 925 million in
1
2011 to 830 million in 2013 and to 700 million by 2050 (Zhao, 2016). The ratio of old-age
population (ages 65 or above) to working-age population (ages 15-64) has been increas-
ing, while the share of working age population (ages 15-64) in total population has been
decreasing rapidly (See Figure 1.1). The dependency ratio is currently 14 percent (as of
2016) but it is expected to increase to 38 percent by 2050 (Holzmann et al., 2012).
Figure 1.1: China as an Aging Society (1960-2016)
Source: World Development Indicators
Despite the challenges coming from the demographic change, however, the social
safety net designed to protect this growing number of elderly population has only been
incompletely and unevenly developed. While the Chinese central government has at-
tempted to include a broader segment of society into the pension system, the extent
to which pension coverage expands has differed sub-nationally. The type of pension
programs developed in each localities has also differed.
In certain Chinese localities, the overall pension coverage has exploded with the rapid
expansion of the residency-based social insurance program. The welfare benefits come
from the residency-based pension program is modest, but it covers a broader segment
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of society. A large number of workers with precarious employment-positions have been
included into the local social safety net. While a small number of workers in these local-
ities are still covered by the employment-based pension program that provides generous
welfare benefits, the coverage of the employment-based pension program has remained
very low in these localities. Other Chinese localities, on the other hand, have concen-
trated generous welfare benefits to a small number of workers with stable employment
positions by further developing the employment-based pension program. The coverage
of the residency-based pension program has not expanded much in these localities de-
spite the increase in the number of workers without secure employment positions. A
large number of workers without secure employment positions in these localities have
been excluded from the social safety net.
Why does the pattern of welfare inclusion and exclusion vary widely sub-nationally
in a country with a centrally designed unitary social insurance system? I explain the
variation in welfare inclusion and exclusion patterns evidenced by sub-nationally dif-
ferent pension coverage by focusing on the locally diverging extent to which political
insiders overlap with labor market insiders.
In the Chinese context, those who are born in a geopolitical community and have
local citizenship (hukou) have been considered as political insiders of the geopolitical
community. Although no Chinese individual has an explicit right to select, remove,
or change local political leaders, individuals with local hukou have implicit right to
political representation and participation in their geopolitical communities. Local state
actors are held accountable to these local residents by the top-down career incentives.
The exclusive provision of public goods and social welfare for local residents is a form
of political representation by local state actors (Manion, 2014). Under the Chinese locally
delineated citizenship system, those who come from other localities can hardly be treated
as political insiders or legitimate members of local community even when they reside in
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the local community for many years. In order to earn local citizenship, the non-locals
have to prove that they have high market competitiveness and skills. Only a handful of
elite non-locals are allowed to transfer their hukou and to be treated as “insiders”. Most
of migrants lacking local hukou have been considered as “outsiders”(Fan, 2002).
Another social division that affects individual’s welfare status is one’s labor mar-
ket status. The Chinese welfare system has long benefited labor market insiders—those
workers with stable and secure employment positions—in the state sectors. The rapidly
changing labor market status of political insiders (local residents) caused by urbaniza-
tion, marketization, and deindustrialization, however, have incentivized some Chinese
localities to develop a new welfare program that embraces labor market outsiders as
well. The diverging labor market status of local residents (political insiders) and local
states’ differing ability to exclude labor market outsiders from their geopolitical commu-
nities are the keys to understanding the diverging development and expansion patterns
of the Chinese pension programs.
In places where most local residents (political insiders) secure their positions as for-
mal workers (labor market insiders) and where non-local workers (political outsiders)
take a large portion of informal employment positions (labor market outsiders), local
governments are likely to develop a narrowly targeting yet generous welfare regime,
based on the employment-based pension program. In places where local residents (po-
litical insiders) are dispersed across formal and informal labor markets and where only a
small portion informal employment positions can be tossed onto political outsiders, local
state actors develop welfare programs that can broadly embrace local residents who lost
their positions as labor market insiders, such as the residency-based pension program.
This dissertation makes a contribution to five strands of literature in comparative
politics. First, this research explains why authoritarian leaders use different welfare
provision strategies—why some authoritarian governments selectively provide gener-
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ous welfare benefits to a narrow segment of society while others incorporate a broader
segment of society using universal welfare programs with shallow benefits. Previous
studies have suggested that autocrats are likely to use exclusive and generous welfare
provision strategy when they are brought to power by a narrow coalition of interests
whereas they use inclusive yet fragmented welfare provision strategy if they are brought
to power by a broad coalition of interests (Mares and Carnes, 2009). Yet the question of
when the leaders are brought to power by a narrow coalition versus a broad coalition has
not been sufficiently discussed. Moreover, these explanations do not adequately explain
changes in the countries where the institutions for bottom-up coalitions are only weakly
developed, like in China. In my dissertation, I provide an alternative explanation by
showing how Chinese local state actors, motivated more by the top-down accountability
rather than by bottom-up political incentives, change their welfare inclusion or exclusion
strategies depending on the scope and membership composition of political insiders in
their jurisdictions.
Second and relatedly, in explaining how structural conditions influence welfare provi-
sion, previous literature focuses extensively on individual-level preferences and coalition
dynamics. Existing studies have extensively discussed how individual worker’s welfare
preference diverges as labor market structure changes (Berens, 2015b; Carnes and Mares,
2013a; Rehm, 2009) and how individuals with differential welfare preferences form po-
litical coalitions to create pressure on government to adopt welfare policies that best
serve their welfare interests (Berens, 2015a; Carnes and Mares, 2013b). The explanation
focusing exclusively on the individual-level welfare preferences, however, only insuffi-
ciently unravels the link between structural changes and welfare policies for the follow-
ing three reasons. First, it does not properly explain how changes in welfare policies
happen in countries where institutions to politicize individual’s welfare preferences are
insufficiently developed or political coalitions in support of certain policies are likely to
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operate in a restrictive and limited space. Second, not all individuals experiencing labor
informalization demand for inclusion or welfare expansion, especially if they have little
experience receiving welfare benefits from the state or if they do not know what they
were excluded from (Dillon, 2015). Third, social policies, like any other policy, are not
solely an outcome of bottom-up political demands. In many countries, social insurance
programs have been developed as a part of states’ development strategies and have been
used as policy tools to help governments achieve their policy goals (Haggard and Kauf-
man, 2008; Wibbels, 2006). State actors may also have differing welfare preferences which
shape independently of individual citizen’s welfare demands or preferences. This disser-
tation project enriches the literature on welfare dynamics by elucidating how structural
changes affect state actors’ welfare inclusion strategies and top-down welfare provision
strategies.
Third, this dissertation reconciles the controversy over the impact of labor market du-
alization (or labor informalization) on welfare configuration. A strand of the literature
contends that labor informalization contributes to the expansion of universal social insur-
ance programs that incorporate both labor market insiders and labor market outsiders
into the social welfare system (Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, 2002; Carnes and Mares,
2013a). Another strand of the literature, however, contends that labor informalization
has only an ambiguous impact on the expansion of universal social insurance programs
and rather consolidates employment-based social insurance programs that prioritize la-
bor market insiders over outsiders (Berens, 2015a). The two strands of literature provide
opposite expectations as they expect different types of political coalition to emerge as a
result of labor informalization. One expects a coalition formation between labor market
insiders and outsiders for welfare expansion while the other expects that internal divi-
sion deepens between the two types of workers to delay welfare expansion. Yet as can be
seen in the China case, the impact of labor informalization on welfare configuration can
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vary even in a country where institutions for coalition formation or civil organization
are only weakly developed. This dissertation project examines how other social insti-
tutions that stratify workers interact with the division created by labor informalization
(the division between labor market insiders and outsiders) in conditioning the impact of
labor informalization on welfare configuration.
Fourth, this dissertation is one of a few attempts to examine the role of labor mobility
on the emergence of divergent welfare regimes. A large number of studies discuss the
role of capital mobility in building welfare states and increasing the role of government
in welfare provision. Theories of embedded liberalism, for example, elucidate how na-
tional governments increase welfare spending and the size of government to protect the
losers of economic globalization from economic turbulence and the maintain electoral
support for continued trade openness (Rodrik, 1998b; Ruggie, 1982). Yet capital is not
the only movable factor. Another factor of production, labor, is becoming increasingly
movable with the opening immigration policies and developing transportation. Instead
of recognizing labor mobility as a factor explaining changes in welfare systems, how-
ever, previous literature discussed more about how the development of welfare systems
in destination countries facilitate labor mobility across national borders (Borjas, 1999;
Levine and Zimmerman, 1999; Nannestad, 2007). Due to the growing labor mobility,
labor markets in some societies are no longer composed of workers of the same citi-
zenship and political entitlement. The influx of workers of differential citizenship (po-
litical outsiders) in labor markets changes the state’s accountability or responsiveness
toward worker demand for protection from globalization or labor market dualization.
This dissertation project examines the impact of labor mobility on welfare configuration
by probing how the growing labor mobility influences local welfare configurations in
China where citizenship institutions are locally defined and domestic migrant workers
are deprived of equal citizenship rights in the hosting localities. Lastly, in exploring local
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variation in Chinese welfare development, previous studies have focused extensively on
the variation in welfare expenditure (Huang, 2015; Lin, 2015; Lin and Tussing, 2016; Rati-
gan, 2017). Variation in welfare expenditure reveals how the level of welfare benefit that
each participant of the welfare program receives from the state differs sub-nationally.
In order to better discuss how the benefit level differs, however, the issue of whether
the given welfare expenditure is distributed across a broader segment of society or is
concentrated to a smaller number of elite citizens should be first addressed. Moreover,
the extent to which Chinese local residents are covered by social insurance programs of
the country varies substantially across different localities in China. The question of who
are protected by and who are excluded from the social welfare programs of a country is
a fundamental political question. This dissertation project updates our understanding of
Chinese local welfare regimes by shifting the focus of the research from local variation
in how much is spent for welfare provision (welfare expenditure) to who are protected
and excluded from welfare programs (welfare coverage).
1.1 Puzzle
Authoritarian welfare regimes are known to be less universal and inclusive than
democratic welfare regimes (Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017). In many autocracies, only
a small number of privileged citizens—be it wage workers, soldiers, urban workers with
formal employment positions—are incorporated into the social welfare system. Such
narrow and preferential cooptation of certain subgroups of society through welfare pro-
vision has helped authoritarian leaders retain their power and enhance the regime sta-
bility (Dillon, 2015; Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017; Mares and Carnes, 2009).
Yet some authoritarian states have started to develop welfare programs that encom-
pass those who used to be regarded as irrelevant for regime survival and were excluded
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from the social welfare system, such as the poor, (rural) precarious workers, low-income
families, and various forms of labor market outsiders. Some authoritarian countries
have even shifted their welfare provision patterns from narrow and targeted provision
to broad and inclusive provision (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Mares and Carnes, 2009).
This is puzzling given the effectiveness and efficiency of the narrow and exclusive wel-
fare provision strategies many authoritarian leaders adopt. Moreover, authoritarian lead-
ers are constrained less by popular demand than democratic leaders are. Why do some
authoritarian leaders expand the welfare coverage while others stick to the narrow and
exclusive welfare provision strategies?
Some focus on differences in leader selection institutions in authoritarian regimes
to explain the variation in welfare provision patterns (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003;
Clark et al., 2011). In order to stay in power, all political leaders must secure support
from the winning coalition—a group of individuals whose support is necessary for a
ruler to attain power. The winning coalition members can be replaced with selectorate
members—a subset of population with a power to select and remove political leaders of
a society. In authoritarian regimes where the size of selectorate is small, leaders find it
harder to replace winning coalition members and their political fates become susceptible
to a winning coalition member’s retraction of support. In this case, autocrats need more
resources to be used to keep their winning coalition members loyal. A need for more
resources incentivizes authoritarian leaders to expand the scope of social provision to
a broader segment of society so that they can increase the general social productivity.
In authoritarian regimes where the winning coalition members can be easily replaced
with selectorate members due to a large size of selectorate, leaders have less incentives
to broadly provide public goods or to increase the social productivity. This explanation
provides important insight to understand variation in authoritarian welfare regimes. It
does not, however, account for changes in welfare policies in a country over time or a
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sub-national variation in welfare policies in a country with a regionally identical political
institution.
A variant of the literature on authoritarian welfare regimes suggests that autocrats
are likely to use inclusive yet fragmented welfare provision strategy if they are brought
to power by a broad coalition of interests (Mares and Carnes, 2009). Yet this research
does not specify when and how the scope and composition of such coalition changes. It
does not sufficiently explain why and how welfare inclusion strategies change in non-
democracies where bottom-up representation mechanisms and institutions for coalition
formation are only weakly developed.
Some might say that the variation in welfare inclusion pattern is purely attributable
to different levels of economic development of each society. Affluent societies in which
most workers have secure employment positions are likely to develop generous welfare
programs simply because these societies have enough wealth to provide to such gen-
erous welfare benefits. Economically less developed societies in which many workers
have poorly paid, precarious, informal employment positions may have no choice but
to provide shallow benefits to a wider range of constituents. Yet this explanation does
not account for the reason why economically less developed societies expand the social
welfare coverage despite the limited resources they have and why economically affluent
societies stick with generous yet narrow welfare inclusion strategies rather than expand-
ing the coverage of the social welfare system.
Others might attempt to account for variation in welfare inclusion pattern by looking
at the divergent state-business relations. Societies with higher bargaining power over
firms are more likely to transfer the social welfare burden to firms and develop the nar-
rowly inclusive yet generous welfare regime based on the employment-based welfare
programs. Societies with a weaker bargaining power against firms are more likely to
internalize the social costs by providing the citizenship-based social insurance program
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to reduce the financial burden on firms. This is a feasible explanation, but it is laid on an
assumption that only firms with weak bargaining power over governments will involun-
tarily provide employment-based welfare benefits. In fact, studies have found that firms
have heterogeneous welfare preferences and some productive firms with higher bar-
gaining power over governments have vested interests in providing employment-based
welfare benefits (Mares, 2005).
So, why do some authoritarian states include a broader segment of society into the
social safety net using the shallow welfare programs and who benefits from this broad
yet shallow programs? Why do some authoritarian states opt to a narrow welfare regime
that selectively rewards a small number of privileged recipients? What explains the
variation across and within authoritarian welfare regimes?
1.2 A Sub-national Approach
This dissertation project sets out to explain the puzzle by examining sub-national
variation in pension regimes in a country where the leader selection institutions and so-
cial insurance structures are identical across different sub-national units yet the coverage
of the two pension programs sub-nationally varies—China.
Like many other authoritarian countries, China used to resort to narrow and ex-
clusive welfare provision strategies. The welfare system that selectively favored urban
State Owned Enterprise (SOE) workers was the key for Chinese leaders to constrain the
explosive urbanization and prevent regime instability, while saving costs (Dillon, 2015;
Wallace, 2013). Recently, however, Chinese pension coverage has increased rapidly as
the residency-based social insurance program expanded in certain localities in China,
incorporating those who used to be excluded. Yet not all provinces experience the same
pattern of pension expansion. Some Chinese localities still maintain a pension regime
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based primarily on the pre-existing employment-based pension program that concen-
trates generous welfare benefits to a small number of privileged beneficiaries.
The sub-national variation shown in China case parallels welfare variation in many
developing non-democratic countries. Some non-democracies maintain exclusive and
narrow welfare regimes while others shift to universal welfare regimes. In examining
variation in welfare regimes, however, a sub-national approach has several advantages
over a cross-national approach.
First, many quantitative studies in the welfare literature focus on cross-country com-
parison (Clark et al., 2011; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017;
Mares and Carnes, 2009; Weyland, 2005), but without sufficiently controlling for differ-
ences between political and economic contexts. Controlling different political, economic,
and social conditions is important given that social insurance and welfare programs are
embedded in various political contexts (leader selection processes and regime types),
market systems (coordinated market v.s. liberal market), and development strategies
(export-oriented model v.s. import-oriented model). The cross-national comparison of
authoritarian welfare regimes is even harder given the heterogeneity and opacity of the
political and social structure of authoritarian countries. A sub-national approach enables
us to control for these factors and to focus on the variables of interests.
Secondly, cross-national comparison of the coverage or expenditure level of welfare
programs has been challenging due to the nationally divergent social welfare systems
and structures. Due to the heterogeneity among social welfare systems and different
structures of social insurance programs, many previous studies comparing welfare pro-
grams of different countries focus on the adoption status of certain social insurance
programs as the main indicator of interest. However, the adoption status of certain so-
cial insurance programs, which is coded as a binary variable, provides important yet
limited information about the country’s welfare configuration and distribution patterns.
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The centrally imposed unitary social insurance systems in China enables a meaningful
comparison of welfare coverage or expenditure at the sub-national level. A large num-
ber of sub-national units—31 provinces and 288 prefectural level cities—also makes it
possible to carry out a large-N analysis.
Third, the role and responsibility of the Chinese sub-national governments in wel-
fare provision are parallel to those of national governments of other welfare regimes.
While Chinese social insurance programs are designed uniformly by the central gov-
ernment, how they actually are implemented can vary depending on the local state
actors’ policy priorities and preferences (Ratigan, 2017). The Chinese fiscal systems are
sub-nationally decentralized and local government has the primary responsibility for
funding and implementing social policies (Wong, 2010). The localized citizenship in-
stitutions and localization of population management have further empowered the role
of local governments as welfare providers. The localized citizenship institution defined
by the Chinese hukou system limits non-local workers’ access to local public goods and
welfare provision. Local governments can decide whether and how to embrace non-local
workers into the local public safety net. Chinese local government also are responsible
to manage the entry of non-local workers into the local labor market.
1.3 Pension Programs in China
Aside from the fact the pension programs touch upon one of the most urgent so-
cial issues in China—aging problem—there are two other important reasons why this
dissertation focuses on the Chinese pension program in examining the logic of welfare
inclusion and exclusion.
First, pension requires a higher level of commitment from both welfare providers
and participants. Pension places a greater financial burden on the state as the benefits
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of pension programs are higher than any other social insurance programs. Pension
expenditure is one of the costliest component of any welfare regimes. In China, pension
expenditure and revenue exceed all other individual categories of spending and revenues
by local governments (Frazier, 2010). For participants as well, they have to contribute
certain amounts of premium for a certain amount of time. Unlike other social insurance
programs that provide the participants the immediate benefits in need, pensions will be
paid in the longer time frame. Most participants cannot receive the full benefits until
they retire. A longer time frame required for pension benefits, however, makes pension
participants trust the leaders to provide future resources. For this reason, it has been
widely used as a policy tool to coopt citizens in many other developing non-democracies
as well (Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017).
Second, pension is a great window to see how local government’s welfare expansion
strategies change and are influenced by other social actors, including the central state,
businesses, workers of differential citizenship, and local retirees. When it comes to
other social insurance programs (such as social assistance program), the main challenge
is rested on whether or not the ruling elites are willing to expand the benefits to the
politically disadvantaged populace. When it comes to pension, the main challenge is
rested not only on the state’s willingness to expand pension coverage but also on their
ability to coordinate different social groups with diverse political and economic interests
(Shou, 2017). Especially for the employment-based pension program, local states have
long struggled not to lose their initiatives in managing the pension programs to the
central state (Frazier, 2010). At the same time, local governments have balanced between
their duties to enforce firms to pay for the pension funds and comply with the national
pension guideline and their roles to facilitate firms’ investment in their localities by
accommodating firms’ interests. As local governments accommodate the interests of
employers, however, certain groups of workers or residents have been excluded from the
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welfare protection. By examining how local governments expand the pension coverage
while coordinating the interests between the different levels of government, employers,
workers, and those who are excluded from the social provision, this dissertation can
further probe how authoritarian leaders’ welfare provision strategies shape.
1.4 Main Arguments
This dissertation argues that changing composition of political insiders is the key to
understanding the variation in welfare provision strategies. Structural changes, such as
labor informalization and growing labor mobility, play a pivotal role in shuffling the
composition of political insiders. Depending on the extent to which political insiders
overlap with labor market insiders, the state develops different types of welfare pro-
grams. When political insiders overlap largely with labor market insiders, employment-
based social insurance program that selectively benefits those who have both political
and labor market power develops. When political insiders do not largely overlap with
labor market insiders, a citizenship (residency)-based social insurance program develops
to embrace political insiders who lost their positions as labor market insider.
I define political insiders as a group of individuals who have right to political rep-
resentation or participation in a geopolitical community and to whom state actors are
held accountable. In this regard, the concept of political insiders remotely approximates
the concepts of selectorate or pivotal supporters. Yet contrary to the two other concepts,
political insiders may not necessarily have direct power to select or change the leaders.
Labor market insiders indicate those who have stable and secure employment positions.
In the Chinese context, individuals with local citizenship defined by their hukou reg-
istration are the political insiders of a geopolitical community. Chinese local state actors
are held accountable to individuals with local citizenship defined by the hukou system,
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despite the fact that Chinese local residents lack any practical power to select, remove,
or change state actors. The decentralized political system and localized citizenship in-
stitutions make Chinese local state actors carry the primary responsibility to take care
of local residents’ livelihoods. How local state actors improve local residents’ livelihood
and maintain social stability by satisfying the welfare needs of local residents has be-
come an important factor the central government cares in evaluating local state actors’
performance (Lin and Tussing, 2016; Manion, 2014). This top-down political incentives
make local state actors care about the welfare needs of local political insiders and alter
their welfare inclusion strategies depending on the changing composition of political
insiders in their geopolitical communities.
Labor market insiders indicate those workers with secure employment positions. In
both democracies and autocracies, securing support from has been critical for the sur-
vival of leaders. Even social democratic parties in developed democracies consider labor
market insiders as their core constituencies and pursue policies that selectively bene-
fit insiders, but not outsiders (Rueda, 2006). In many authoritarian regimes, including
China, the creation of labor market insiders and a generous welfare provision to this
privileged worker group have played an important role in legitimizing and stabilizing
the authoritarian ruling.
In many societies, including China before the economic reform, most labor market
insiders were the same population as political insiders. The overlap between labor mar-
ket insiders and political insiders enabled the state to pursue narrowly targeting welfare
inclusion strategies that distribute welfare benefits on the basis of one’s employment
position. The increase of informal employment positions, however, has shattered the
overlap between political insiders and labor market insiders. In societies where political
insiders are no longer equated with labor market insiders, the state develops broadly
targeting welfare inclusion strategies that embrace those political insiders who lost their
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positions as labor market insiders. Figure 1.2 summarizes the main theoretical frame-
work of this dissertation project.
Figure 1.2: Summary of the Main Argument
Political 
insiders
Labor market 
insiders
Political 
insiders
Labor market 
insiders
Residency-based inclusion
Broader, modest welfare provision
Employment-based inclusion
Narrow, generous welfare provision
Applying this in the Chinese context, urban SOE workers have long maintain their
positions as political insiders and labor market insiders in the geopolitical community
they belong. The restricted labor mobility and the urban economy based primarily on
SOEs have further consolidated their positions both as political insiders and labor mar-
ket insiders. The employment-based welfare programs were effective tools to selectively
target these narrowly defined group of political insiders who are also labor market in-
siders.
This long-maintained overlap between political and labor market insiders, however,
has been shattered in some Chinese localities with the growing labor mobility and labor
informalization. With labor informalization, a growing number of urban local workers
lost their positions as labor market insiders. The influx of non-local workers followed
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by growing labor mobility has broken the concept that all workers are local residents
(political insiders).
These two structural changes have re-configured and changed the membership com-
position of political insiders in different localities in China. In localities where a large
number of workers are imported from other localities and informal employment posi-
tions are passed onto these non-local workers, urban local workers are shielded from the
shock of labor informalization and retain their positions as labor market insiders. As
the link between the two insiders remain intact, local state actors maintain the narrow
welfare provision strategies. In these localities, the employment-based pension program
persists despite the high level of labor informalization. In localities with fewer non-local
workers to absorb the shock of labor informalization, many local workers (political in-
siders) lose their positions as labor market insiders and become informal workers (labor
market outsiders). In these localities, local leaders develop the universal pension pro-
gram to provide shallow yet broader welfare benefits to labor market outsiders who still
maintain their positions as political insiders. The inclusiveness of the broader welfare
regime centered on the residency-based welfare regime is, however, bounded by the lo-
cally defined citizenship institutions in China. The residency-based welfare regime, for
example, is inclusive only to political insiders who have legitimate local citizenship and
does not give a permission to political outsiders to enroll in the welfare program.
The similar pattern stands out at the individual-level as well. Individuals who are
labor market outsiders are less likely to enroll in the employment-based pension pro-
gram. Yet, informal workers who are local residents are more likely to enroll in the
residency-based pension program. This will provide them minimal yet important social
protection against market turbulence. Informal workers who are non-local, however,
are less likely to enroll in the residency-based pension program and are more likely to
remain uninsured.
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1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation includes an introduction chapter, a theory chapter, a descriptive
chapter, three empirical chapters, and a concluding chapter. The chapters are organized
as the follows.
Chapter 2 spells out a theory that explains the development of divergent welfare
regimes in authoritarian regimes and its application in the context of sub-national China.
I argue that structural transformation, such as labor informalization and growing labor
mobility, alters authoritarian state actors’ welfare provision strategies by reshuffling the
membership composition of political insiders to whom state leaders are held account-
able. When political insiders are generally the same population as labor market insiders,
state actors choose to narrowly incorporate those who have both political and economic
power in a geopolitical community using the employment-based social insurance pro-
grams. Yet structural changes, such as labor informalization or growing labor mobility,
change labor market status and composition of political insiders. When political insiders
are dispersed across different labor market sectors, state leaders use a welfare inclusion
strategy that broadly encompasses those political insiders who lost their positions as
labor market insiders.
Chapter 3 discusses how the local state actors and the central government have com-
peted and interacted in constructing and implementing the Chinese pension system.
This chapter spells out the two pension programs—the residency-based pension pro-
gram and the employment-based pension program—serve different groups of citizens
and how the funding structures and redistributive implications of the two pension pro-
grams differ. This chapter shows that existing institutions and political legacies—such
as decentralized fiscal relations between the central and local government, local welfare
systems buttressed by the Chinese local citizenship institutions (hukou system), and ca-
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reer evaluation mechanisms emphasizing economic performance—generated different
policy preferences and interests than the central state actors in implementing pension
policies and have empowered local state actors to resist the central government’s attempt
to centralize the pension system.
Chapter 4 examines how different types of “outsiders” are created in different lo-
calities across China. Using the two rounds of individual-level survey conducted in
various localities in China, this chapter examines the size of informal employment and
scale of labor mobility by sub-national level and explores how the two social categories
that construct “outsiders” interact with each other. The main arguments and findings
of this chapter can be summarized as the following: 1) while the division of workers by
their employment position has long persisted since the pre-reform period, marketization
has further fragmented and institutionalized the division between formal and informal
workers and the division within informal workers by creating different types of infor-
mal employment positions; 2) the growing labor mobility and institutional reforms have
increased the saliency of local v.s. non-local division over urban v.s. rural division in
further stratifying the welfare status of Chinese labor market outsiders (informal work-
ers); 3) due to locally divergent patterns of labor mobility, the extent to which non-local
worker overlaps with informal workers or the extent to which local workers are shielded
from labor informalization have varied across localities, contributing to the creation of
different types of welfare outsiders.
Chapter 5 examines how the emergence of different types of ‘outsiders’ discussed in
the previous chapter has induced local states to adopt different pension development
strategies. By examining sub-national variation in pension coverage among China’s 31
provinces during the period of 2005-2015, this chapter provides empirical evidence to
support the hypotheses that the reshuffling of the scope and composition of political in-
siders caused by labor informalization and growing labor mobility explains the diverg-
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ing coverage of the two pension programs across localities. Labor importing localities
that can externalize the shock of labor informality to non-local workers maintain the
welfare regime based primarily on the employment-based pension program. This pen-
sion regime would selectively and exclusively benefit formal workers, most of whom are
local, with generous welfare benefits, Yet a growing number of informal workers who
are mostly coming from other localities would be left outside the welfare system. Labor
exporting localities where the shock of labor informalization is absorbed mostly by lo-
cal workers, on the other hand, develop a welfare regime based on the residency-based
pension program. This pension regime embraces a growing number of labor market
outsiders who still maintain their positions as political insiders by providing shallow yet
broader benefits. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and negative binomial
regression analyses, this chapter shows that the findings stand both at provincial and
prefectural level.
Chapter 6 asks why, despite the expansion of the pension coverage, some workers
remain uncovered by pension system of the country and investigate who these unin-
sured workers are. Analyzing two rounds of individual-level survey data on China la-
bor dynamics, this chapter examines how the impact of labor informality on individual’s
pension participation pattern varies by their local citizenship status.
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of major findings, limitations of the research,
and future directions of the current dissertation project.
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Chapter 2
Theory
2.1 Introduction
This chapter elucidates a theory that explains local variation in the Chinese welfare
regime, ranging from a narrowly targeted, generous, employment-based welfare regime
to a broadly encompassing, modest, residency-based welfare regime. I explain the local
variation by adopting a state-centric view in the context of dynamic structural condi-
tions. Structural dynamics influence state actor’s social policy preferences and welfare
provision strategy by altering the composition and scope of the social groups state actors
are held accountable to.
Even in the absence of electoral systems, Chinese workers with legitimate local cit-
izenship (hukou) have been considered as political insiders who have right to political
representation or participation in a geopolitical community. Structural changes, such as
labor informalization and increasing labor mobility, have shuffled the membership com-
position of political insiders in local communities and thereby induced changes in local
welfare inclusion strategies. Before China experienced the two structural changes, labor
market insiders—formal sector workers—were by and large the same population as po-
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litical insiders—local residents. Chinese local state actors have rewarded those who have
both political and labor market power by developing a welfare system that selectively
benefits local formal workers. The spread of informal employment positions, however,
has shattered the overlap between political insiders and labor market insiders. Increasing
labor mobility has also influenced the extent to which the two groups of insiders overlap
with each other, while giving some local state actors a political option that they have not
had before—ignoring welfare demands from informal workers and even evicting them
from the local jurisdiction if necessary.
In Chinese inland areas where most workers are locally supplied, local governments
develop the residency-based welfare system, characterized by broad coverage and shal-
low benefits, in response to labor informalization. State actors in these localities cannot
simply evict the growing number of informal workers (economic outsiders) from the
welfare regime because they are local residents (political insiders). Chinese coastal areas
that import a large number of non-local workers, on the other hand, have reacted differ-
ently to labor informalization. In these localities, political insiders (local residents) main-
tain their positions as labor market insiders thanks to the growing number of non-local
workers who absorb the shock of labor informalization for local workers. As the overlap
between local workers (political insiders) and labor market insiders remains intact, state
actors in these localities cling to the existing exclusive employment-based welfare system
that mainly benefits labor market insiders who are at the same time political insiders.
Unlike state actors in Chinese inland areas, state actors in labor importing coastal
localities are less interested in embracing labor market outsiders. A large proportion
of labor market outsiders in these areas are non-locals to whom local officials are not
held accountable. State actors in labor importing localities are less averse to ignoring
non-local informal workers and can even evicting them from their jurisdiction when
necessary. The mass eviction of migrant workers in Beijing exemplifies how local au-
23
thorities are not hesitant to and are able to get rid of non-local workers from their ju-
risdictions (Shepherd and Thomas, 2017; Zhuang and Cai, 2017). The growing level of
labor automation also reduces local officials’ incentives to embrace low-skilled workers
without local citizenship as their labor can be easily automated by robots. Instead, these
localities selectively embrace those non-local workers with high skill and talent. The
point-based hukou transfer policies and exclusive social welfare policies help these local
governments attract high-quality human capital and retain them as permanent local resi-
dents (political insiders) of the localities (Friedman, 2017). These fragmented and locally
divergent social insurance provision strategies help local authoritarian states maintain
their political legitimacy, hold their control over social insurance funds, and retain the
type of workforce best needed for their local economy.
In the subsequent sections, I first discuss different approaches taken by the previous
literature to explain different types of welfare regime. Each view emphasizes the role of
structural factors, power dynamics between interest groups, and state actors’ preferences
and interests, respectively. After discussing the limitations of each approach, I elucidate
how authoritarian welfare regimes, in particular, local welfare regimes in China, can be
better understood by bridging the structural view and the state-centric view. To further
discuss authoritarian state actors’ welfare preferences and interests, section 2 discusses
why and under what conditions authoritarian leaders are interested in providing wel-
fare benefits. Section 3 discusses to whom authoritarian leaders provide social benefits
and how the type and configuration of the welfare beneficiaries change. This section
concludes by proposing a theoretical framework to understand why authoritarian states
coopt different types of groups using divergent social policies. In this section, I argue
that structural changes, such as labor informalization and growing labor mobility, alter
the scope and characteristics of social groups authoritarian leaders need to coopt. Sec-
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tion 4 applies the theoretical framework to understand local variation in Chinese welfare
regimes.
2.2 Theories of Social Policies
The question of why governments develop different social policies benefiting differ-
ent groups of population is an important political issue. Previous scholarship has tried
to answer these questions focusing on the impact of structural factors, power dynamics
between interest groups, and political dynamics between state-actors holding divergent
welfare preferences. Yet most of existing theories are predominantly developed in the
context of developed democracies. This chapter examines each approach to discuss what
approaches are most relevant to explain the development of sub-nationally diverging
welfare regimes in an authoritarian developing country—China.
2.2.1 Structural Explanation
The earliest literature on social policy focuses on structural conditions—such as the
size of economy, the level of economic globalization, and labor market structure—to
explain variation in welfare regimes across countries.
Economic development, for example, is expected to develop welfare states by bring-
ing new social needs for quality lives and by raising state capacity to meet these needs
(Huber and Stephens, 2001). This view stems from the modernization theory that eco-
nomic modernization will eventually bring about political and social modernization,
leading to the emergence of democracy and welfare states. However, an explanation
solely based on the level of economic development does not explain why countries with
similar level of economic development have a widely different level of social spending
(Adsera and Boix, 2002; Mares, 2005).
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In recent years, a growing number of studies have shifted their attention to the role
of trade openness as a key to explain the expansion of welfare states. The embedded
liberalism theory, for example, explains that economic openness creates a social pressure
for more social spending and expanded welfare provision from those who are threatened
by economic volatility (Avelino et al., 2005; Rodrik, 1998a; Ruggie, 1982; Quinn, 1997). In
consequence, governments with a high level of trade openness are expected to increase
the size of the government and the amount of welfare spending.
A more recent variant of structural approach updates the link between trade open-
ness and welfare spending by shifting the focus of research from cases of developed
economies to those of developing economies. Instead of merely looking at the level of
trade openness, this new theory examines how the level of trade openness, the size of
domestic market, abundance of labor, and asset inequality jointly determine the develop-
ment strategy of developing countries (Wibbels, 2006; Wibbels and Ahlquist, 2011). So-
cial policies are important components of development strategies that help states shape
and retain a labor force adequate to their particular development projects.
In a large, labor-abundant, and low-inequality developing economy, the state often
prefers an export-oriented development model as a mode of participation to the global
economy. In a concern for increased labor cost, countries pursuing the export-oriented
development strategy repress demands for broad social insurance provision (Wibbels
and Ahlquist, 2011). Hence, contrary to the expectation from the embedded liberalism
theory, trade openness in these countries does not necessarily lead to the expansion of
social provision. On the other hand, countries characterized by large domestic market,
scarce labor, and high inequality pursue import-substitution strategy. Protecting domes-
tic workers from market turbulence and stabilizing domestic consumption are important
parts of this internally-oriented development strategy. As a result, countries with the in-
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ternal orientation tend to increase social spending level and develop inclusive social
insurance programs.
This strand of studies further innovates the literature by examining the impact of
structural conditions and development strategies not only on the level of social spend-
ing but also on the type of social policies developed. While existing studies with the
structural view focus extensively on the level of welfare spending, an attention only
on the aggregate level of welfare spending does not fully capture the role of structural
changes on welfare distribution (Esping-Andersen, 1990). According to the new theory,
developing countries with export-oriented development strategy place more emphasis
on developing social policies that improve human capital, such as education and health
(Rudra, 2005, 2007). These social insurance programs help the state keep labor costs
low while attracting foreign investment by improving the productivity of human capi-
tal. Countries pursuing import-substitution strategy, on the other hand, place a greater
emphasis on developing social insurance programs protecting workers from market fluc-
tuation, such as minimum income guarantee or unemployment insurance (Rudra, 2007).
A more recent variant of the structural view shifts the focus of the literature from
trade openness to domestic industrial structure. Industrial restructuring characterized
by the shrinkage of manufacture and the rise of service jobs has transformed the skill sets
needed in the labor market. The poor transferability of skills across sectors has increased
demands for a higher level of social spending. Governments expand their welfare spend-
ing to accommodate those who lost jobs in the interim of industrial restructuring and
deindustrialization (Iversen and Cusack, 2000).
Variants of studies focusing on structural conditions show how social policies of a
country are influenced by changes in its macro-economic structure. A structural fac-
tor (or even multiple structural factors) alone, however, does not shape or affect gov-
ernment’s decisions on the level and patterns of social spending. Political dynamics
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and interactions affect the way structural factors shape welfare policies. Depending on
political dynamics and political motives political actors have cultivated, governments’
reaction to similar structural conditions may vary widely. In authoritarian states, in
particular, social policies are shaped by political agenda and motives that are not nec-
essarily related with their structural conditions (Mares and Carnes, 2009). Moreover,
studies focusing on structural factors under-explore how the preferences of different po-
litical actors—including state actors, workers at different labor market positions, and
employers—influence the way social policies shape and change.
2.2.2 Social-Pressure Based Explanation: Power Resource Theory &
Cross-Class Coalition Theory
As an attempt to understand the political mechanisms linking structural factors to
social policies, a later version of literature on social policies has started to emphasize
political dynamics between different social actors.
A so-called power resource perspective assumes that demands for welfare expansion
come mainly from workers who want to be compensated and protected from market
turbulences (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983). Employers, on the other hand, are
expected to oppose welfare expansion, because they want to preserve their control over
workers by making workers dependent on the market (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990). In
this regard, the power resource perspective explains the increase in the generosity and
coverage of welfare programs as a consequence of an increased organization capacity
of labor organizations or left-leaning parties (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990; Korpi and
Shalev, 1979). The empowerment of capital or conservative parties, on the other hand,
is expected to shrink welfare spending and welfare coverage. Studies based on Western
European countries have found that labor strength, measured by union density, the share
28
of seats held by left-leaning parties, and a presence of strong social democratic party in
government, has a strong association with the level of welfare distribution of a society
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber and Stephens, 2001).
Yet this perspective is built on a simplistic assumption that workers (and employers)
have a monolithic welfare preference. Not all employers, for example, oppose increase of
welfare spending. In fact, in many parts of the world, including East Asian development
countries, employers have played an important role in establishing welfare states and
supporting the expansion of social policies (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). Employers’
organizations in some European countries have even initiated the introduction of social
insurance and welfare programs in their societies (Soskice and Hall, 2001; Swenson, 2004;
Thelen, 2001).
Based on these observations, a new variant of the social policy theory updates the
literature by correcting the overly simplified assumption of the power-resource theory. It
explores the possibility of a cross-class political coalition between labor and capital. This
cross-class coalition theory finds that employer’s welfare preferences are not necessarily
homogeneously against the introduction or expansion of welfare policies. Expanded
social policies and welfare programs do impose heavier financial burdens on employers.
Yet, for certain types of firms, the benefits come from social policies outweigh the costs
imposed on them. In this case, employers strategically support welfare expansion and
the establishment of welfare states. Whether firms benefit from the expansion of social
policies varies widely depending on the size of firms, skill composition of workforce,
and the relative risk profile of the firms (Mares, 2005). Larger firms are more likely
than smaller firms to benefit from the expansion of social policies. Firms in need of
skilled workers are likely to support the introduction of social policies for workers as
social welfare programs help them retain skilled workers and help workers invest in
improving their skills and qualification. Firms with a higher likelihood of workplace
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accidents have supported the introduction of compulsory work-injury insurances. Social
insurance and welfare policies can sometimes be used as a tool to recruit and attract
workers in a tighter labor market (Rickne, 2013).
Both power resource theory and cross-class coalition theory, however, insufficiently
discuss how welfare preferences of workers or labor organization may vary depending
on the sectors or labor market status of workers. Power-resource theory, in particular,
underestimates the possibility that workers or left parties have diverging welfare prefer-
ences. Workers of all types are assumed to share the same welfare interest as workers
employed in the formal sector, protected by labor unions, and supported by the major
leftist parties (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Rueda, 2006, 2015). In fact, empirical findings
show that workers in the informal sector and with precarious employment positions
have a widely divergent welfare and social insurance preferences from formal workers
(Berens, 2015a; Carnes and Mares, 2013a, 2015). Moreover, social democratic parties in
many European societies have not been univocal in supporting universal provision of
welfare for all worker (Shefter, 1977). After the postwar periods, left parties have used
social policies to selectively reward their core supporters—those who have stable and
secure employment positions (labor market insiders)—at the expense of workers with
unstable and precarious employment positions (labor market outsiders) (Rueda, 2006).
While the cross-coalition theory moves one step further by acknowledging the diver-
gences in employers’ welfare preferences, it still pays an insufficient amount of attention
to diverging welfare preferences of workers or left parties over the patterns of welfare
distribution.
Another related limitation of these theories of social policy is that both are developed
predominantly in democratic contexts. In both theories, workers’ interests are repre-
sented by left parties or labor unions. Worker’s political strength is expected to grow as
social democratic parties or labor unions develop. The cross-class coalition theory also
30
posits a political alliance of employers and workers as a precondition for expansion of
social policies. Workers are also assumed to have organizational capacity and autonomy
to form a political coalition. A study of social insurance systems in Latin America, for
example, finds that the coalitional realignment of workers of differential labor market
status is the main driver behind the development of non-contributory social insurance
programs in this region (Carnes and Mares, 2013b). These explanations have a limited
applicability in countries where workers have limited political power and representation
mechanisms and where party systems are ill-developed to stand for different interest
groups (both employer and employees). In many autocracies and emerging democ-
racies, institutional mechanisms to empower workers as political actors are still only
weakly developed, if not suppressed. Explanations based on bargaining between em-
ployers and employees represented by party systems cannot adequately explain political
dynamics that enabled the expansion and development of social policies in countries
with repressive political systems and limited representation mechanisms.
2.2.3 State-Centric Explanation
Most theories mentioned above assume that policymakers would design social poli-
cies based either on structural conditions or on the class-struggles (or coalitions) oc-
curring in their societies. In other words, policymakers are viewed as impartial agents
who hold indifferent and unified views on social policies. Policymakers are expected to
design and implement policies based on external conditions. In reality, however, policy-
makers and state actors may have diverging ideas and preferences over social policies,
formed independently from external social pressure. While structural conditions and so-
cietal pressures create a list of policy options, it is ultimately the policymakers that play
a pivotal role in selecting specific sets of policies and deciding the patterns of redistri-
bution. In this regard, the state-centric approach emphasizes varying policy preferences
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of individual bureaucrats (Skocpol et al., 1985) or politics between these policymakers
(Heclo, 1974) as main factors explaining variation in social policies.
This approach emphasizes that individual bureaucrats’ policy preferences or policy-
making processes are not mere reflection of social economic conditions or external social
pressures. Rather, individual bureaucrats’ policy preferences and their policy making
processes are bounded and shaped by their experience with existing policies and insti-
tutional legacies (Pierson, 1995; Skocpol et al., 1985; Weir and Skocpol, 1985). A compar-
ative study of policy response of three countries to the Great Depression shows how past
policy experience shapes individual bureaucrats’ policy preferences and how diverging
policy preferences of state actors bring about widely diverging policy outcomes. During
the Great Depression, Britain did not adopt Keynesian Macroeconomic policies whereas
Sweden and the United States experimented with Keynesian policies. Britain’s diverg-
ing policy response to the same structural change (Great Depression) is attributable to
British policymakers’ diverging experience with past policies (Weir and Skocpol, 1985).
Their prior experience with a limited unemployment insurance made British policymak-
ers reluctant to introduce large scale programs that Kaynesian Macroeconomic policies
pursue. In the absence of similar historical legacy or institutional experience, Swedish
and US policymakers were open to experiment with Kaynesian Macroeconomic policies
and to embrace the changes these policies bring about.
The state-centric view also emphasizes how political dynamics and competition be-
tween bureaucrats shape social policies (Heclo, 1974). A study of Chinese urban basic
health insurance programs analyzes how political competition between different bureaus
and conflicts between central and local bureaucrats have shaped the health insurance
system of the country (Duckett, 2003, 2004). Another study of Chinese pension system
examines how the policy preferences of the central reformers and local officials have
diverged over the unification of the Chinese pension system. It further shows how the
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bureaucratic conflict between the central reformers and local officials in collusion with
local economic elites resulted in the fragmentation of the Chinese pension programs
(Frazier, 2010).
The state-centric view also shows how diverging welfare preferences and interests of
state actors often result in different patterns of policy implementation and uneven level
of enforcement of social policies. A study of the Argentinian national food program
shows how local politicians implemented the program differently depending on their re-
liance on support from the poor constituents, the main beneficiaries of the food program
(Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). In South American countries, local politicians have strategically
varied the enforcement level of the regulation on street vendors depending on the extent
to which they need support from those who benefit from the lax enforcement of the
regulation (Holland, 2015). In doing so, it improves our understanding of cross-regional
variation in the development of social policies and the variation across social policy areas
(Mares and Carnes, 2009).
The role of state bureaucrats as agenda setters and stakeholders may loom even larger
in developing nondemocracies where institutional mechanisms to represent individuals’
interests are less developed. Despite the relevance of the state-centric view in updating
our understanding of social policies in authoritarian regimes, a vast majority of the stud-
ies with the state-centric view is still by and large developed in context of (emerging)
democracies. To better understand the under-explored dynamics behind sub-national
variation in the development of welfare policies and the variation across social policy ar-
eas in developing non-democracies, a closer look at the changing bureaucratic incentives
is further required.
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2.2.4 Summary
This section reviews how previous literature explains development of different social
policies and discusses what approach(es) can provide the most adequate explanation for
sub-national variation in welfare regimes and social insurance development in China.
Like in many other societies, structural changes generate a demand for new types of
social policies and reshape welfare preferences of different political actors—such as Chi-
nese workers of different labor market positions, Chinese employers in different indus-
trial sector, and state actors of different bureaucratic levels. The changing power dy-
namics between the state, business, and workers may also explain increasing demands
for social security and the increased role of the central government in welfare provision.
Yet, China is an authoritarian country where institutional representation mechanisms
are weakly developed, if not are suppressed. Coalitions among workers (or employers)
of similar welfare preferences or cross-class coalitions may not have an explicit or clear
impact on social policy development in China.
In the Chinese context, the political and incentives of state-actors, namely the bu-
reaucratic incentives of central and local policymakers, play an even more decisive role
in explaining the divergent patterns of development of a social insurance program. A
fragmented bureaucratic structure, decentralized fiscal system, and the historical insti-
tutional legacies have further fragmented Chinese local policymakers’ welfare interests
and preferences.
Yet Chinese local political actors’ welfare interests and preferences are not static.
Rather, their preferences and interests change and reshape as they experience major
structural changes in their economy. In this regard, I adopt the state-centric approach
combined with structural view as the most appropriate theoretical framework to under-
stand sub-national variation in Chinese localities.
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Before discussing how structural changes have reshaped the welfare preferences of
Chinese local states, it is necessary to explore what bureaucratic incentives authoritarian
leaders have in providing welfare benefits to workers in the first place. The section
below discusses why and under what condition authoritarian leaders are incentivized to
protect workers despite the fact that workers under authoritarian regimes lack suffrage
to select or remove authoritarian leaders from their offices.
2.3 Authoritarian Welfare Provision: Who Distributes Wel-
fare Benefits and Why?
2.3.1 Authoritarian Incentives for Welfare Provision
To understand welfare interests and preferences of authoritarian state leaders, it is
necessary to understand why and under what conditions authoritarian leaders provide
welfare benefits to citizens in the first place. Unlike political leaders in democracies, au-
thoritarian leaders are known to be constrained less by public demands or electoral com-
petition. Insulated from the median citizens, leaders in non-democracies are believed to
be able to ignore demand for more social spending and to spend less on social spending
(Nooruddin and Simmons, 2009). For this reason, many argue that non-democracies will
have less extensive and generous social policies than democracies. Indeed, empirical evi-
dence suggests that democracies are better than non-democracies in providing particular
social insurance programs and welfare benefits (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Ansell,
2010; Boix, 2003; Lake and Baum, 2001; Przeworski et al., 2000).
A new variation of the literature, a so-called selectorate model, further theorizes the
reason why authoritarian states are less likely to provide public welfare than democratic
states (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). According to the theory, a society is composed of
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three groups—the winning coalition, selectorate, and the rest. The winning coalition is a
group of individuals whose support is necessary for a ruler to attain power. The winning
coalition is a subset of the selectorate—a subset of population with a power to select and
remove political leaders of a society. Those who do not belong to the selectorate group
(and the winning coalition) are assumed to be largely irrelevant for the political fates
of leaders. Leaders of any regime types, both democracy and autocracy, are indistin-
guishable in that they pursue the same goal—to maintain their power in office—and in
that they can achieve this goal by ensuring loyalty of a subset of population—the win-
ning coalition. The only factor that separates democracy from non-democracy is the size
of winning coalition and selectorate. Due to the large size of the winning coalition, it
is cost-efficient for democratic leaders to use public goods to buy support from their
winning coalition. Autocracies, on the other hand, have a smaller winning coalition. Au-
tocrats find it more efficient to reward the small winning coalition members selectively
by using private goods than to provide them with public goods. In other words, the
institutional framework in autocracies disincentivizes authoritarian leaders to provide
public goods to a broader segment of society.
Against the common expectation, however, empirical evidence shows that some au-
thoritarian states strive to provide public welfare and expand social coverage. Empirical
evidence finds that non-democracies are no worse than democracies in providing cer-
tain type of social insurance benefits, such as pensions (Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017).
History also attests that the first major welfare state emerged in non-democracies, prior
to the wave of democratization (Esping-Andersen, 1990). These studies show that the
threat against authoritarian regimes comes not only from elites (winning coalition) but
also from the below through social unrests and mass mobilization. Authoritarian leaders
concerned about regime stability and the potential of mass upheaval are incentivized to
provide public welfare to a broader segment of society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006;
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Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Svolik, 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Kim and
Gandhi, 2010; Wintrobe, 2000).
While the literature remains inconclusive about whether the threat against the regime
comes mainly from the winning coalition or from the below, most of studies of author-
itarian welfare provision agree that autocrats’ concern for regime survival and their
incentives to remain in power is the main motive behind autocrats’ provision of public
welfare. The underlying assumption is that authoritarian state actors are unitary in a
sense that they have identical and homogeneous preferences in regard to different social
policies.
Yet the authoritarian state is made up of different actors with different policy goals
and incentives, just like democracies are. While regime stability and political survival
are the shared goal pursued commonly by state actors at every level and position, this
is not the sole factor that shapes authoritarian state actors’ policy preferences and in-
terests. Their policy preferences and interests differ widely depending on the political
institutions, historical legacies, and local contexts they are embedded in. In Russia, for
example, some local governors tolerated or even mobilized labor protests as a way to
attract an attention from the central governments so that they could secure more fiscal
transfer (Robertson, 2007). This shows that local state actors in non-democracies do ac-
tually have their own interests and preferences, which at times may challenge regime
stability. In political settings where fiscal and political structures are decentralized, the
political influence of local actors can loom even larger. In Venezuela, for example, local
governors have played a decisive role in distributing land and implementing the land
distribution policies. The extent to which the center’s policies are accomplished has var-
ied widely depending on how local governors enacted the policies (Albertus, 2015a,b).
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2.3.2 The Chinese State: Fragmented Political Structure and Diverging
Welfare Preferences
China provides another example of state actors having heterogeneous views and
preferences on welfare systems and social policies. The Chinese bureaucratic structure
is fragmented between the center and local levels. While the central government decides
the general direction of policies and regulations, it is the local state actors that tailor the
central directions according to local conditions and implement the policies in practice
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1990). In this process, Chinese local states breed their own
policy preferences, which at time are against those of the central government.
In designing and implementing social policies, preserving regime stability is undeni-
ably an important shared goal between Chinese central and local state actors. Yet, unlike
the simplified prediction of the previous literature, Chinese local policymakers are not
solely motivated by the goal of preserving regime stability. As much as it is an impor-
tant goal for them to preserve regime stability, local state actors are also motivated to
maximize local interests at the expense of the others. This self-interested development
strategy of local governments often comes into conflicts with the central government’s
policies that pursue common interests of the Chinese society as a whole.
The long-delayed establishment of unified social insurance system epitomizes how
policy preferences between the central government and local state actors diverge. As
the society is aging rapidly and social instability coming from incomplete social safety
net looms larger, the establishment of unified social insurance system has become an
important political task for the Chinese central policymakers to preserve their power
and regime stability. Yet, the Chinese local governments have vehemently resisted the
central government’s attempt to integrate the social insurance system. The decentralized
fiscal system started since 1994, localized citizenship institutions (hukou) in China, and
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the recent reform of the hukou system have all incentivized local state actors to delay
the unification of the social insurance system.
The decentralized fiscal system had each sub-national government collect and man-
age tax revenues independent from the intervention of upper-level governments. Social
insurance funds sent to the local social pooling system has been one of the most im-
portance sources of local extra-budgetary revenue. Local state actors’ reluctance to lose
their grip on social insurance funds has incentivized them to resist the central govern-
ment’s attempt to centralize the pension fund management. Localities with sound fiscal
structures have resisted the centralization of the pension fund even more vehemently as
it implies that they have to share the social burden of poorer and underdeveloped locali-
ties with less sound fiscal structure and that they would pay out social insurance balance
for the poorer localities (Frazier, 2010; Lin, 2015). Despite the benefits that the integra-
tive social insurance funding management system would bring for the regime stability,
self-interested local state actors in developed areas have little incentive to cooperate with
the central government to build an integrative social insurance funding system.
The competition between different subnational units has also complicated the uni-
fication of the Chinese social insurance system. A high level of regional inequality in
China incentivized Chinese local officials to cultivate local protectionism and favoritism
in enacting social policies. The localized citizenship institutions, defined by the hukou
system, have made Chinese local officials prioritize locals over non-locals in providing
welfare benefits (Wang, 2005; Wang et al., 2015). The local welfare protectionism and
chauvinism have been intensified with the recent reform of the hukou policy that made
the possession of local resident status a pivotal criterion for welfare entitlement (Shi,
2012). Worrying that the return of non-local workers to their hometown would result
in their loss of social insurance funds, localities relying heavily on non-local workforces
have become the main opponents of the regional integration of the social insurance funds
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(Lin, 2015; Lin and Tussing, 2016). A detailed discussion on how the central-local rela-
tions, decentralized fiscal system, and political legacies have shaped local politicians’
welfare preferences and consolidated the current fragmented pension system will follow
in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
2.3.3 Summary
The literature on authoritarian welfare provision provides an important insight re-
garding why authoritarian leaders are motivated to provide welfare benefits to those
who have no power to affect their political fates. Preserving regime stability and pre-
empting social unrest are the most important motivation behind the authoritarian pro-
vision of welfare benefits to those who do not have political power. However, authori-
tarian leaders are far from unitary actors. Authoritarian state actors of differential po-
sitions and administrative levels have heterogeneous policy preferences. Their policy
preferences and interests vary widely depending on their positions and institutional
constraints they are embedded in. While preserving regime stability through welfare
policies is the shared goal of most authoritarian leaders, it is not the sole driver behind
authoritarian welfare politics. Different state actors may have different ideas and pref-
erences regarding whom to coopt, what benefits to provide, and how to distribute the
benefits to better achieve the shared goal.
In China, for example, preserving regime stability is the utmost political goal for
both central and local leaders. Yet, due to the fragmented political structure and politi-
cal legacies that define their interests, such as the hukou system and decentralized fiscal
system, local leaders have different political goals and preferences than central leaders in
designing welfare programs and implementing them. The varying welfare preferences
and diverging local conditions have also complicated the coordination across different
local actors, delaying the unification of social insurance systems of the country. The
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goals and preferences of local state actors are not necessarily against their shared goals
of preserving regime stability. Yet local leaders’ failure to coordinate with other local-
ities or their incomplete compliance with the central regulation may also result in the
destabilization of the regime.
2.4 Whom to Benefit?
In general, authoritarian states are less universal in welfare coverage than democra-
cies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017). Many authoritarian
states coopt a smaller portion of population through exclusive yet generous benefits. Yet
other authoritarian states incorporate a broader segment of society by providing shallow
benefits widely. How do authoritarian regimes decide whom to coopt through social
provision and whom to exclude? What explain the changing scope and configuration of
welfare beneficiaries under authoritarian regimes?
A variant of the selectorate theory proposes a way to understand why some author-
itarian leaders extend the scope of welfare provision to a broader segment of society
while others maintain narrow and exclusive welfare regime. The key to distinguish the
two types of autocrats lies in the relative size of winning coalition to the size of selec-
torate. The theory posits that members of winning coalition are replaceable with any
members from the pool of selectorate. Replacing winning coalition members becomes
harder as the size of winning coalition relative to the size of selectorate increases. Lead-
ers with a smaller size of selectorate find it harder to replace winning coalition members
than autocratic leaders with large selectorate. Knowing it is hard to buy support from
their winning coalition members, autocrats with smaller selectorate will need more re-
sources to be used to reward their winning coalition members. Autocrats in need of more
resources, then, expand social services and the scope of social provision to a broader seg-
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ment of society in order to increase the general social productivity. The increased social
productivity achieved through a broader provision of social welfare helps autocrats hold
their grip on power by buying support from their winning coalition members (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003).
As succinct as the theory seems, this theory has limitation in explaining the changing
configuration of welfare beneficiaries in authoritarian regimes. First, it is hard to de-
fine who constitutes the winning coalition, selectorate, or the rest (non-enfranchised) in
authoritarian regimes. In democracies where universal suffrage and electoral rules have
long been institutionalized, the concept of winning coalition or selectorate can be defined
in a relatively straightforward way. In authoritarian contexts, however, election is not the
only path through which leaders are removed and retain the power. Many authoritarian
leaders around the world have been removed by various non-institutional mechanisms,
such as mass uprising or assassination. This unexpectedness and vicissitudes of leader
selection (removal processes) make the distinction between selectorate, winning coali-
tion, and the non-franchised blurry (Gallagher and Hanson, 2015). The murkiness of
leader selection and removal processes in authoritarian regimes renders the selectorate
theory less applicable in explaining who authoritarian leaders try to coopt using social
policies and when they extend the scope of welfare beneficiaries.
Relatedly, the actual beneficiaries of authoritarian welfare programs do not often
align with the concept of selectorate or winning coalition. The welfare beneficiaries
defined in the literature of authoritarian welfare states, which at times are labeled as
critical supporters (Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017) or pivotal supporters (Mares and
Carnes, 2009), roughly approximate the concept of winning coalition in the selectorate
theory in that they are the group of individuals whose support is critical for the regime
and leaders’ political fates. Yet not only are these welfare beneficiaries conceptually
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different from either winning coalition or selectorate, the configuration of authoritarian
welfare beneficiaries varies widely across different authoritarian welfare regime.
These welfare beneficiaries consist of heterogeneous groups of individuals, ranging
from land owners, civil servants, former army veterans, waged workers, business own-
ers, and industrial workers (Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017; Mares and Carnes, 2009).
The Chinese welfare regime has provided exclusive and selective welfare benefits to ur-
ban (state-sector) workers at the expense of rural workers. Namely, the selectorate theory
does not sufficiently explain which subgroups of authoritarian society are blessed with
welfare provision and why they have become the target of authoritarian welfare coopta-
tion.
I provide an alternative theoretical framework to understand why and under what
condition authoritarian states coopt different types and scopes of subgroups as welfare
beneficiaries. Before providing the theoretical framework, the subsection below reviews
how the configuration and scope of welfare beneficiaries differ across two distinctive au-
thoritarian welfare regimes—the narrow and collusive welfare regime versus the broad
and fragmented welfare regime.
2.4.1 Coopting the Privileged: Collusive Welfare Provision Strategy
Many authoritarian leaders use restrictive welfare cooptation strategies that funnel re-
sources to a small number of privileged groups of society, while preventing the resources
from being wasted to the irrelevant groups (Knutsen and Rasmussen, 2017; Mares and
Carnes, 2009). This narrow, selective, and exclusive provision of rents in a form of
welfare benefit ensures these privileged groups’ loyalty to their leaders. This narrow
welfare regime targets groups possessing economic power and resources and establishes
a collusive relationship between the regime and the welfare beneficiaries. While each au-
thoritarian regime may have different economic ‘insiders’ depending on their economic
43
structures, wage earners in formal sector, also known as labor market insiders, have
been one of the core groups commonly targeted by many authoritarian leaders. In Latin
America, wage earners in the formal sector have been provided generous welfare ben-
efits including pension, health benefits, and employment insurance (Mares and Carnes,
2009). While the autocrats in this region were not hesitant to reduce their spending on
welfare programs that mainly affect the lower-income class and precarious workers, they
were more cautious about cutting their spending on social security and welfare spend-
ing designed for these labor market insiders (Huber et al., 2008). The government of
Taiwan in the 1950s instituted a system that selectively and exclusively benefited work-
ers coming from mainland China, at the expense of Taiwan-native workers (Mares and
Carnes, 2009). In Brazil and China, as well, formal sector workers have been the key
beneficiaries of the generous welfare programs (Dillon, 2015). Various social institutions
and laws developed in these societies have also consolidated the narrow inclusivity of
the welfare system. The Chinese Labor Contract Law (LCL), for example, ensures one of
the highest level of protection for workers and high legal standards, but this high level
of protection is available only to those who have signed labor contracts—formal workers
(Gallagher, 2017).
These privileged welfare beneficiaries under the narrow collusive authoritarian wel-
fare regime are conceptually far from the selectorate in democracies in a sense that they
do not necessarily possess institutional power to choose or remove leaders. Neverthe-
less, authoritarian leaders still have incentives to reward this group of population with
generous welfare benefits. Although these individuals lack electoral power to remove
or choose leaders of a society, they are political insiders with a legitimate membership
in a geographically delineated political community. It is hard for authoritarian leaders
to achieve their political or economic goals without earning implicit or explicit support
from these individuals. The Peruvian government, for example, has coopted middle-
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class rural laborers with land redistribution, not because they have electoral power to
remove the leaders from office but more because these groups had the greatest capacity
to organize anti-regime resistance (Albertus, 2015a). Their economic power, strength-
ened by the state’s exclusive provision of rents and welfare benefits, further corroborates
their position as political insiders.
The collusive relationship formed between the state and welfare beneficiaries helps
authoritarian leaders ensure regime stability most efficiently by inducing welfare benefi-
ciaries to moderate their demand for better working conditions, higher wages, collective
power of labor. In Brazil and China, for example, the privileged workers blessed with the
generous welfare programs have turned into the main opponent of welfare expansion
for labor market outsiders rather than become leaders of a labor coalition for further
redistribution and labor collective rights (Dillon, 2015). Coopting these workers with
generous welfare benefits and making them as privileged insiders have been efficient
and beneficial for many authoritarian leaders.
2.4.2 Embracing the Underprivileged: Broader yet Modest Welfare Pro-
vision
While the narrow and targeted welfare provision strategy is commonly observed in
many authoritarian regime, some authoritarian regimes embrace a broader segment of
society rather than narrowing down the beneficiaries of welfare programs to those who
have power in labor market. A growing number of authoritarian states has started to
design welfare programs that can encompass to a broader segment of society that in-
cludes the poor, (rural) precarious workers, low-income families, and various forms of
labor market outsiders. The Chinese central government, for example, has recently in-
troduced redistributive programs and social protection measures for the urban poor,
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who have been widely excluded from the existing welfare system (Hurst, 2011). Chinese
local governments in underdeveloped regions have particularly striven to develop so-
cial insurance programs for lower-income families and those with unstable employment
position (Ratigan, 2017).
In contrast to the narrow and collusive welfare regime that ensures the exclusive
seizure of welfare benefits by the privileged group, the broader yet modest welfare
regime allows proliferation of different organizations and subgroups distributed across
various economic, political sectors. Due to the heterogeneity of these groups, states are
required to accommodate widely different welfare needs. Accordingly, social policies in
this broader yet modest welfare regime are less coordinated and more fragmented than
those in the narrow collusive welfare regime (Mares and Carnes, 2009). In China, the
introduction of the residency-based social insurance program has added a new layer to
the existing welfare system predominantly built on the employment-based social insur-
ance programs. This has led to the dualization of the Chinese social insurance (pension)
system, although the extent to which the new layer of social insurance system replaces
the existing employment-based social insurance system varies across localities.
The use of this broader and fragmented welfare provision strategy does not, how-
ever, mean that the privileged welfare beneficiaries under the existing narrow collusive
welfare regime are excluded from the welfare system. The welfare proliferation model
continues to coopt the existing privileged beneficiaries, while it introduces a new layer
of program that embraces and benefits those who have been excluded from the exist-
ing narrow collusive welfare model. In China, for example, formal sector workers are
still enjoying their privileged position, although the type and contents of welfare ben-
efits have changed a lot. While Brazil in the early 1970s has extended social security
entitlements to rural workers and informal workers, these new beneficiaries of welfare
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programs are provided with shallower welfare benefits than the welfare beneficiaries
under the existing narrow welfare regime (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008).
2.4.3 Theoretical Framework: Politics of Welfare Inclusion and Exclu-
sion
As discussed, authoritarian leaders use divergent welfare provision strategies and
benefit different groups of population using their social policies. Yet the question of
why some authoritarian governments choose welfare provision strategy based on narrow
and collusive cooptation while others adopt broader, fragmented, yet shallow welfare
provision strategy has not yet been sufficiently addressed (Mares and Carnes, 2009).
Mares and Carnes (2009) suggest that the membership of the pivotal supporters,
which approximates the concept of winning coalition in the selectorate theory, can ex-
plain variation in authoritarian welfare provision strategies. They contend that narrow
and collusive welfare provision is likely when political leaders are brought to power by
a narrow coalition of interests whereas leaders brought to power by a broad coalition
of interests are likely to pursue broad and fragmented welfare provision strategy. Yet
this explanation does not account for changes in welfare provision strategies in author-
itarian regimes in which institutions for bottom-up coalition formation are only weakly
developed.
I further develop a theory of authoritarian welfare inclusion and exclusion by arguing
that it is the changes in the membership composition, rather than the changes in size, of
political insiders that explain the variation in authoritarian welfare provision strategies.
Political insiders indicate those who have right to political representation or participation
in a geopolitical community. It is important for state actors to earn the explicit or implicit
support from political insiders and contain grievances from them by rewarding them
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with various welfare benefits. In this regard, the concept of political insiders remotely
approximates the concepts of winning coalition or pivotal supporters. Yet contrary to
the two other concepts, political insiders do not necessarily have direct power to select
or change the leaders. State actors can be held accountable to political insiders even in
the absence of electoral mechanisms if they can govern more stably and improve their
career trajectories by holding accountability to political insiders.
Each political insider may have varying policy preference and interest depending
on their socioeconomic status. Hence, changes in the composition of political insiders
have a direct impact on welfare preferences of the political insiders. The importance
of membership composition of insiders has also been suggested by earlier studies built
on the selectorate theory. Milner and Kubota (2005), for example, suggest a possibility
that the enlargement of the selectorate influences welfare provision strategies not just
because it changes the relative size of winning coalition to the selectorate but because
it allows representation of more diverse interests and thereby expands policy options
for leaders. Steinberg and Shih (2012) contends that varying interests, not the size or
proportion, of the local selectorates (or constituents) explains different levels of political
support for the undervalued exchange rates.
Structural changes, such as labor informalization and labor migration, play a sig-
nificant role in shuffling the membership composition of political insiders by altering
the labor market status of political insiders. Depending on the extent to which politi-
cal insiders overlap with labor market insiders—those workers with secure employment
positions (Rueda, 2006), authoritarian state actors are incentivized to take different ap-
proaches in embracing political insiders. When political insiders largely overlap with
labor market insiders, authoritarian leaders use the exclusive yet generous welfare inclu-
sion strategy to embrace political insiders who also have labor market competitiveness.
When political insiders overlap less with labor market insiders, authoritarian leaders
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use a broad, diversified, and fragmented welfare inclusion strategy to embrace political
insiders who lost their positions as labor market insiders.
As discussed, one of the main welfare beneficiaries under many narrow and collusive
authoritarian regimes has been the group of wage workers in the formal sector. In many
of these welfare regimes, the concept of labor market insider has been inseparable from
the concept of political insider. The high level of overlap between individuals with
political power and individuals with labor market power has incentivized state leaders
to concentrate the generous welfare benefits to this small number of insiders equipped
both with political and economic resources.
The spread of informal and precarious employment position, however, has shattered
the overlap between labor market insiders and political insiders. Political insiders could
no longer be equated with labor market insiders. The dismantling of the overlap between
political and labor market insiders has pressured state actors to develop a new welfare
provision strategy. To embrace political insiders but who lost their positions as labor
market insiders, many states have developed more encompassing welfare programs. A
large number of Latin American states, for example, have either developed universal
social insurance programs or even shifted the narrowly targeting employment-based
social insurance program to universal social insurance program as they experience labor
informalization (Carnes and Mares, 2013a, 2015).
The increasing labor mobility has also smashed the long-maintained overlap between
economic and political insiders. Some scholars have predicted national welfare states to
be incompatible with the free movement of labor (Freeman, 1986). The free movement
of labor across borders and growing labor immigration have challenged the concept of
closed welfare states based on national citizenship (Bommes and Geddes, 2003; Matten
and Crane, 2005; Rose, 1996). With the influx of immigrant workers in the labor market,
labor market insiders could no longer be equated with political insiders. Whether to
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grant an equal access to welfare programs to non-citizen workers has become a critical
political issue in many parts of world including Europe and the United States.
Labor mobility has also influenced how a state experiences and responds to labor
informalization. With the growing level of labor mobility across borders and influx of
immigrant workers, some states could externalize the shock of labor informalization to
(im)migrant workers—political outsiders. As informal jobs are passed on to non-citizens,
most political insiders in these societies could maintain their positions as labor market
insiders. As the overlap between political insiders and labor market insiders remains
intact, state actors have found little incentive to broaden their welfare coverage to em-
brace labor market outsiders who are not political insiders. Instead, these societies have
consolidated the narrow and exclusive welfare provision strategy, further demarcating
the distinction between (political and labor market) insiders and outsiders.
In other words, structural changes can alter welfare inclusion and exclusion strategy
by transforming the membership composition of political insiders. In society where
political insiders are hit by labor informalization and fail to maintain their positions as
labor market insiders, the narrow collusive welfare provision strategy cannot persist. In
this case, state actors incorporate a broader segment of society in to the welfare system
by introducing new social policies that embrace labor market outsiders. In societies
where the shock of labor informalization is externalized to those who have no political
membership in the community—political outsiders, state actors have little incentive to
broaden the coverage of welfare programs.
2.5 Understanding Chinese Local Welfare States
I argue that Chinese local governments develop different pension expansion strate-
gies depending on the membership composition of political insiders. Localities in which
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political insiders maintain their positions as labor market insiders and a large number
of labor market outsiders can be expelled at the local state’s will, a narrow yet generous
pension regime centered on the employment-based pension program develop. Con-
versely, localities in which political insiders are dispersed across different labor market
sectors develop a broader yet modest pension regime centered on the residency-based
pension program in order to embrace labor market outsiders who are still political in-
siders.
Chinese locally delineated citizenship institution, defined by hukou system, is the
key to understanding why localities develop different welfare inclusion strategies and
who constitutes political insiders and outsiders in Chinese local contexts. In the Chinese
context, “local” residents are political insiders of a geopolitical community who have im-
plicit yet important political influence on local governance. Not all individuals residing
in a locality are called as “local” residents. In order to be recognized by local authori-
ties as “local” residents, one should possess local household registration (hukou). Local
residents in China are, obviously, different from democratic constituents in that they do
not have electoral power to change or select the leaders. Nevertheless, the top-down
political incentives have made Chinese local state actors held accountable to local res-
idents. Local authorities and bureaucrats bear the primary responsibility to minimize
the social turbulence coming from local residents and to take care of the residents in
their jurisdictions. How local state actors improve local residents’ livelihood has become
an important factor the central government cares in evaluating local state actors’ perfor-
mance (Lin and Tussing, 2016; Manion, 2014). It has also affected the political legitimacy
and trusts in the local state institution (Dickson et al., 2016; Woodman, 2016).
The locally delineated citizenship institutions, however, have exempted local state ac-
tors from paying social costs for the livelihood of non-local workers—workers employed
in their jurisdictions but without having local hukou. Non-local workers are political
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outsiders in that they have been denied any implicit or explicit right to political repre-
sentation or participation in their hosting localities (Friedman, 2017). In order to defend
their rights and pursue interests, an increasingly large number of non-local workers have
initiated collective actions or protests. Yet local authorities have not been proactive in
resolving non-local workers’ grievances because they could easily expel non-locals their
jurisdictions when non-locals cause trouble. Non-local workers cannot be easily accepted
as local citizens (or political insiders) even when they have resided and worked in a lo-
cality for many years. Even the most inclusive cities have allowed only a small number
of elite non-local workers with higher income, stable employment positions, and higher
education level to apply for local citizenship (Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Zhang, 2012).
While local state actors are incentivized to respond to welfare needs of political insid-
ers, the composition of political insiders and their welfare needs are subject to change.
In China, labor informalization and growing labor mobility have been the two most im-
portant structural factors that changed the composition of political insiders and thereby
induced the changes in welfare provision strategies.
From the socialist era, China has long maintained narrow welfare states that selec-
tively reward urban SOE workers. Until the economic openness, labor mobility across
different locality was strictly constrained in China. Most workers in urban area were em-
ployed in state-owned sectors. In this regard, most Chinese workers were labor market
insiders and political insiders at the same time. The narrow welfare provision strategy
ensuring support from the privileged worker group has helped Chinese (local) state ac-
tors maintain their political legitimacy for a long period of time (Dillon, 2015). While
non-local migrant workers or workers employed in informal sector were largely excluded
from the social welfare system, their exclusion did not actually threaten local social sta-
bility. There was little pressure for inclusion or expansion of welfare coverage as these
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outsiders had yet not gained the sense of what and if they were excluded from (Dillon,
2015).
Labor informalization and growing labor mobility have shattered the long-maintained
overlap between political and labor market insiders. The rise of the private and infor-
mal economy has dislodged the concept that all local residents (political insiders) are
labor market insiders. Labor informalization has made local state actors decide whether
to develop a new social welfare system that embraces labor market outsiders (informal
workers) or to stick with the existing exclusive welfare system for labor market insid-
ers (formal workers). Local state actors in Chinese inland provinces, for example, have
chosen to develop social insurance programs that cover the growing number of labor
market outsiders and provide welfare benefits that protect them from the worst poverty.
Many political insiders (local workers) in these regions lost their positions as labor mar-
ket insiders. For state actors in these localities, abandoning or expelling the growing
number of labor market outsiders from the local welfare regime has not been an option
to consider.
The increasing labor mobility across localities has also affected local state actor’s
welfare provision strategy in two important ways. First, labor mobility has alleviated so-
cial burdens associated with labor informalization for labor importing localities located
mostly in Chinese coastal area. Thanks to the large influx of non-local migrant work-
ers, localities in Chinese coastal area could protect their local workers (political insiders)
from the shock of labor informalization. A large portion of informal jobs are passed
onto non-local workers who are willing to accept the precarious employment position
with worse labor conditions and few employment-related benefits. As local residents
(political insiders) maintain their positions as labor market insiders, the existing wel-
fare regime that narrowly targets urban formal workers remains untouched. Moreover,
While China has realized freedom of movement for labor power, it has not yet realized
53
freedom of movement of people as social beings (Friedman, 2017, 17). The localized
citizenship institution and exclusive welfare provision strategies allow labor importing
provinces deploy non-local workers’ labor power for growing informal employment po-
sitions but without paying the costs associated with accepting these workers as a social
being (Friedman, 2017).
Second, the mobility of workers in coastal cities has given state actors in labor im-
porting localities a political option that they have not had before and their inland coun-
terparts cannot utilize in the near future —to expel labor market outsiders from the local
welfare regime. Labor mobility empowers non-local informal workers to threaten the
economic stability of the labor importing localities by voting with their feet. Yet labor
mobility is a double-edged sword. It also enables local governments to expel non-local
informal workers without worrying too much about social ramification or regime stabil-
ity. The mass eviction of migrant workers in Beijing exemplifies how local authorities
can take advantage of the mobility of non-local workers (Shepherd and Thomas, 2017;
Zhuang and Cai, 2017). The fact that informal workers are relatively easily replaceable
and trained at lower costs also made local state actors less averse to using the option of
evicting non-local informal workers. Expelling labor market outsiders is not an option
available for state actors in inland provinces where many of these informal workers are
still political insiders. Figure 2.1 summarizes how the theoretical framework developed
in this dissertation project applies to China case.
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Figure 2.1: Development of Two Divergent Welfare Regimes in China
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The use of divergent welfare provision strategies helps local governments maintain
regime stability by accommodating the need of their local residents (political insiders) in
response to changing labor market status. Moreover, the selective and exclusive welfare
provision strategy adopted by labor importing localities has also helped local govern-
ments selectively attract and retain the type of non-local workers to whom local govern-
ments are willing to grant a permission to be political insiders in the long run. It is not
a coincidence that those places with the most generous welfare provision are also the
places with the highest bar of entry (Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Friedman, 2017). The
point-based hukou transfer system adopted by several mega-cities in labor importing
areas has also helped localities selectively accept new incoming non-local workers with
certain qualifications to become local residents (political insiders). In order to apply
for local hukou, individuals have to prove that they have a secure formal employment
position, evidenced by the possession of labor contracts, and leases of formal housing.
Non-local workers who successfully transferred their hukou and obtained local citizen-
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ship in their hosting localities tend to have higher educational attainment compared to
those non-local workers without local hukou (Sun and Fan, 2011). A number of medium-
sized cities have also implemented policies favoring high-skilled workers at the expense
of the low-skilled (Li et al., 2016, 13). The point-based hukou transfer system and labor
market policies designed in favor of workers with high skill, stable income and stable
employment positions have helped local governments address persistent and growing
labor shortage issues and retain the most attractive human capital in their jurisdictions.
On the other hand, unqualified and less-productive non-local workers—informal non-
local workers or workers living in informal housing—have been effectively prevented
from even attempting to earn local citizenship and becoming political insiders of the
hosting cities (Friedman, 2017).
Ironically, these locally diverging welfare inclusion policies challenge the central gov-
ernment’s attempt to stabilize the regime by unifying the overly fragmented Chinese
welfare system. In fact, local governments’ use of diverging welfare inclusion strategies
is not solely driven by their concern for regime stability. Another important motivation
behind the locally diverging welfare inclusion strategies is local government’s fiscal and
economic interests. The use of divergent welfare strategies and fragmentation of social
insurance system enable local governments to keep their grip on social insurance funds
and tailor the type of workforce best needed for their local economy.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter elucidates local variation in authoritarian welfare regimes by adopting
a state-centric view in the context of dynamic and changing structural conditions. The
state-centric view provides an important and relevant insight in understanding welfare
policies in authoritarian regimes where state leaders are relatively insulated from the
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pressure from social actors with diverging welfare preferences. While authoritarian state
actors’ preferences and interests play a decisive role in designing social policies, their
preferences and interests are neither unitary nor static. Their preferences and interests
are influenced by the structural changes they experience. Massive changes in the labor
market structure and economic conditions affect how these state actors construct welfare
regimes and whom they want to include in or exclude from their social welfare system.
I argue that structural transformation alters authoritarian state actors’ welfare pro-
vision strategy from a narrow and collusive one to a broad yet modest one. It does so
by reshuffling the composition of political insiders to whom authoritarian leaders are
held accountable. Labor informalization and labor (im)migration change the member-
ship composition and welfare preferences of political insiders by influencing the extent
to which political insiders overlap with labor market insiders. When political insid-
ers overlap largely with labor market insiders, authoritarian leaders coopt this narrow
groups of insiders using collusive and exclusive social policies. When political insiders
lose their position as labor market insiders due to labor informalization, authoritarian
leaders use welfare programs that can encompass labor market outsiders who are still
political insiders. Growing labor mobility, however, can influence the extent to which po-
litical insiders are hit by labor informalization. When the growing number of informal
employment positions can be outsourced to (im)migrant workers who have little right
to political representation or participation, state actors have little incentive to reform the
existing exclusive, employment-based welfare distribution mechanism.
This framework helps us better understand the local variation in Chinese welfare
regime and the reason why local fragmentation persists despite the Chinese central gov-
ernment’s attempt to unify and centralize the welfare system. Labor informalization and
labor mobility are the two most important changes that have affected local state actors’
welfare provision and inclusion strategy. Labor informalization has forced local actors
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to decide whether to develop a new welfare system that would coopt informal workers
or to stick with the exclusive welfare regime designed for formal workers. Growing
labor mobility and influx of non-local workers has enabled some local governments to
evict unproductive workers instead of embracing the growing number of labor market
outsiders into the social welfare system.
Evicting labor market outsiders has not been an option for local state actors in Chi-
nese inland localities. It is politically risky for them to ignore economic outsider who are
still by and large political insiders (local residents). For these reasons, local governments
in inland China have responded to labor informalization by developing social insurance
programs that embrace the growing number of local informal workers—political insid-
ers who no longer are labor market insiders. Non-local (informal) workers, however, are
left uninsured even this broader and modest welfare regime. To the contrary, Chinese
coastal provinces have consolidated the existing narrow welfare regime based on the
employment-based social insurance program. Thanks for the influx of non-local migrant
workers, they could protect their local workers (political insiders) from the shock of labor
informalization. As local residents (political insiders) maintain their positions as labor
market insiders, the existing welfare regime that narrowly targets urban formal work-
ers remains untouched. The mobility of non-local (informal) workers has enabled local
state actors to evict them when necessary, instead of developing a system that embraces
the growing number of non-local informal workers into the local welfare system. As
a consequence, local welfare regimes in China have become further fragmented across
regions. This fragmented welfare system, however, has helped local governments hold
their grips on social insurance funds and tailor the type of workforce best needed for
their local economy.
Among many social policy areas, pension is the social insurance program where local
state actors’ fiscal, economic, and political interests are most intensively intertwined. The
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next chapter describes how the Chinese central and local actors’ interests and preferences
over the Chinese pension system have changed and evolved as the country experience
major institutional and structural changes.
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Chapter 3
How the Central-Local Relationship
Shaped the Chinese Pension System
3.1 Introduction
The Chinese pension system, among many other social insurance programs, is the
best example to showcase how major structural changes—such as market reform, grow-
ing labor mobility and labor informality—affect the policy preferences of central and
local state actors and thereby constrain the way social policy develops and evolves. The
Chinese central government has long attempted to build a unified and centralized pen-
sion system. The central government’s attempt, however, has not been successful due to
the resistance of the local state actors and the rampant principal-agent problem. Local
state actors have resisted and delayed the central government’s attempt to centralize the
pension management system.
While it is the central state that designs the general guideline and structure of the so-
cial insurance system, it is the local state actors who implement and enact social policies
in practice. Local state actors range from bureaucrats at social security bureaus or labor
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bureaus at city level to policymakers at the provincial level. While the specific policy
preferences and interests can differ across their personal profile, local state actors as a
whole have some shared interests and incentive structures. First, local state actors have
career incentives to be held accountable to local residents by upper level governments.
Maintaining social stability, providing welfare benefits, and increasing local employment
rates are important tasks for local state actors. They perform these activities not so much
because they need support from local residents. They do so rather because these activ-
ities are evaluated by the upper level government and influence their career trajectories
(Lin and Tussing, 2016; Manion, 2014). The central government’s recent emphasis on
social security has made the expansion of pension coverage as an important career goal
for local state actors (Lin and Tussing, 2016). Second, local state actors are revenue max-
imizers. Local state actors’ interests to maximize their revenues often create a conflict
with their incentives to comply with the central mandate and to be held accountable to
local residents. When it comes to pension expansion, for example, local state actors have
delayed the centralization of the pension pooling system to the upper level so that they
can hold their grip on local pension revenues (Frazier, 2010).
While local state actors do not have power to change the general structure of the
social insurance system, they can strategically choose how to implement the social in-
surance policies to accomplish their goals which are not always compatible with each
other—showing off their accountability to local residents by increasing social insurance
coverage and maximizing their revenues. The delayed unification of the Chinese pension
system, the fragmented pension structure, and the regionally varying coverage of pen-
sion programs cannot be fully explained without discussing the interests of local state
actors and their interaction with the Chinese central government.
Why have Chinese local state actors delayed the central government’s attempt to
build a unified pension system? How has the struggle between the central-local govern-
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ments affected the structure of the current Chinese pension system? What structural and
institutional conditions have empowered local governments to resist the central govern-
ment’s pension plan? This chapter addresses these questions by tracing the changing
central-local dynamics in the process of the Chinese pension reform.
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section discusses how the Chinese pen-
sion system has been restructured since the 1990s until now. This section discusses how
structural changes—such as the restructuring and dismantling of the SOEs in the 1990s,
growing labor mobility and marketization in the 2000s, and the increase in the size of
insecure population and the shift of development strategy in the 2010s—have affected
the interests and policy preferences of Chinese central and local state actors. The next
section provides an overview of the institutional setup of the current Chinese pension
system. This section discusses how the current system, featured by its high level of lo-
cal fragmentation, departs from the universal and centralized pension system that the
Chinese central government has aimed to build. The next section elucidates how exist-
ing institutions and political legacies have shaped local governments’ policy preferences
regarding the pension system and how these institutions enabled local governments to
consolidate and maintain the locally fragmented dual pension regime against the Chi-
nese central government’s attempt to centralize the pension system.
3.2 Evolution of the Chinese Pension System: Central and
Local Government’s Responses to Major Structural Changes
The Chinese economy and labor market have experienced major changes in the last
few decade—SOE reform, growing labor mobility, and labor informalization. The cen-
tral and local state actors in China have cultivated different policy preferences and ideas
as they experience such major structural changes. This section traces how the Chinese
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pension system has been restructured as the Chinese central and local governments re-
spond to major structural changes and how the central government’s pension preference
has diverged from those of local governments.
3.2.1 The 1990s: From SOE-based Pension System to Locally Managed
Pension System
The market reform started from the late 1980s has alerted the Chinese policymakers
to the necessity of the overhauling of the welfare programs, including pension. In the
socialist era, each (state-owned) enterprise was mainly responsible for providing welfare
benefits, including health care, education, housing, and pension to employees. Pensions,
for example, were funded entirely by employers’ contribution (3 % of wage bills) while
individual employees were not required to make any contribution. As the pension fund
was collected and managed at the enterprise level, local governments played a limited
role in providing and managing pension benefits. With the market reform and dis-
mantling of SOEs, however, this enterprise-based welfare system could not last. For a
successful restructuring of SOEs, it was crucial to shift the social burden placed primar-
ily on enterprises to a public system through the reform of the pension system (Frazier,
2010; Shi, 2011; Whitefold, 2003).
Unlike other countries undergoing similar structural changes, both Chinese central
and local policymakers did not support the idea of minimizing the state’s roles in pro-
viding pension benefits through pension privatization. Both Chinese central and local
state actors agreed that the responsibilities of pension provision should be transferred
from enterprises to the state. Yet the central and local state actors have disagreed on
which level of the state should be mainly in charge of managing the pension system.
The Chinese central government and reformers in Beijing tried to build a nationalized
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pension system. Chinese local governments, however, have resisted the unification or
the centralization of the pension management system.
Local governments resisted the centralization of the pension funds because they
needed a full control over the local pension fund to sell-off ailing local SOEs (Frazier,
2010). In the 1990s, dismantling unproductive local SOEs was one of the main political
and economic priorities of Chinese local governments. Reform of unproductive local
SOEs, however, was a challenging task because most of unproductive local SOEs had no
financial sources to compensate their retirees with pension benefits promised under the
socialist system. Local governments, in collusion with local SOEs, tried to bail out these
unproductive local SOEs by compensating their retirees with the local pension funds
(Frazier, 2010, 77). To divert the local pension funds in favor of the ailing local SOEs,
local governments strove to hold their grip on the local pension fund by resisting the
central government’s attempt to centralize the pension system.
The introduction of the multi-pillar system in the pension system has consolidated
and empowered local government’s control over local pension funds. The multi-pillar
system was first introduced in 1991 by the State Council. The basic idea of the multi-
pillar system is to share the responsibility of welfare provision between the state, enter-
prise, and individual workers. The multi-pillar system has fully shaped and replaced
all alternative pilot programs in 1997 as the State Council released the Document No.
26, “Decision of the State Council on the Establishment of a Unified Basic Pension System for
Enterprise Employees” (Salditt et al., 2007)
To share the social responsibility of welfare provision, the multi-pillar system com-
bines the social pooling component funded by employers and the individual account
funded by individual workers. While individual worker’s contribution is accumulated
in the individual account, employer’s contribution is pooled at local social pooling sys-
tem and is managed by local social insurance agencies. With the implementation of the
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new system, local governments have been granted with the power to force groups of en-
terprises to contribute to the local social insurance pool and to manage the pension fund
collected at the local level. Local governments have become a pivotal actor in managing
pension funds and distributing the benefits (Gu, 2001).
Yet the ambiguity and lack of specificity in the 1991 decision invited a series of policy
struggle between the central and local government and bureaucratic infighting between
ministries of overlapping authorities (Frazier, 2010; Shi, 2011). First, the 1991 statement
did not specify what level of government should manage the social pools. The 1991
decision stated that the fund should be gradually transferred from the current city- or
county- level pools into provincial pools. Yet city or county authorities that had already
established their own pension funds did not comply with the central directives. The
ambiguous statement and the lack of specific directives made it easier for local officials
to resist the central government’s attempt to upgrade the pooling system to higher levels
(Whitefold, 2003). The 1997 regulation once again called for a transfer of county-level
pools to the provincial-level, but it was not successful either (Frazier, 2010, 61).
Second, the ambiguity in the 1991 direction invited bureaucratic infighting at the
central level between the Ministry of Labor (MoL) and the National Economic System
Reform Commission (ESRC) over the proposed composition of the multi-pillar system
(Hu, 2012; Shi, 2011; Frazier, 2010).1 Even before the adoption of the 1991 direction, the
MoL and ESRC had long competed over different pension models: The MoL supported
the model designed and advocated by the International Labor Organization (ILO) that
is centered on the social pooling of pension funds; the ESRC, on the other hand, was
attracted to the pension model advocated by the World Bank that emphasizes the role of
1 These bureaucratic infighting over welfare reform presents in other social insurance programs as well.
Duckett (2003), for example, shows how the ministry of finance, ministry of civil affair, and ministry of
labor represent the interests of state, enterprises, and urban poor respectively and compete over the design
of health insurance policies.
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individual accounts in financing pension funds. After a series of struggles, the national
policymakers of the MoL and ESRC finally compromised by adopting both social pool-
ing and individual accounts, which later evolved into the principle of “Integrating Social
Pools and Individual Accounts” endorsed at the 14th central committee’s third plenum
of 1993 (Hu, 2012). Yet they continued to struggle over how to spell out the principle
endorsed in 1993. The MoL, for example, proposed a Pay As You Go (PAYG) defined
benefit model adopted by Jiangxi and Liaoning where the social pool—social pension
funds collected based on priori wages and the number of years a worker had made con-
tribution—becomes the major pillar and the second pillar (individual accounts) become
a supplementary pillar. On the other hand, the ESRC promoted the defined contribu-
tion model adopted by Shanghai and Shenzhen where the benefits are calculated mainly
based on accumulation in individual accounts (the second pillar).
Rather than centrally imposing what model should be adopted, the State Council’s
1995 regulations allowed the 31 provinces to select one of the two pension financing
and benefit arrangements. The discretion given to provinces in choosing one of the
two pension reform models has contributed to the further fragmentation of the Chinese
pension system (West, 1999; Whitefold, 2003). In an attempt to retain its control over
the pension funds, each municipality government has chosen differing schemes than
their neighboring localities, resulting in the further fragmentation of the pension system
(de Coquereaumont, 1997; Shi, 2011). With these changes, local government has been
transformed from a passive actor to an active actor who has a power to tailor the central
directions regarding social insurance system, to decide the pension reform style, and to
rule the qualification of participants of the schemes (Duckett, 2003; West, 1999).
In the late 1990s, as the number of retirees exploded with the restructuring of small
SOEs, scholars and policymakers strongly demanded the abolition of the individual ac-
counts advocated by the ESRC and the World Bank and a revival of the pure social
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pooling system advocated by the MoL and the ILO. At that critical moment, the World
Bank played a critical role in maintaining the individual account against domestic oppo-
sition and contributed to the establishment of the 1997 pension system, which became a
foundation for the current Chinese pension system (Hu, 2012).
Lastly, the 1991 decision also did not specify the percentage of wage bills that enter-
prises would remit to local pension pools and the contribution rate for workers’ indi-
vidual accounts. The decision allowed each local government to set their own contribu-
tion rates depending on the local conditions—the number of retirees and SOE payroll
amounts. It was not until 1997 that the Chinese government attempted to standardize
the contribution rates. The 1997 regulation placed a ceiling on employee contribution
and a floor on individual contribution, at least in theory (Frazier, 2010). The 1997 reg-
ulation made employers contribute a maximum of 17 percent of the wage bill to the
defined benefit PAYG scheme (pillar 1) and individual employees contribute a minimum
of 11 percent of their wages to the individual account (pillar 2) (Holzmann et al., 2012).
Later on, the employer contribution rate has increased from 17 to 20 percent while the
employee contribution rate has adjusted from 11 to 8 percent.
The Chinese central government in the late 1990s striven to bring greater unity to
the Chinese pension system (Frazier, 2010, 58). Central leaders and reformist, like Zhu
Rongji, took a more aggressive stance in moving toward a unified pension system and
regulating non-compliance of local authorities (Frazier, 2010, 59). Yet, in practice, local
fragmentation and the lack of coordination between local actors have continued.
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3.2.2 The 2000s: Marketization, Growing Labor Mobility, and Further
Fragmentation of the Pension System
The history of the Chinese pension reform in the 1990s can be summarized as a his-
tory of conflict between the central and local governments surrounding how to make a
smooth transition to a market economy by compensating laid-off former SOE workers
with pension benefits. (Frazier and Li, 2015). In the 2000s, as private enterprises and
foreign enterprises have become an important part of the economy, it has become crucial
to embrace non-SOE workers into the pension system. The central government updated
relevant regulations to broaden the coverage of the social insurance coverage outside the
SOEs. Lowering individual worker’s pension contribution rate was one of the attempt to
increase the pension participant rate. In 2005, the State Council released “Decision on im-
proving Enterprise Employees’ Basic Pension System”, in which the individual contribution
rate has been adjusted from 11 % of total wage to 8 % and the employer contribution
rate has risen from 17 to 20 percent (Holzmann et al., 2012). In turn, the coverage of the
employment-based pension program has improved (See Figure 3.1).2
Yet neither the Chinese central government nor local governments had coherent pol-
icy ideas regarding how to (or whether to) incorporate a new group of workers created
by marketization and growing labor mobility—migrant workers. By early 2000s, migrant
workers became an un-ignorable part of a labor market. Yet little formal and informal
institutions have been put in place to protect migrant workers from social and economic
instability. Under the Chinese local-citizenship system defined by Hukou, which will be
discussed in detail in the latter part of this chapter, migrant workers have had limited
access to social security programs. Apart from their families and friends, migrant work-
ers have few informal ties or safety net that they can resort to. Chinese migrant workers’
2 Coverage is calculated as a percentage of active participants of the urban employment based pension
scheme (excluding retirees) in urban employees.
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social security status has become even more unstable as many of them become landless
migrant workers. Unlike conventional landholding migrant workers, these landless mi-
grant workers have no last resort for their social security and find it harder to return
back to their home localities (Lee, 2016). Hence, failure to incorporate migrant workers
into the social insurance system could potentially cause serious social instability. Incor-
porating this new class of workers into the pension system has become one of the main
issues surrounding the pension reform in the 2000s.
Figure 3.1: Urban Employment Pension Participation Rates (2001-2015)
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Since the 2000s, the central government has urged local actors to incorporate a grow-
ing number of migrant workers into the social safety net (Shi, 2012). Yet, the central
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government did not establish nationalized binding regulations about migrant workers’
pension participation. Instead, the Chinese central government once again had local
governments decide how to incorporate migrant workers into the local pension system.
As provincial and city governments issued dozens of divergent local laws and regula-
tions on migrant workers’ pension participation, the Chinese pension system has become
further fragmented (Frazier, 2004).
Cities like Beijing and Qingdao (in Shandong province) have established a separate
pension scheme designed only for migrant workers. To accommodate the lower income
of most migrant workers, the contribution rate of this separate pension scheme was set
lower than that of the urban employment-based pension scheme (Guo and Du, 2005;
Huang, 2008). Provinces and cities like Zhejiang and Xiamen also adopted a similar
model in incorporating migrant workers (Nielsen and Smyth, 2008). Other city govern-
ments established a comprehensive social scheme for migrant workers that encompasses
not just pension but other four social insurance schemes (Watson, 2009).
Shanghai was the first city that established this system. In 2002, the Shanghai gov-
ernment, partnered with commercial insurance companies, announced Temporary Mea-
sures on Comprehensive Insurances for Outsiders Working in Shanghai. A year later, in 2003,
Chengdu established the Provisional Method on Comprehensive Social Insurance for Non-
Urban Hukou Laborers in Chengdu. This low priced and low benefit system encouraged
migrant workers’ participation into social insurance programs, but at the same time, has
also separated migrant workers from urban local workers.
Both types of migrant incorporation pension scheme were set separately from the
existing urban employment-based pension program and were not compatible with the
urban employment-based pension scheme. For this reason, the pension fund collected
from migrant workers under the two models could not be used to back up the low
balance in urban employee pension scheme (Guo and Du, 2005).
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Some cities and provinces allowed migrant workers to participate in the urban employment-
based pension program that local workers are participating. Many cities in Guangdong,
for example, permitted migrant workers to participate in the urban employment-based
pension program (Guo and Du, 2005; Nielsen and Smyth, 2008; Watson, 2009). Mi-
grant workers participating in the program were obliged to make financial contribution
for the pension fund with the same contribution rate imposed on urban workers. As
migrant workers’ contribution is integrated into the urban employment-based pension
fund, some local governments started to encourage migrant workers’ participation. In
doing so, local governments attempted to enrich their pension revenues and make up
the low balance of the urban pension fund (Trieu, 2013; Zhang, 2008).
Majorities of other localities had no specific policies for migrant workers’ pension
participation. These fragmented local laws regarding migrant workers’ incorporation
into the pension system have further complicated the unification of the pension system.
Depending on specific local regulations, the extent to which migrant workers are in-
corporated into the existing employment-based pension system or the extent to which
migrant workers are covered by any pension programs has varied widely across locali-
ties (Mok and Wu, 2013; Nielsen and Smyth, 2008; Ringen and Ngok, 2013).
As migrant workers’ low pension participation has become a social issue, the Chi-
nese central government has started to step up and be more proactive. In 2006, the State
council released the “State Council Opinions on Resolving the Problems of Migrant Workers”
to improve migrant workers’ social security and welfare provision status. The passage
of the LCL of 2008 has further improved migrant workers access to social insurance pro-
grams, including pension (Chen and Gallagher, 2013; Gallagher et al., 2014; Gao et al.,
2012). The LCL has made it mandatory for employers sign written labor contract with
their employees, pay wages on time, and provide social insurance benefits (Gallagher
et al., 2014). The LCL has made individual worker’s possession of a signed labor con-
71
tract, rather than the individual’s hukou type and location, as the single most important
factor that explains the individual’s social insurance participation (Cheng et al., 2013).
The 2009 Social Insurance Interim has further facilitated migrant workers’ pension partic-
ipation by making it eligible for all migrant workers to enroll in the employment-based
pension program (Frazier and Li, 2015).
However, despite the enactment of the LCL and the central government’s support,
migrant workers’ pension participation rates have been lower than those of local ur-
ban workers. The majority of employers were reluctant to pay social insurance fees for
migrant workers in a concern for rising labor costs. Local government’s lack of enforce-
ment and firms’ non-compliance to the LCL and social insurance regulations have also
aggravated the situation. The global financial crisis occurred in 2008 has further slowed
down migrant workers’ social insurance participation. The central government allowed
struggling enterprises to delay social insurance contribution for their employees up to
six months. The 2011 Social insurance law has further formalized this regulation that al-
low firms delay social insurance payment if they have permission from local authorities
(Harney, 2015).
Moreover, migrant workers themselves did not see the benefits of participating in the
urban employment-based pension program. Migrant workers often found the contribu-
tion requirement for the urban employment-based pension scheme onerous and rather
wanted to have the money in their hands (World Bank, 2014). The non-transferability
of pension fund has also discouraged migrant workers’ participation into the urban
employment-based pension scheme (Frazier, 2010; Lin, 2015; Lin and Tussing, 2016).
Under the locally fragmented pension system, migrant workers cannot fully transfer
their pension funds from one locality to another as they relocate; they can withdraw the
individual contribution they’ve made (Pillar 2) but they cannot withdraw the pension
funds that their employers have contributed for them into the local social pooling sys-
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tem (Pillar 1). The increasing employment opportunities in inland provinces in China
has further motivated Chinese migrant workers to cash out their pension contribution
before they go back to their home province and find a permanent job there (Zhang,
2008). The cashing out phenomenon was even more outstanding in Southern China,
such as Shenzhen and Dongguan, where the separate pension plan for migrant workers
was absent. In a fear of losing pension funds, governments of migrant-receiving locali-
ties were not entirely supportive of migrant workers’ attempt to cash out their pension
funds. Some local governments have even implicitly discouraged migrant workers from
cashing out by placing a warning sign saying that “Once you cash out, you cannot enjoy the
benefits. Do you really want to lose big reward by chasing after a short-sighted benefit?” (Zhou,
2008).
In reality, however, many of these migrant-receiving localities were not too concerned
about migrant workers’ cashing out phenomenon. Local governments knew that migrant
workers could not get the employer’s portion of pension contribution accumulated in the
local pooling system even when they cash out their pension funds. In pursuit of fiscal
interests, some local governments have even encouraged migrant workers to first enroll
in the employment-based pension program and then to cash out as they leave. These
local governments even passed a regulation that makes workers cash out their social
insurance funds as they terminate a labor contract with their employers, despite the
fact that the current labor law allows workers to continue to have their social insurance
account even after a termination of a labor contract (Zhang, 2008). As the employers’
contribution made for non-local workers cannot be cashed out, local governments can
also use them to fill out the pension deficits and compensate the local workers.
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3.2.3 The 2010s: A Bumpy Road toward the Universal Pension System
While the pension reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s have attempted to broaden
the coverage of the pension system, the Chinese pension system has evolved in a way
that leaves large numbers of the population uninsured—migrant workers, non-employed
urban residents, and rural populations.
To fix the problem in the exclusive social insurance system, the central government
tried to build a centralized pension system with universal coverage as early as the mid-
1990s by releasing the first draft of the social insurance law. Yet bureaucratic infighting
and a concern for increasing social costs associated with the expanded or universal cov-
erage have delayed the passage of the law (Frazier, 2010). While the Chinese central
government has long been unsatisfied with local governments’ noncooperation with the
central regulations in reforming the pension system, the central government could not
find a momentum to constrain local governments due to the imperatives of market re-
form and SOE restructuring (Frazier, 2010). Scholars and specialists, as well, predicted
that the collusion of local government and business would delay the successful imple-
mentation of the social insurance law (Frazier, 2010, 69).
Since the 2010s, China has started to gradually shift its development strategy to one
that focuses more on sustainable urbanization, domestic consumption, and a balanced,
integrated, and sustainable growth. Correcting the welfare system that selectively re-
wards the privileged urban workers and enhancing the role of the central government
in welfare provision could no longer be postponed (Dickson et al., 2016; Dorfman et al.,
2013; Hurst, 2011). When it comes to pension reform, the expansion of pension coverage
beyond urban local employees has become a new priority of the Chinese central govern-
ment. Development of an inclusive and universal social insurance has become a crucial
part of domestic-consumption oriented model as it helps stabilize domestic consumers’
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livelihoods and thereby boost domestic consumption by is an important component of
the domestic-consumption-oriented development model (Meng, 2014). In late 2008, the
Chinese national people’s congress finally released the draft of the Social Insurance Law
for public comment. In 2011, after the lengthy delay, the Social Insurance Law was fi-
nally passed, epitomizing the central government’s effort to bring the central state back
in for welfare provision and its will for centralization of the Chinese social insurance
system (Hurst, 2011). The passage of the Social insurance law has brought two major
changes.
First, with the implementation of the law, all types of Chinese workers have become
obliged to enroll in the employment-based pension scheme. By making all Chinese
workers eligible to enroll in the employment-based pension program, the Chinese cen-
tral government has attempted to expand the coverage of the employment-based pen-
sion program and embrace a broader segment of society. Various types of precarious
workers, including workers without labor contract or the self-employed, have also be-
come eligible to enroll in the employment-based pension program. Local laws which
used to separate migrant workers from the urban employment-based pension scheme
have all been abolished. The comprehensive social insurance scheme of Shanghai or
migrant workers’ pension system of Beijing, for example, have been terminated. All mi-
grant workers have been integrated into the urban employment-based pension scheme,
at least in theory. Although the issue of non-transferability of pension fund has not been
completed resolved, the abolition of the separate pension policies for migrant workers
and the integration of migrant workers into the employment-based pension scheme have
improved social stability of migrant workers with stable income who can afford the so-
cial insurance fees. As one informant notes, “It’s true that the urban employment-based
pension program is more expensive than the comprehensive pension program, but it also ensures
more benefits equal to those enjoyed by local workers. Migrant workers here unquestionably pre-
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fer the employment-based pension scheme to the comprehensive social insurance plan.3” With
the passage of the new social insurance law, workers could no longer cash out of their
social insurance funds as they did before. This change has improved migrant workers’
social insurance participation status, although the change is driven more by the shift of
the state policy than by improvement of migrant worker’s legal consciousness.4
At the same time, the Chinese central government has also attempted to achieve
universal pension coverage by moving beyond the urban employment-based social in-
surance model. Starting with rural areas in late 2009, and with urban areas in 2011, the
Chinese central government has re-organized and introduced an additional layer of pen-
sion program—the residency-based pension program (Bateman and Liu, 2014; Ngok and
Huang, 2014). In doing so, the central government has attempted to build a nationwide
voluntary pension scheme that covers those who are left outside the employment-based
pension scheme.
The old rural residency-based pension program was a voluntary scheme of which pri-
mary funding relies mostly on individual contribution. Unlike the urban employment-
based pension program, the element of social pooling or government subsidies did not
exist for the rural residency-based pension program. In 2009, the state council issued “the
guideline for pilot implementation of the new rural pension scheme” and introduced a respon-
sibility sharing system for the rural residency-based pension program, where the social
burden is shared between individuals, the locality (collective), and the government. In
2011, the Chinese central government has updated the existing rural-residency-based
pension program so that the rural residency-based pension program would have an
aligned structure with the urban residency-based pension program in terms of the basic
pension level, financing design, and matching contributions funded by local authorities
3 subject # 11, Interview with a labor bureau official, Shanghai, Mar 9, 2016.
4 subject # 15, Interview with a labor Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) activist, Guangzhou,
April 1, 2016.
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(Dorfman et al., 2012). The only distinction between the urban and rural residency-based
pension programs is in their contribution tier ranges: from 100 RMB to 500 RMB in the
rural scheme and from 100 RMB to 1000 RMB in the urban scheme.5 The structural
alignment of the two residency-based pension programs has paved an institutional base
for the combination of the two programs. By the end of 2012, the residency-based pen-
sion schemes have been established in all counties and cities for both rural and urban
residents (World Bank, 2014). In 2014, the State Council issued the “Opinions of the State
Council on Establishing a Unified Basic Pension Insurance System for Urban and Rural Resi-
dents (Document No. 8)”, which stated that the urban and rural residency-based pension
schemes would be combined into a unified basic pension scheme (Bateman and Liu,
2014; Dorfman et al., 2012; Liu and Sun, 2016).
With the integration of the rural and urban residency-based pension schemes, those
who have been left out of the urban employment pension scheme have become em-
braced by the national pension plan. The central government intended to reduce the
chronic urban-rural inequality by integrating the urban and rural residency-based pen-
sion scheme and expanding the social insurance coverage in both urban and rural areas.
The introduction of the residency-based pension program may have not been achieved
without the active role of the central government in promoting and subsidizing this
scheme (Dorfman et al., 2012; Hurst, 2011; World Bank, 2014).6 The increased central
subsidies for the residency-based pension scheme has incentivized local authorities to
follow the nationally coordinated pension scheme for the first time (Dorfman et al., 2012).
5 For a more detailed description of the Chinese residency-based pension program, see Dorfman, Wang,
O’Keefe, and Cheng (2012) Chapter 11, China’s Pension Schemes for Rural and Urban Residents. Matching
Contributions for Pensions: A Review of International Experience. The World Bank, 217-241.
6 The central government now provides full compensation for western regions, 40% for the middle,
and none for the coastal provision (Lin and Tussing, 2016).
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3.3 Current Pension System: Consolidation of the Dual
Pension Regime with Local Fragmentation
The social insurance law of 2011 has simplified the overly fragmented pension schemes:
First, separate pension schemes for migrant workers issued by each local government
have been halted. The existing employment-based pension program has become the
only legitimate and functioning pension program for all Chinese employees. Second,
the rural and urban residency-based pension schemes have been reorganized and inte-
grated. With these changes, the social insurance law of 2011 has consolidated the dual
pension system in which two distinctive layers of pension programs—the employment-
based pension scheme and the residency-based pension scheme—coexist in every lo-
cality in China (see Figure 3.2).7 Yet it has not yet fixed the locally fragmented social
pooling system or low transferability of pension funds. This section scrutinizes how
each layer of the two pension programs operates and benefits its participants. It also de-
scribes how the central government’s social insurance goal has been only incompletely
achieved, leaving a large number of Chinese residents outside the pension protection.
7 This bifurcated and localized reform strategy echoes the dual-track strategy that has traditionally
been adopted by China since the market reform era. In the early period of market reform, the Chinese
central government had maintained two different price systems (the market-price system and the planned
price system) simultaneously and gradually moved from a planned economic system to a market economy
so that it could cushion the impact of rapid social or economic reforms. This dual-track strategy has been
adopted in many other policy areas. For a detailed discussion of dual-track systems adopted in various
policy areas, see Shen. (2006), Understanding Dual-Track Urbanization in Post-Reform China: Conceptual
Framework and Empirical Analysis. Population, Space, and Place 12: 496-516., Lau, Qian, and Roland.
(2000), Reform Without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual Track Approach to Transition. Journal
of Political Economy 108: 120-143.
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Figure 3.2: Consolidation of the Chinese Dual Pension System
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3.3.1 Employment-Based Pension Program
While the urban employment pension scheme in the 1990s mainly benefited SOE
workers, the coverage of the pension scheme has extended to wage earners of any types
of firms, including foreign invested firms and private firms. The passage of the LCL of
2008 has also opened a door for migrant workers with labor contracts to enroll in the
employment-based pension program. The Social Insurance Law of 2011 has officially
stipulated that every worker, regardless of their household registration (hukou) type or
employment status, has an equal right and responsibility to join the urban employee
basic pension scheme. The Social insurance law has also allowed self-employed and
workers in informal sector to enroll in the employment-based pension program on a
voluntary basis. Yet, in practice, only a small number of these precarious workers enroll
in the employment-based pension program (Dorfman et al., 2012).
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The employment-based pension program is a contributory pension scheme in which
the fund is co-financed by employers, employees, and local governments. The cur-
rent pension system has been structured with the announcement of the State Council
Document No.26 in 1997. Figure 3.3 illustrates the funding structure of the Chinese
employment-based pension system, featured by its multi-tier setting. The first tier of the
pension fund consists of two pillars—the defined benefit social pooling account and the
individual accounts. The first pillar is a defined benefit pensions financed on a PAYG
basis. Employers are required to remit a certain percentage of individual workers’ pre-
retirement wages (currently 20%) to the locally managed social pooling system. The
second pillar is a defined contribution scheme, financed by individual workers’ contri-
bution. Since 2001 Liaoning province has introduced fully funded defined contribution
component in which the individual contribution is supported by the central and local
subsidiaries (Holzmann et al., 2012). Currently, eleven provinces covered by the pilot
program fund the second-pillar with employee’s contribution of 8 per cent of wage.8 In
practice, 5 percent is paid by the state (3.75 per cent from central government and 1.25
per cent from local government) and 3 percent is paid by individual participants (Salditt
et al., 2007). The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) established by the central gov-
ernment supplements the deficits in social security expenditures and provide pension
subsidies for local governments. The second tier is an enterprise annuity plan, financed
by employer contribution who are pre-approved by Ministry of Labor and Social Se-
curity (MOLSS). The third tier is a supplementary personal funds that a worker had
voluntarily accumulated for other sources than the public pension system (Frazier, 2010;
Shi, 2011).
8 Liaoning (2001), Jilin and Heilongjiang (2004, 2005), Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, Shanghai,
Shanxi, Tianjin, and Xinjiang.
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Figure 3.3: Funding Structure of the Chinese Employment-based Pension System
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China imposes one of the highest social insurance contribution rates to employers
(See Figure 3.4).9 Currently, employers are obliged to fund a maximum of 20% of public-
defined pension benefits for the employment-based pension program. This high social
insurance contribution rate explains why China records one of the highest labor tax
wedge among many developing and developed countries (Giles et al., 2013). In order to
evade the financial responsibilities associated with pension funding, many Chinese em-
ployers hire workers informally or persuade workers to forgo their rights to enroll in the
employment-based pension program. Some local governments reduce the contribution
rates imposed on employers or lower the level of enforcement of the social insurance
regulations to favor firm managers and enterprises.10
9 Source: OECD Library, available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
download/8115201ec030.pdf?expires=1518472257&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=
00F6CE52963D5E5BC1D1F7A015F5011E
10 subject # 21, Interview with a researcher, Beijing, Dec 14, 2017.
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Figure 3.4: Employer Contribution Rates by Countries 2014
Source: OECD Library
The employer’s pension contribution is accumulated in the social pooling system,
managed by municipal or provincial government. Although most provinces have made
regulations for provincial-level pooling by 2015, a majority of provinces have not imple-
mented provincial-level pooling. Among 31 provinces, only Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai,
Chongqing, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Tibet have truly implemented provincial level pooling
in practice and three of them are actually provincial-level cities (Zheng, 2016). Majority
of other provinces have partial pooling system. Under the partial pooling system, cer-
tain proportion of pension funds are transferred to the provincial level and the rest are
managed by the prefecture- or city-level government. Guangdong is an example of a
province where pension contributions are fully managed at the prefecture city level, but
there are still a number of provinces where the pension funds are pooled and managed
at the county-level (World Bank, 2014, 228).
82
Employees should contribute 8% of their monthly wages to the individual account
for more than 15 years. Local governments fill in the shortfalls of pension benefit ex-
penditure. The current system also allows workers who do not have an employer (self-
employed) to enroll in the employment-based pension program. In order to enroll in
the programs, these workers have to first report their income level ranges from 60 to
100 percent of the local average wage and then pay 20 percent of that income level into
the social pooling system. They also have to accumulate 8 percent of that income level
into the individual account. In other words, self-employed or workers in informal sector
should act both as an employee and an employer of themselves at the same time in order
to enroll in the employment-based pension program. While the double burden placed on
informal workers often discourages them from enrolling in the employment-based pen-
sion program, some local governments encourage informal workers’ participation into
the employment-based pension program by subsidizing them. For example, in Shang-
hai, local government provides 50% of pension contribution for a local informal worker
who is older than 45 years.
These options are, however, available only for local informal workers. There’s no
relevant policies or regulations to ensure non-local self-employed workers’ participation
into the urban employment-based pension program.11 Research based on a survey on
Chinese urban workers also finds that migrant workers with labor contract have a higher
social insurance participation rates in 2010 than in 2005. Yet, the same rule does not
apply for local workers—whether or not having a labor contract is not directly related
with local workers’ social insurance participation status (Gallagher et al., 2014). It implies
that some local workers are provided with social insurance benefits even when they
lack labor contracts, while the case is rare for non-local migrant workers. It suggests
that local governments and employers are more permissive to local informal workers’
11 subject # 11, Interview with a labor bureau official, Shanghai, Mar 9, 2016.
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participation into the social insurance program, while they tend to be more selective and
restrictive to non-local informal workers’ social insurance participation. Knowing the
unfavorable conditions for their social insurance participation, some migrant workers
voluntarily make the decision to opt out of social insurance programs. They at times
bargain with their employers to get pay increase in exchange for their non-participation
to the employment-based social insurance program (Park et al., 2012).
Figure 3.5: Replacement Rate of the Chinese Employment-based Pension (1991-2015)
Source: OECD Library
Although the replacement rate has constantly decreased since the market reform, the
benefits from the employment-based pension program are more substantial than those
from the residency-based pension program (Li, 2017). Currently, the average replace-
ment rate is around 40%: a worker whose monthly wage is around 4,000 RMB is ex-
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pected to receive approximately 1,669 RMB ($250) per month for their monthly pension
benefit (See Figure 3.5)12.
3.3.2 Residency-Based Pension Program
The residency-based pension scheme was built to provide basic level benefits to a
broader segment of local society. This pension scheme distributes social benefits not on
the basis of employment but on the basis of local residency. Anyone who is over 16 can
enroll in the residency-based pension program, regardless of their employment status,
only if they can prove their local residency status. Chinese residency-based pension
program shares important redistributive characteristics with noncontributory universal
social insurance programs in Latin America. Both programs aim to cover broader seg-
ments of society, including the neediest low-income individuals, informal workers, and
the unemployed, with modest benefits (Carnes and Mares, 2013a, 2015; Forteza and
Ourens, 2012). Yet the Chinese residency-based pension program is different from non-
contributory universal social insurance programs elsewhere in two important aspects.
First, the Chinese residency-based pension program is open only to people with local
urban hukou. Migrant workers from rural or other urban areas are eligible to participate,
but only in their area of hukou registration (Dorfman et al., 2012). In this regard, the
residency-based pension program is more locally restricted than the employment-based
pension program.
Second, the residency-based pension program requires financial contribution from
individual participants, although the required amount of financial contribution is min-
imal. Contrary to the employment-based pension program, the required premium of
the residency-based pension program is unrelated to payroll. The contribution rate re-
quired by the residency-based pension program is also lower than that required by the
12 Source: OECD Library http://www.chyxx.com/industry/201711/581598.html
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employment-based pension program. A large number of workers with lower income
and precarious employment-position find it less onerous to enroll in the residency-based
pension program. These workers often choose to enroll in the residency-based pension
program, while forgoing their opportunity to enroll in the employment-based pension
program (Bateman and Liu, 2014; Dorfman et al., 2012).
Individual participants can choose their annual voluntary contribution tiers, which
range from 100 RMB to 1,000 RMB, depending on their income levels. Similar to uni-
versal pension programs elsewhere, the Chinese residency-based pension program is
financed heavily by public subsidy. Each local government provides an ex-ante match-
ing contribution of 30 RMB to each individual account annually. The local government’s
top-up payment varies across localities based on their living standards and economies
(Bateman and Liu, 2014). The expected benefits from the residency-based pension pro-
gram, by design, are modest and locally vary. After 15 years of vesting, this matching
contribution from local government is topped up to the basic monthly payment of 55
RMB subsidized by the central government. The Chinese central government funds the
entire basic pension costs for western and central regions and provides half of the basic
pension costs for the population in coastal regions. The increased financing commitment
from the central government has incentivized local governments to comply with the cen-
trally design pension regulation for the first time in its pension reform history (Dorfman
et al., 2012).
Given the lowest individual contribution (100 RMB), the monthly benefit for the par-
ticipants in Beijing, for example, is 280 RMB (40 USD) per month. It is one of the
highest level of benefits that any residency-based pension participant can expect from
the program. As one of the richest local governments, Beijing local government provides
participants with monthly benefits of 125 RMB on top of the guaranteed basic monthly
pension benefits of 55 RMB, using their own fiscal revenue. Other localities with lower
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fiscal revenue do not provide such a large amount of additional subsidy. In many local-
ities, the benefit from the residency-based pension program is notfjaa enough to ensure
a basic livelihood of elderly citizens and lower than the benefit level of other forms of
social assistance (Liu and Sun, 2016). The replacement rate for rural residents after years
of contribution, for example, is between 8.04% and 13.85%. This is much lower than
the replacement rate of the employment-based pension program (40%) or the replace-
ment rate suggested by the International Labor Organization as the bottom line (Shou,
2017). Nevertheless, even this low level of pension benefits improves recipients’ lives by
helping them with living expenditures and producing a strong sense of economic sta-
bility (Dorfman et al., 2012). However, this low level of benefit is not sufficient enough
to support an elderly citizen’s life and makes individuals rely more on individual sav-
ings or family support (Liu and Sun, 2016). For these reasons, Chinese labor activists
have criticized that the residency-based pension program might, in practice, transfer the
burden of welfare provision for elderly citizens from state and firms to the shoulder of
individual workers and citizens (China Labour Bulletin, 2016).
Table 3.1 summarizes the major differences between the two pension programs.
The Chinese central government has expanded the coverage of the employment-
based pension program beyond local urban workers in SOEs. The introduction of the
residency-based pension program has further contributed to the expansion of pension
coverage by incorporating those who have not been covered by the employment-based
pension program into the public pension system. The implementation of the residency-
based pension program has established the principle of universal entitlement to basic
provision for the first time since 1949 (Duckett and Wang, 2017). If the two pension
programs had been implemented as is intended by the central government, almost all
Chinese residents—employed and non-employed, formal workers and informal work-
ers—should have been covered by any of the two pension programs.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of the Two Pension Programs in China
Employment-based Pension Residency-based Pension
Eligibility Employees, including migrant
workers and the self-employed
(at least in principle)
Local Residents over age 16
Participation Mandatory for all formal work-
ers; voluntary for urban work-
ers in informal sectors and the
self-employed
Voluntary
Vesting 15 years 15 years
Financing Contributions co-funded by em-
ployees, employer, and the state
Individual Contribution + Pub-
lic Subsidies from local and the
central governments
Individual Contribution 8% of individual worker’s
monthly payroll to the individ-
ual account; 20% of employer
contribution to public defined
benefits
Varies by income level, ranges
from 100 RMB ($15) to 1,000
RMB ($ 150) per year
Government Subsidy Central and local governments
fill in the shortfalls of pension
benefit expenditure
30 RMB matching contribution
on the individual account annu-
ally (ex ante) ; 55 RMB (ex post)
basic monthly pension
Benefit level High (1,669 RMB/ month) Modest (280 RMB / month)
Fund Management Municipal level County and city level
Source: World Bank, 2014, p. 207;Dorfman et al., 2012, p. 222
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Obviously, the overall pension coverage has increased rapidly with the implementa-
tion of the residency-based pension program and the social insurance law (See Figure
3.6). While the employment-based pension program still benefits a limited number of
privileged social members, the introduction of the residency-based pension program has
dramatically expanded the scope of population covered by the public pension programs.
By 2015, more than half of Chinese population is covered by one of the two pension pro-
grams (Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.6: Pension Coverage by Total Population (2005-2015)
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Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook (Various Years)
Despite the rapid expansion of the pension coverage, however, the achievement of
universal coverage has not yet been fully achieved. Certain groups of Chinese resi-
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dents have still been systematically marginalized from benefiting from the reformed
pension system. The lax enforcement of the social insurance law and continuing lo-
cal non-compliance to the mandate on upgrading the pension pooling level are mainly
attributable to the incomplete achievement of the universal pension coverage.
First, the failure to upgrade the pension pooling level has made it impossible for
Chinese migrant workers to transfer their pension funds to different localities as they
relocate. The complexity of pension transfer across localities discourages a large number
of migrant workers from enrolling in the employment-based pension program (Wat-
son, 2009). While the Chinese central government has constantly striven to upgrade
the pension pooling system at provincial level and eventually at national-level, this at-
tempt has been hampered by vehement resistance from local officials. In the absence of
the national fund management system or an inter-regional transfer mechanism, migrant
workers relocating to different provinces or returning to their home provinces cannot
withdraw the portion of pension funds their employers have contributed for them. Un-
der the current system, migrant workers can only withdraw the contribution they have
in the individual account and 12% of the employer contribution in the social pool. While
the social insurance law per se does not preclude migrant workers’ participation in the
employment-based pension program, the lack of mechanisms for inter-regional transfer
discourages migrant workers’ participation in the employment-based pension program.
Second, some employers and local officials have taken advantage of the system and
encourage migrant workers enroll in the residency-based pension program of their home
locality. According to an interview with a labor NGO activist at Guangzhou, many em-
ployers in Guangzhou hire migrant workers on condition that they have enrolled in the
residency-based pension program of their home locality.13 Under the current regulation,
no individual worker can enroll in the both residency and employment-based programs
13 subject # 15, Interview with a labor NGO activist, Guangzhou, April 1, 2016.
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at the same time. When migrant workers enroll in the residency-based pension pro-
gram of their home locality, firm managers and local governments can be exempted
from the obligation to have these migrant workers enroll in the employment-based pen-
sion scheme. Migrant workers either do not know that they will receive meager benefits
from the residency-based pension program by forgoing their chances of enrolling in the
employment-based pension program or succumb to the employers’ request so that they
can be employed. As migrant workers enroll in the residency-based pension scheme
in their home locality, the social security burden of migrant workers is passed on to
individual workers and the local government of their home localities. The social secu-
rity burden passed from migrant receiving localities to migrant sending localities not
only exacerbates the existing economic inequality but also deepens the social inequality
between two localities.
Third, while the social insurance law requires informally employed workers to par-
ticipate in the employment-based pension program, the lack of enforcement mechanism
and proper monitoring system has created a large number of informal workers not-
enrolled in the employment-based pension program. Informal worker’s low level of en-
rollment in the employment-based pension program is partly driven by informal work-
ers’ lack of motivation to enroll in the expensive social insurance program. As will be
discussed in chapter 6, individual workers with precarious employment position are
less likely to participate in the employment-based pension program due to their em-
ployment and income insecurity. However, employers and local governments have also
often turned blind eye on, if not encouraged, informal workers’ non-enrollment in the
employment-based pension program.
Due to the limitation of the current pension system, the universal pension coverage
has yet far to be achieved. Moreover, the extent to which the two pension programs
develop has varied widely across localities depending on the type and composition of
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workforce in the local labor market. In principle, the expansion of one pension scheme
does not necessarily preclude the expansion of the other, as the two pension programs
target different groups of population. However, the two pension programs have not
developed in tandem and have expanded at widely varying rates across different local-
ities in China. In some provinces, overall pension coverage has improved mainly due
to the rapid expansion of the residency-based pension program. In other provinces, the
residency-based pension coverage has not expanded much and the employment-based
pension programs have remained as the main social insurance program of the localities.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation discusses in detail why the two pension programs develop
differently across different localities in China.
The next section discusses how existing institutions has incentivized local actors to
resist the upgrade of the pension pooling level and improvement of the transferability
of pension funds, impeding the further expansion of the two pension programs and
achievement of universal pension coverage in China.
3.4 Institutional Background behind the Fragmentation of
the Chinese Pension System
Institutions do not form in vacuum: Past institutions, historical legacies, and struc-
tural changes altogether influence the way institutions shape and evolve. The structure
of the current Chinese pension system, characterized by its functional and local frag-
mentation, cannot be understood without discussing how existing institutions and his-
torical legacies have constrained the way it evolves and develops. These institutions have
shaped local state actor’s social policy preferences while at the same time empowering
them to pursue their preferred policy and to resist the central government’s attempt to
centralize the pension system.
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Chinese local governments have long resisted the central mandate to upgrade of the
pooling level, improve the transferability, and enforce the employment-based pension
program for all type of workers, hampering the achievement of the universal coverage
(Bland and Yu, 2004; Frazier, 2010). In fact, Chinese pension system is not the only policy
area where local non-compliance is observed. The gap between the law and its actual
enactment has existed in China over various policy areas (O’Brien and Li, 1999), includ-
ing energy policy (Kostka and Hobbs, 2012), labor market policies for migrant workers
(Davies and Ramia, 2008) , and environment policy (Chan et al., 1995; Eaton and Kostka,
2014). Moreover, Chinese central government has tolerated, if not encouraged, local gov-
ernment’s selective implementation of economic policy and local economic experimenta-
tion in an expectation that it would bring regional economic growth through competition
between localities. Local experimentation in social policies, however, has been tolerated
less by the central government as it can aggravate zero-sum competition between poor
and rich regions with different level of social risks (Shi, 2011). Why, then, despite this
unique nature of social policies and the central government’s growing will to construct a
more unified and inclusive welfare regime, have the Chinese welfare regimes developed
a locally fragmented way? What past institutions and historical legacies incentivize local
state actors resist the central government’s pension plan and enable local state actors to
consolidate the fragmented pension system?
This section explores how existing institutions, such as decentralized fiscal system,
political favoritism for local residents shaped by the career evaluation system, the re-
formed household registration (hukou) system, and the economic incentives of local
officials, have incentivized local authorities to resist and impede the upgrade of the pen-
sion pooling level and the improvement of pension fund transferability, hindering the
achievement of universal pension coverage of the country.
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3.4.1 Fiscal Incentives
Although China is not a federal state, the Chinese fiscal system is locally decentral-
ized: each sub-national government is mainly responsible for collecting and spending
tax revenue. Except the revenue remitted to the central government, each local gov-
ernment has discretion to manage the revenues and spend them according to the local
needs, independently from the intervention of upper-level governments. In 1994, the
central government has attempted to regain its initiatives and reclaim a larger share of
the national fiscal revenues with the implementation of the fiscal reform (Wang, 1997;
Zhang, 1999). Yet local governments have continued to retain the main responsibility in
local revenue spending.
Among many sources of local revenue, pension funds sent to the local social pool-
ing system have been one of the most importance sources of local revenue (Lin, 2015).
Pension revenue has been a core source of local social security revenue. The average
proportion of pension revenue to total social security revenue in between 2005 and 2015
was 73.5%. Pension revenue alone approximates one-third of local government’s total
tax revenues (See Figure 3.7). Yet the use of the revenue is not well overseen by the
upper-level government. For these reasons, pension funds have often been misused by
local officials. In Shanghai, for example, local officials diverted local pension fund as
a major source of financing for local developers’ real estate projects (Kahn, 2006). The
same patterns of misuse of pension fund by local officials has been observed in other
Chinese cities including Guangzhou, Hunan, Liaoning, and Zhejiang (Frazier, 2010, 16).
The upgrade of the pension pooling system and the central government’s direct manage-
ment of the pension fund will make it hard for local governments to divert local pension
funds for their personal use or for other development projects. Local governments in-
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sisted that the unified and centralized pension fund management system would not be
compatible with the decentralized fiscal system (Lin, 2015).
Figure 3.7: Average Pension and Social Security Revenue (and Expenditure) as a Per-
centage of Total Local Revenue (and Expenditure)
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The rampant and chronic regional inequality has also hampered the upgrade of the
social pooling system and the establishment of the inter-provincial funding transfer sys-
tem. Provinces like Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang have sound fiscal structure with
sufficient pension balance to compensate their workers. Yet other provinces in the Chi-
nese rust-belt, such as Heilongjiang and Liaoning, have been experiencing chronic and
serious shortfall of the pension balance (See Figure 3.8). Apparently, local governments
with sound fiscal balance do not want their pension surplus to be used to make up the
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deficits of local governments with less well-endowed pension funds and heavy retiree
burdens (Frazier, 2004; Lin, 2015; Shi and Mok, 2012). They resist the establishment of
social pooling where the social risks and costs are shared across a broader group of
participants in the program (Frazier, 2004).
Figure 3.8: Pension Balance by Province (2005-2015)
0
500
1000
0
500
1000
0
500
1000
0
500
1000
0
500
1000
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
Anhui Beijing Chongqing Fujian Gansu Guangdong Guangxi
Guizhou Hainan Hebei Heilongjiang Henan Hubei Hunan
Jiangsu Jiangxi Jilin Liaoning Neimenggu Ningxia Qinghai
Shaanxi Shandong Shanghai Shanxi Sichuan Tianjin Tibet
Xinjiang Yunnan ZhejiangP
en
si
on
 B
al
an
ce
 (1
00
 m
ill
io
n 
C
N
Y
)
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook (Various Years)
It is not a coincidence that localities characterized by sound fiscal structure are ones
whose economy spurred during the market reform period. The influx of migrant work-
ers started with market reform has helped these localities secure sound balance. While
migrant workers in these localities have enriched the local pension pool, many of these
migrant workers have left the localities without fully claiming their shares. Just like
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transitional winners in other post-communist societies blocked the further reform of the
social system (Hellman, 1998), the transitional winners of the Chinese market reform
have become the main opponent of the establishment of the inter-provincial pension
transfer systems.
In response to the central government’s effort to upgrade the pooling level, provin-
cial governments have attempted to set up an intra-provincial transfer system in which
pension contribution can be transferred across different cities within a province (Lin,
2015). Yet, even up until today, the inter-provincial transfer system has not yet been
established. The failure to build an integrated pension pool has further consolidated the
existing local inequality by making affluent and well-endowed localities become even
more socially and economically sound and making undeveloped localities suffer both
from economic and social insecurity. The deepening inter-regional welfare inequality
has made it even harder for the central government to centralize the pension program
(Lin, 2015).
3.4.2 Local Welfare Chauvinism and Local Citizenship Institutions
The Chinese career evaluation system has incentivized local governments to care
about local workers’ social stability even in the absence of electoral mechanisms. Main-
taining local social stability serves as a veto point for local officials’ career advancement
(Lin and Tussing, 2016; Manion, 2014). Improved welfare provision for local residents
has also become a major source where local officials gain legitimacy (Dickson et al.,
2016). The increase in pension participation rate, for example, has been considered as
an important political achievement for local party cadres (Lin and Tussing, 2016). This
political incentive structure has led local officials to direct public goods exclusively to
those who have local citizenship, at the expense of non-local migrant workers—those
who lack local citizenship status but have supplied the much-needed labor for the local
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economy. In providing employment opportunities or welfare benefits, such as retirement
benefits, labor training for unemployed, or housing, local governments have prioritized
local workers over non-local workers. Local governments regard non-local workers as
‘outsiders’ unless they have skills and resource to guarantee them stable jobs in large-
scale factories (Davies and Ramia, 2008; Nielsen, 2005).
The Chinese welfare system built on the Chinese local citizenship institution (hukou)
has laid out an institutional foundation of such discrimination based on local origin
of a worker. Chinese hukou system was designed in the socialist era to control the
mobility of workforce and divide the urban and rural sectors (Chen and Fan, 2016).
Under the hukou system, individuals with urban hukou are privileged with generous
welfare benefits, including housing, education, pension, and health care benefits while
individual with agricultural hukou have limited access to such welfare benefits. One can
claim their welfare benefits only in a designated local jurisdiction. The hukou system
helped the state concentrate the welfare benefits to urban sectors and pursue urban-
oriented industrialization by limiting rural residents from sharing the urban achievement
(Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Chen and Fan, 2016; Solinger, 1999; Wallace, 2013). The
hukou system did not perish even during the marketization process. Instead, the system
has helped China to avoid the excessive expansion of citizenship during the economic
transition and marketization, the cost that other developing countries had to pay as
they pursue marketization (Solinger, 1999). Employers could hire non-local workers or
workers coming from rural areas at a lower price without providing them with social
insurance benefits entitled to their urban local counterparts. While China has realized
freedom of movement for labor power, the hukou institutions have prevented China
from achieving freedom of movement people as social beings (Friedman, 2017, 17).
For these reasons, the reform of the hukou system has long been regarded as a prereq-
uisite for migrant workers’ improved access to the urban social safety net (Salditt et al.,
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2007). Despite the recent hukou reform, however, migrant workers still have limited
access to urban employment social insurance benefits. In fact, the recent hukou reform
has further intensified structural discrimination against non-local migrant workers and
marginalized migrant workers’ social welfare status by making the local residency-status
as the utmost important criterion for social welfare entitlement.
In the past, it was the hukou type (urban or rural), and not the hukou registration
place, that played a decisive role in determining one’s welfare entitlement. Until re-
cently, the conversion of rural to urban hukou was strictly restricted by the Chinese
central government. (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). Because labor mobility was strictly
restricted and the urbanization was constrained by the state, hukou registration place
meant nothing more than one’s birthplace. With the dismantling of the state-owned
enterprises, however, the socialist welfare distribution system centered on urban state-
owned enterprises has come to end. The market position, rather than one’s hukou type,
started to play a pivotal role in determining the type of welfare benefits one can claim,
especially with the implementation of the LCL of 2008 (Chen and Fan, 2016). Reflecting
these changes, the recent hukou reform abolished the distinction between agricultural
and non-agricultural hukou by equalizing the type of public goods and welfare services
entitled to rural and urban hukou holders (Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Chen and Fan,
2016). The competitive advantaged attached to urban hukou has gradually diminished.
Yet this does not mean the differential treatments over Chinese individuals with dif-
ferent hukou have been entirely abolished. Instead, the hukou reform shifted the basis
of discrimination from urban-rural divide to the local versus non-local divide. With the
hukou reform, the local residency status has become the most powerful factor deter-
mining one’s welfare status. In other words, the convergence of the urban and rural
hukou types did not bring any meaningful changes to the welfare access of rural hukou
workers coming from different hukou registration places (Chan and Buckingham, 2008).
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This change has, ironically, intensified local government’s influence over welfare distri-
bution because it is each local government, and not the central government, that decides
whether to grant a permission to a conversion of hukou registration place from one to
the other.
In this regard, the recent hukou reform has further intensified and legitimized local
welfare chauvinism, empowering local governments resist the central government’s at-
tempt to unify the pension system across localities. The local favoritism corroborated
by these institutional changes has also resonated with business interests and further
marginalized migrant workers’ social and economic status. The implementation of the
SIL and the termination of the comprehensive social insurance scheme for migrant work-
ers in Shanghai, for example, have brought out the diminishing employment rate of
migrant workers. When the comprehensive social insurance program existed, hiring
non-local workers was a cost-efficient strategy for employers who seek to cut the social
insurance costs. Now that all workers are covered by the expensive employment-based
pension program, employers find little reason to favor non-local workers to local work-
ers. Instead, firms have started to seek out local workers more actively as they were
provided with subsidies from the local government as they hire local workers and con-
tribute to the local employment rate. In addition, firms have to worry less about housing
problems or high turnover rates of workers when they hire local versus non-local work-
ers.14
3.4.3 Economic Incentives: Employer Interests and Local Economic
Development
The Chinese career evaluation system has placed a higher emphasis on the economic
performance of local government than anything else. Attracting more investment from
14 subject # 11, Interview with a labor bureau official, Shanghai, March 9, 2016.
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firms, maintaining high employment rate, and recruiting and retaining skilled workers
have become main goals of local government motivated by economic incentives. The
strategic and selective implementation of the social insurance system has become an
important policy tool for local government to achieve these goals.
Although the 2011 Social Insurance Law has made it mandatory for all employers
to pay pension contributions for their employees, employers have limited incentive to
comply with the law (Gallagher et al., 2014; Giles et al., 2013). Workers’ increasing par-
ticipation in the employment-based pension program places a huge financial burden
on enterprise and employers, especially because the current Chinese employment-based
pension system levies one of the highest contribution from employers. To evade the
social responsibility, some employers offer higher wages for their employees on condi-
tion that they forgo their rights to enroll in the employment-based pension program
(Gallagher et al., 2014). Some workers are encouraged or even forced to enroll in the
residency-based pension program so that their employers can be exempted from the
responsibility to pay for these workers’ social insurance contribution.15 While these
loopholes are not legal, Chinese local officials have often turned a blind eye on firms’
noncompliance to the social insurance law in order to attract and retain these employ-
ers. The lax or selective enforcement of the social insurance law by local government in
collusion with businesses has affected both local and non-local workers’ social insurance
participation.
In order to maintain the local competitiveness, many local governments lower the
social insurance contribution by adjusting the reference local wage.16 While some cities
choose local minimum wage as a reference wage, others choose 60% of provincial-level
average wage. Local governments also design and implement various preferential in-
15 subject # 15, Interview with a labor NGO activist, Guangzhou, April 1, 2016.
16 subject # 21, Interview with a research associate, Beijing, December 14, 2017.
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surance policies for selected firms and industries. These tendencies are even more out-
standing in underdeveloped inland areas. In order to attract factories and firms, local
governments in these areas strive to lower the social contribution rate for employers by
providing preferential policies or adjusting the local average wage. Employers in these
regions may seem to fulfill their social responsibility better than employers in coastal
area, but it is mainly because the local authorities in these regions have lowered their
social contribution burden in advance. Because each firms and industrial complex is pro-
vided with different terms and preferential policies, the level of compliance to the social
insurance regulation may vary more widely in the underdeveloped localities. For these
reasons, the extent to which firms comply with the national social insurance guideline
may differ widely even when they are under the control of a same local authority. This
uncoordinated pension contribution rates and preferential policies for firms have made
it even harder for the central government unify the locally fragmented pensions system.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter examines how the diverging policy preferences of the Chinese central
and local government have shaped the Chinese pension program, featured by a high
level of functional and local fragmentation. Major structural changes in the Chinese
economy and labor market necessitated the reform of the Chinese pension system, but
has also changed the incentives and preferences of the central and local actors regarding
the specifics of the pension reform on the other hand. Existing institutions and politi-
cal legacies—such as decentralized fiscal relations between the central and local govern-
ment, local welfare system buttressed by the Chinese local citizenship institutions (hukou
system), and career evaluation mechanisms emphasizing economic performance—have
made local actors cultivate different policy preferences and interests than the central
102
government and empowered local state actors to resist the central government’s attempt
to centralize the pension system.
In 2015, the central policymakers reiterated the imperative of the establishment of
the nationwide pension pooling system. The current chair of the NSSF and the for-
mer Chinese minister of finance has also emphasized that the pension fund should be
directly managed and monitored by the central government in order to promote labor
mobility. While the central policymakers reached a consensus to centralize the pension
system, achieving such goal is not as straightforward as it sounds. One of the serious
challenge for the centralization of the pension system is the pension fund deficit. Local
governments, who have enjoyed the discretion of managing the local pension fund, have
depleted the local pension fund to pay for the older workers, causing serious and chronic
shortage of the fund. Provinces in the Chinese rust-belt, such as Heilongjiang, has the
most serious problem. In order to centralize the pension management system, the cen-
tral government has to make up the balance in local pension funds while at the same
time striving to make local actors comply with the central regulations and coordinate
the differences in local pension structure.
As the central government starts to play a more direct and active role in managing
pension funds and subsidizing different pension programs, local governments may have
more incentives to comply with the central pension policies. The rapid expansion of the
residency-based pension program in many localities in China, for example, would have
never achieved with the realignment of the fragmented residency-based programs and
the increased central subsidies. Yet the extent to which local government complies with
the central government’s direction to embrace the broader segment of society has var-
ied across localities depending on the specific demographic structure and composition
of workers in local labor market. The latter part of this dissertation examines how lo-
cal governments develop different pension expansion strategies and construct different
103
pension regimes depending on the local labor market structure. To understand different
challenges local governments face, the next chapter of this dissertation describes how the
demographic structure, labor market structure, and citizenship composition of workers
vary across different localities in China.
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Chapter 4
Creating “Outsiders” : How Labor
Informalization and Labor Mobility
Interact in Stratifying Chinese Workers
4.1 Introduction: Motivation, Findings, and a Road Map
Chinese social insurance system has developed in a way that selectively benefits cer-
tain groups of society, while leaving others outside the state’s protection. Who are the
‘welfare outsiders’ and how are these ‘outsiders’ constructed in Chinese society?
In many countries around the world, labor market outsiders—those who have tem-
porary, non-standard, and insecure employment positions—are considered to be wel-
fare outsiders as well. Even social democratic parties in the most developed welfare
states have often proposed and implemented welfare policies that selectively protect la-
bor market insiders (those with secure employment positions) at the expense of labor
market outsiders (Rueda, 2006). Labor market dualization—the segregation between
labor market insiders and outsiders—has often led to welfare dualization in both devel-
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oped economies (Häusermann and Schwander, 2010) and developing countries (Gundo-
gan and Bicerli, 2009), although the extent to which the two trends are related with each
other has varied across countries (Häusermann and Schwander, 2010).
In China as well, the division within workers has long existed even before the market
reform. Temporary workers in both rural and urban areas received much less welfare
benefits than urban permanent workers in SOEs even during the Chinese socialist era.
Yet the division by employment position is not the only meaningful cleavage that de-
marcates welfare ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in China. In China, various socio-economic
and spatial categories—such as local v.s. non-local, urban v.s. rural—have created im-
portant divisions among workers (Perry, 1994, 14). The interaction and overlap between
theses socio-economic categories reinforce or alleviate the position of a labor market
outsider (or insider) as a welfare outsider (or insider). Some labor market outsiders are
further marginalized from welfare provision than other labor market outsiders. Chinese
informal workers, for example, may have widely different entitlement to welfare bene-
fits, working conditions, relationship to the local labor market, degree of incorporation
into the cities, and wages depending on whether they are from within the same locality
and/or whether they have urban hukou (Swider, 2011).
By examining the China case, I show that the extent to which labor market outsiders
become welfare outsiders varies depending on how other social categories that construct
‘outsiderness’—non-local residency status or rural hukou status—overlap and interact
with one’s employment position. In this chapter, I argue that the locally divided citizen-
ship institutions, differing patterns of labor mobility, and political systems that nurture
local favoritism influence the extent to which labor informalization leads to welfare du-
alization.
Previous works have focused exclusively on the urban v.s. rural divide to explain
the welfare dualization in China. A large number of studies have discussed how rural
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workers are more likely to have precarious employment positions and how rural (versus
urban) workers are more likely to be welfare outsiders. A handful of studies find that
whether one has “local” urban hukou is a key to understanding labor market segmen-
tation in China (Fan, 2002). However, these studies do not sufficiently discuss whether
and how the effect of local v.s. non-local divide differs from the rural v.s. urban divide
in explaining the social stratification in China. I shift the focus of discussion from the
urban v.s. rural divide to the local v.s. non-local divide. I argue that growing labor mo-
bility and institutional changes—hukou reform and social insurance reform—have made
local vs. non-local divide as the most salient cleavage that further corroborates Chinese
informal workers’ positions as both ‘labor market outsiders’ and ‘welfare outsiders’. Lo-
cally diverging patterns of labor mobility influences the extent to which informal jobs
are passed onto non-local workers. The locally differing level of overlap of between
non-local workers and informal workers is the key to explaining why Chinese localities
develop different welfare regimes in response to labor informalization (Chapter 5) and
why some Chinese informal workers remain uninsured despite their eligibility to enroll
in the national social insurance programs (Chapter 6).
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I examine how Chinese work-
ers have been internally stratified. I first examine how the ‘outsiders’ have been created
even before the market economy was introduced in China. I then examine how the
growing labor mobility and institutional changes have increased the saliency of local v.s.
non-local division over urban v.s. rural division in further reinforcing the ‘outsiderness’
of Chinese informal workers. In the following two sections, I discuss the heterogeneity
among informal employment by disaggregating informal employment by its sources and
types—self-employed, non-contract workers, and various forms of precarious workers.
I also provide empirical evidence showing local divergences in the size and forms of in-
formal employment. The next section discusses how locally divergent patterns of labor
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mobility influences the extent to which non-local worker overlaps with informal worker
varies across localities and thereby creates different types of welfare outsiders.
4.2 Continuities and Discontinuities in the Internal Divi-
sion Among Chinese Workers
Various types of informal and precarious employment positions seen in nowadays
China have their roots in the pre-reform period. The internal division within workers
created in the pre-reform period has continued as China goes through marketization
and labor informalization.
What has been changes after the reform is the growing importance of local v.s. non-
local divide as a social category that stratifies workers. In the pre-reform period, the
rural v.s. urban division played a more decisive role in reinforcing the outsiderness of
certain temporary workers. The growing labor mobility followed by the market reform
and a series of institutional changes have increased the saliency of the local v.s. non-local
divide as another decisive factor that reinforces informal workers’ position both as labor
market outsiders and welfare outsiders.
4.2.1 Socialist Labor Dualism in the Pre-Reform Era: Permanent v.s.
Temporary Workers
One of the common myths about the socialist China is that it treated all workers
equally by providing them with secure employment positions and generous welfare
benefits. In fact, only a small fraction of the population was the winner of the system,
rewarded with a secure employment position and extravagant fringe benefits coming
from urban SOEs. Most rural workers were widely excluded from public good provi-
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sions given to urban workers. They were often recruited as temporary employees for
urban SOEs. Temporary workers existed not only in rural areas but also in urban areas.
The social division between urban SOE workers and urban temporary workers was as
notable as in capitalist society (Walder, 1984; White, 1976).
Many temporary workers were recruited from rural area as short-term seasonal la-
bor during the slack agricultural season (Walder, 1984; White, 1976). While some rural
temporary workers were hired without any labor contracts at all, many rural temporary
workers were recruited through nearby commune officials for a contracted period. Even
with this fixed-term contracts, however, the relationship between rural temporary work-
ers and state enterprises was tenuous and temporary. Both contracted or non-contracted
rural temporary workers were not eligible for any of the fringe benefits that permanent
state workers in urban sector received.
Yet such temporary employment was not confined to rural workers. In between rural
workers and urban permanent workers, a large number of urban temporary workers
existed. Unlike rural temporary workers whose primary job was farming, urban tempo-
rary workers were mainly and primarily affiliated with state enterprises. In this regard,
urban temporary workers were economically and socially more dependent on urban en-
terprises than rural temporary workers. Yet, unlike urban permanent workers, urban
temporary workers were outside of the enterprises’ planned official roster. As a result,
they could not fully enjoy the employment-related welfare benefits. They often work
under fixed-term contracts, although it was not uncommon for urban temporaries to
work for many years at the same factory (Dillon, 2015; Walder, 1984). They tended to
earn significantly less than permanent workers despite the fact that they usually perform
same tasks as permanent workers (Dillon, 2015, 3). Infuriated by this absurd discrimina-
tion and disenchanted by the socialist promises of egalitarian society, urban temporary
workers took the lead in staging labor protests in the 1950s. (Perry, 1994; White, 1976).
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The economic hardship created by the Great Leap Forward (GLF) in the late 1950s
further widened, rather than shrunk, the internal gap between temporary and perma-
nent workers. After the disastrous sweep of the GLF, permanent employment positions
became even more scant while temporary employment position increased. Labor sta-
tions in each locality functioned as what nowadays are labor agency firms, although
labor stations were definitely a part of government: They arranged temporary works for
the unemployed; any temporary workers had to provide a receipt showing that he had
registered at the labor station before they pick up their wages (White, 1976). The eco-
nomic hardship followed by the GLF also weakened the solidarity between permanent
and temporary workers by making permanent workers oppose the expansion of welfare
benefits to temporary workers. (Dillon, 2015, 259-260). While a growing number of tem-
porary workers claimed same treatment and benefits enjoyed by permanent workers, the
distinction between permanent and temporary employees remained solid. (Dillon, 2015,
260).
The labor dualism shown in the pre-reform era is different from labor informalization
presented after the economic reform in a sense that it was the state (and not the mar-
ket) who actively recruited, used, and managed various forms of temporary workers to
supplement permanent workers. Yet many important similarities and continuities exist
between the socialist dualism in the pre-reform era and labor market dualism (labor in-
formalization) after the reform. Various forms of temporary workers in the pre-reform
era suffered from high employment insecurity, lower wages, and lack of social welfare
benefits, just like informal workers in a market economy do.
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4.2.2 From the Rural v.s. Urban Divide to the Local v.s. Non-Local
Divide
While all temporary workers in the pre-reform periods were marginalized from the
extravagant welfare benefits enjoyed exclusively by urban permanent workers, there ex-
isted important division even within temporary workers. Depending on one’s hukou
type (rural v.s. urban hukou), the extent to which a temporary worker is marginalized
from the state’s welfare provision varied. Because the type of welfare benefits one could
receive from the state varied widely across the hukou type (rural v.s. urban hukou),
rural temporaries were further marginalized from welfare provision compared to urban
temporaries. Urban temporaries also received higher wages and had a longer-term rela-
tionship with enterprises than rural temporaries. Whether one is from within the same
locality or from other locality was less of an issue because both urban and rural tempo-
raries were recruited from nearby towns and villages within the same provinces due to
a high restriction on labor mobility (Swider, 2011).
As the restriction on labor mobility is eased in the market reform period, however,
the source of informal employment has become more diversified. A growing number
of informal employment positions have been filled not only by local rural workers but
also by workers coming from less-developed localities. Inter-provincial migration, in
particular, has become one of the prevalent modes of migration. The growing level of
labor mobility has made the local v.s. non-local division as another important layer that
stratifies the Chinese labor market, along with the rural v.s. urban division.
A large number of informal and precarious employment positions have been passed
onto workers coming either from rural areas (within the same locality) or from other un-
derdeveloped localities. This workers have been collectively called as ‘migrant workers’.
This term, however, often fails to make a clear distinction between workers coming from
111
rural to urban area within a same locality or workers coming from different localities.
The ambiguity innate in this term was less problematic in the past as the distinction be-
tween rural and urban hukou workers was the most important cleavage that determines
one’s welfare status and as labor mobility was strictly limited. The growing labor mobil-
ity and increasing number of inter-provincial migrant workers, however, has increased
the saliency of the local v.s. non-local divide. Even official reports on migrant workers
make an important distinction between rural migrant workers coming from within the
same locality (bendi nongmingong) and migrant workers employed in different localities
than their hukou registration place (waichu nongmingong).
Various institutional changes, including hukou reform and fiscal decentralization,
have also increased the saliency of local v.s. non-local divide. When labor mobility
was strictly restricted and the type of welfare benefits one can receive varied by hukou
type (rural v.s. urban hukou), hukou location (local v.s. non-local) had no additional
meaning than a place where individuals can claim the benefits designated to them. Yet
with the recent hukou reform, the type of social benefits rural hukou workers receive
has become similar to that is entitled to urban hukou workers (Chan and Buckingham,
2008) and the possession of local resident status has risen a pivotal criterion for one’s
welfare entitlement (Shi, 2012).
The upgrade of the social pooling system of Chinese social insurance programs has
also changed the scope to which local government regards an individual as a ‘local’,
although to different extents across cities and provinces. Since 2000s, the Chinese central
government has urged local governments to integrate the scatter social insurance system.
Many localities have followed the lead of the central government by integrating same
social insurance programs scattered through different sub-units of a locality. Localities
with higher income gap and labor sending provinces (which mostly located in Chinese
inland provinces) have been more active in upgrading the social pooling systems to the
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upper level for greater risk sharing (Huang and Kim, 2017). By 2016, more than 80%
of Chinese cities have completed the city-level integration of social insurance programs
(Huang and Kim, 2017). Some Chinese localities have even completed the establishment
of the provincial-level pooling system. The Chinese central government keeps pursuing
the integration of social-pooling system at the provincial level for all localities. Before the
reform, the concept of ‘local residents’ was only narrowly defined as local government
only considers workers from within the same township as “local”. With the integration
of the social pooling system, local governments have incentives to embrace workers
coming from within the same city or from within the same province into the public
welfare systems, while excluding non-locals from the boundary of the public system.
These institutional changes have reinforced and interacted with local government’s
long-maintained favoritism to local workers, in particular workers coming from within
the province. Chinese local governments have designed and implemented several poli-
cies to favor the natives and intra-provincial migrant workers to inter-provincial mi-
grant workers (Davies and Ramia, 2008; Nielsen, 2005). Provinces including Zhejiang,
Sichuan, Shandong and Chongqing have enacted policies that allowed migrant workers
from within the same province to settle down in cities. However, the same rules have
not yet applied to inter-provincial migrant workers (Liang, 2016, 8). Even in the most
inclusive and progressive provinces in which rural–urban social protection systems are
integrated, only intra-provincial migrants can benefit from the unified social protection
system (Liang, 2016).
When an informal worker (labor market outsider) is from other provinces, his or her
position as a welfare outsider is reinforced due to the discriminating hiring policies that
favor local workers, growing importance of local residency status in claiming welfare
entitlement, and implicit and explicit discrimination against non-locals.
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The extent to which informal worker overlaps with non-local workers, however, dif-
fers across localities. The fourth section of this chapter empirically examines how the
likelihood of a non-local workers to be employed as informal workers varies across lo-
calities. As a pre-step to examine the overlap between non-local workers and informal
workers, the next section first examines various forms of informal employment emerged
after marketization, their sizes, and regional distributions.
4.3 Sources and Sizes of Informal Employment in China
While the internal division of temporary and permanent workers has long existed
since the communist era, a full-fledged labor informalization has started with economic
opening and marketization in the late 1980s. The creation of flexible and non-standard
employment in the transitional period has helped the state make a smooth transition
to a market economy by absorbing surplus workers (Cooke, 2008), sustaining the liveli-
hood of new urban residents (Xue and Huang, 2015), and increasing the market flexi-
bility (Wang et al., 2016). Labor informalization after the market reform occurred not
only through an increase of informal employment in the formal sector—which has long
existed even before the market reform—but also through an enlargement of informal
sectors. Various forms and types of informal employment has created across different
economic sectors, ranging from self-employment, hourly paid work, temporary work,
irregular work, non-contracted employment, and dispatched employment (Chen and
Chan, 2018; Wang et al., 2016).
Acknowledging the variation in forms and types of informal employment is crucial to
better understand how many of Chinese workers are labor market outsiders, how they
experience different levels of employment insecurity, and how their relationship with
the state (institutions) shape differently. In this chapter, instead of merely estimating
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the aggregated size of informal employment, I provide a disaggregated measurement of
the size of informal employment by its sources. The new approach provides us three
important insights. First, labor informality is rampant in China, accounting for around
70% of employment of the country. Second, informal employment is rising in both the
formal and informal sectors, while the use of other non-standard forms of informal
employment is decreasing after the revision of the LCL of 2013. Third, the major source
of informal employment varies across localities: in underdeveloped inland regions, the
increase in informal employment is mainly attributable to the growth of informal sector.
In developed coastal provinces, to the contrary, most informal employments are created
in the formal sector.
The following section classifies types of informal employment by its source. The next
section estimates the size of informal employment by its sources and discusses how the
major sources of informal employment vary across localities.
4.3.1 Informal Employment by Sources
Informal Sector Employees
While there existed a large number of temporary workers with precarious and in-
formal employment positions in the pre-reform era, workers were mainly employed the
state enterprises. With the market reform, an economic sector not monitored and un-
regulated by the state—informal sector—has emerged, creating a growing number of
informal sector employees.
Compared to other developing countries, China has a relatively small informal sector.
Yet the emergence of informal economic sectors has enabled a soft landing to a market
economy by absorbing the growing number of newly released rural and urban workers
(Huang, 2009). An increasing number of rural workers participated in informal eco-
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nomic activities as self-employed, by selling small food or fruits or by repairing shoes,
bicycles, or keys in small scales (Cook, 2008). In urban areas, informal sectors emerged
in forms of informal private enterprises. These informal private enterprises are com-
posed of less than seven employees or are usually owned and managed by an individual
or by a family. These enterprises are regulated and monitored not as strictly as formal
enterprises, such as SOEs, collective enterprises, or foreign enterprises.
While the rise of self-employed or enlargement of informal sectors are often inter-
preted as the sign of economic backwardness, it actually played a pivotal role in boost-
ing the Chinese economy in the early phase of the reform (Giulietti et al., 2012; Meng,
2001). Compared to the informally employed in the formal sector, informal sector em-
ployees (self-employed) also have high labor market quality as well. They possess higher
managerial skills and make higher income than what they would have earned had they
worked in the formal sector as an informal wage worker (Giulietti et al., 2012; Meng,
2001).
Non-Contract Workers in the Formal Sector: Rising Informality in the Formal Sector
in Mid 1990s and Early 2000s
While the size of informal sector has been growing, a larger portion of informal
employment in China has been created in the formal sector. Starting from the late 1990s,
the urban economy previously predominated by SOEs has become diversified with the
rise of private enterprises and foreign enterprises. Unlike SOEs, the newly emerging
formal sector—foreign and private enterprises—was not fully responsible to workers’
social or employment security. These profit oriented private and foreign firms concerned
more about lowering labor costs and maintaining price competitiveness in the world
market. To achieve these goals, firms in the newly emerging formal sector employed
workers without establishing formal employment-relationship through labor contracts.
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While the concept of employment relationship built on labor contract has introduce
in the Labor Law of 1994, many workers entering to the emerging formal sector were
not aware of the existence or concept of labor contracts. Firms often took advantage
of workers’ lack of legal knowledge to not to provide workers with labor contracts and
even discouraged workers from signing onto the labor contract (Gallagher et al., 2014;
Gao et al., 2012; Cui et al., 2013). Due to their lack of labor contracts, workers’ em-
ployment relationships have been poorly monitored, managed, or regulate by relevant
authorities or local governments despite the fact that they are employed in the formal
sector. Local governments have often turned blind eyes on firms’ violation of the la-
bor law to maintain firms’ economic investments to their localities. In consequence, the
number of formal sector workers who are not protected by labor laws and experience
high level of employment insecurity has increased.
Workers from rural areas or other localities have become major sources of these in-
formal employment in the formal sector. In order to attract these firms’ investments to
their own localities and provide these firms with stable supply of cheap and low-skilled
labor, Chinese local governments have loosened their restrictions on rural to urban mi-
gration. A large number of rural workers coming from within and across provinces have
provided much needed labor for mass production of labor intensive, low-skilled goods,
without being provided with labor contracts. Yet, due to their differential hukou sta-
tus, rural workers employed in urban areas had difficulty in claiming legitimate wages
or better working conditions (Solinger, 1999). Nor could they benefit from the urban
employment social protection programs. Profit-oriented foreign and private firms have
actively hired these rural workers to make the hiring and firing processes flexible and to
save costs related with labor protection (Knight et al., 1999).
The informally employed in the formal sector share some important characteristics
with informal sector workers (such as self-employed) in that they are not provided with
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employment-based social insurance and they experience high income insecurity. Yet for-
mal sector workers lacking labor contracts are regulated more intensively by the state
regulation and are affected more directly by labor regulations and laws compared to the
self-employed in informal sectors. According to a research comparing the two groups of
informal workers, formal sector employees lacking labor contracts work shorter hours
and provided with better social protection than informal sector workers. Formal sec-
tor workers lacking labor contract, however, earn less money and have lower level of
subjective well-being than informal sector workers (Liang et al., 2016).
The LCL of 2008 was introduced to reduce the social ramification and instability
caused by the rampant labor abuse and increase of employment insecurity. As Hu
Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration rose in power with the catchphrase of “harmonious
society”, maintaining social stability and reducing labor discontents have become im-
portant political goals. By enacting a more enforceable and protective labor law, the
Chinese government tried to improve workers’ working environment and reduce social
instability caused by poor treatment against informal workers, in particular, migrant
workers (Meng, 2017; Gallagher et al., 2014; Li and Freeman, 2015). The LCL has made
it mandatory for workers to sign labor contracts with their employers. Employers were
punished when they failed to sign a labor contract with their employees within a month
from the employment relations began. The passage of the LCL has certainly increased
the proportion of workers whose labor relationships are formally established based on
labor contracts (Gallagher et al., 2014). The proportion of workers with labor contracts
has increased not only among urban workers but also among migrant workers. With
the implementation of the law, workers became more aware of their labor rights and
gained power to file labor disputes, claim their social rights, and protect themselves
from rampant labor abuses (Gallagher, 2006).
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Precarious Workers: at the Edge of the Labor Contract Law
The LCL has not, however, ended the use of informal employment. In fact, the protec-
tive legislation of the LCL and the strict enforcement of it have unintendedly created new
forms of non-standard employment positions (Park and Cai, 2011). Moreover, as a way
to accommodate the strong opposition from businesses regarding the rigid employment
management processes imposed by the LCL, the law added specific provision on the
use of dispatched workers and other forms of non-standard employment option. This
has unintendedly justified the use of dispatch workers and other forms of precarious
employees.
Indirect employment through labor dispatch agencies (paiqiangong), in particular, has
been widely used as a way to circumvent the strict enforcement of the labor law (Wang
et al., 2016).1 The use of dispatch workers helped firms hire workers at lower costs and
with a high flexibility but without directly violating the LCL (Cook, 2008; Swider, 2015).
Dispatch workers sign labor contract with a labor dispatch enterprise, but not with the
company they actually work (host company). The legal responsibility regarding hiring
and firing processes, provision of government-mandated social insurance benefits, and
redress of labor grievances, has been from hosting firms to the agency firms (Chen and
Chan, 2018). While dispatch workers usually perform same tasks as regular employees,
dispatch workers are paid less, are marginalized from social protection, and experience a
higher level of job insecurity (Ren and Peng, 2007; Park and Cai, 2011; Wang et al., 2016).
Their labor relations are hardly monitored by labor authorities due to the complexity of
the employment relationship. To make things even worse, much of employment related
evidence for dispatch workers remain in the hands of the employers, not employees
(Cheung, 2013). While dispatch employment was initially concentrated in the low-skilled
1 Different terms are used to indicate this group of workers: dispatch workers, subcontracted workers,
agency workers
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sectors, primarily in industries or private enterprises, it has now spread to well-protected
sectors such as state-owned manufacturing enterprises (Park and Cai, 2011; Wang et al.,
2016). In the worst case, dispatch workers compose more than two thirds of full time
employees at SOEs (Cheung, 2013). According to a research report by the All China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) dispatched employment project team, dispatch
workers make up nearly 17% of the total workforce in urban employment (ACFTU,
2012).
Employers have also created other forms of nonstandard and precarious employment
positions that pay workers at hourly rate or that hire workers only temporarily or sea-
sonally (Wang et al., 2016; Zhou, 2013). Part-time and probationary work also allowed
employers to enjoy employment flexibility without being caught by the violation of the
LCL (Ho and Huang, 2014).
Chinese local governments, however, played a limited role in limiting the use of
various forms of precarious employment positions. Instead, they have overlooked, if
not facilitated, the growth of precarious employments to boost labor market flexibility
(Wang et al., 2016). Some local labor bureaus even negotiated with labor agency firms
and allowed them to provide only limited social benefits to the agency workers (Wang
et al., 2016).
The over-expansion of precarious employment positions (especially the explosive use
of dispatch workers by firms), however, has worried Chinese government about its ram-
ification on its economic development and social stability. The Chinese government’s
turn to domestic-consumption oriented model also played a role in motivating the state
to revise the LCL. In December 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress released the Decision of the Standing Committee on the Revision of the LCL, which
became effective in July 2013. The revised LCL restricts the use of dispatch worker, stipu-
lates the six-month limit on using temporary workers, and set the maximum percentage
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of dispatch workers in a firm’s total employees. Yet many observers cast doubt on the
effectiveness of the revised law in reducing the abuse of non-standard employment and
in decreasing the size of informal employment. While many firms have reduced their
use of dispatched workers, they have developed loopholes to cope with the new regula-
tions. Business outsourcing and part-time employment, for example, have risen as new
forms of informal employment widely used by employers who want to enjoy employ-
ment flexibility but not being caught by the new labor regulations (Wang et al., 2016).
The global trend of rising gig economy has also enlarged the size of informal employ-
ment in China. Gig workers are similar to the self-employed in that their employment
relationship is not based on labor contract and are hardly monitored by the state. Yet
they are different from the self-employed in that they still work for a company or for
an enterprise. The connection between gig workers and firms is, however, tenuous and
unstable. Most gig employees work only to complete a particular task or for defined
time (Friedman, 2014). Hence, just like other informal employees, they experience high
income and employment insecurity. Moreover, in the absence of lasting financial or
social connections to workplaces, gig workers are separated from their fellow workers
(Friedman, 2014).
Chinese local governments, those in underdeveloped inland areas in particular, have
encouraged and supported the rise of this new form of employment. According to an
interview with a manager of an employment agency, whose headquarter is in Shanghai
but whose branches are spread all over China, local governments encourage the rise
of gig economy to create more employment.2 He said that “Local governments in inland
areas do not have many firms (to create employment). These days, they establish human resource
service centers and invite agency firms like us to create various forms of informal employment.”.
He also added that this new form of employment rooted in the gig economy has become
2 subject # 9, Interview with a manager of an employment agency, Shanghai, March 8, 2016.
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an important mode of employment in China: “Flexible employment (linghuojieyue) has
become a new model of employment type. You (an employee) don’t have to be tied in a firm or a
company. If someone needs you, you can go work for someone. If nobody wants you, you can just
go rest.”.
4.3.2 Measuring the Size of Informal Employment in China
How are different forms of informal employment distributed in China? Estimating
the size and distribution of Chinese informal employment has been a challenging task
for the following two reasons.
First, the Chinese government has placed less efforts in officially measuring the size
of informal employment (Park et al., 2012). The lack of official effort to understand the
size and nature of labor informality of the country is related with the state’s reluctance
to acknowledge the existence of informal employment (Liang et al., 2016). Even when
the state describes informal employees, it has adopted the term of ‘flexible’ (linghuojiuye)
workers to dilute the negative connotation and to reduce the de-legitimizing effect that
the term ‘informal’ may bring to the society. The lack of coherent measurement of
informal employment has delayed the establishment of systematic policy guidelines for
informal workers (Liang et al., 2016).
Second, focusing more on measuring the aggregate level of informal employment,
a large number of previous studies pay only insufficient amount of attention to the
differences in the types and characteristics of informal employment. Various forms of
informal employment positions created at the edge of the LCL, such as employment
through dispatch agencies, have been widely under-counted. This has often led to an
underestimation of the size of informal employment.
Studies using official statistics released by NBS, for example, measure the size of in-
formal employment by looking the gap between the number of total urban labor force
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and the number of formal employees (Cook, 2008; Hu and Zhao, 2006; Park and Cai,
2011; Zhang et al., 2015). While this approach is widely used, this residual approach
does not clearly spell out who constitutes the ‘residual’ worker group. Some argue that
the number of uncounted workers is likely to capture the number of informal employ-
ees in formal sectors (Hu and Zhao, 2006). Others, on the other hand, interpret this
number as the number of workers in informal sectors such as unregistered private and
self-employed sectors (Park and Cai, 2011). Moreover, informal workers exist not just
in informal sector but also in formally registered sectors. The residual approach, how-
ever, treats all workers as formal if they are employed in formal enterprises. It thereby
underestimates the size of informal employment.
Some studies supplement the limitation of the residual approach by measuring the
size of informal employment using individual-level survey data. Unlike official statistics,
individual-level survey data provide detailed information on differences in employment
sectors, employment positions, and social-economic characteristics of workers who con-
stitute different informal worker groups. Most research identifies a worker as informal
if a worker is self-employed workers (Cook, 2008; Park and Cai, 2011) or a worker lacks
labor contracts (Chen and Hamori, 2013; Liang et al., 2016; Park et al., 2012). Another
variant of this approach looks at not only a worker’s possession of labor contracts but
also his/her social insurance (pension, health insurance, unemployment insurance) par-
ticipation status (Park et al., 2012). In doing so, studies using survey data captures in-
formal employment in both informal and formal sectors. Yet this estimate often fails to
capture various forms of informal workers who have labor contracts yet still experience
a high level of employment insecurity, such as workers who are contracted as temporary,
part-time employees or workers who are employed indirectly by labor dispatch agencies
(Cook, 2008; Swider, 2015). Recognizing this group of informal workers is important in
understanding Chinese labor market outsiders not only because its size is substantial
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but also because they experience different outsiderness than non-contracted workers in
the formal sector or the self-employed.
This chapter provides an updated measure of the size of informal employment by
taking into account three different sources of informal employment using two rounds of
nationally sample survey data, CLDS of 2012 and 2014. The first type of informal em-
ployment indicates those employment positions created in informal economic sectors,
such as self-employed and those employed in family-owned enterprises. The second
and third type of informal employment occurs in formal sectors: The second type of
informal employees indicates formal sector employees lacking labor contracts (hereafter,
non-contracted workers); The last type of informal employees indicates formal sector
employees with labor contract but whose employment position is nevertheless precari-
ous (hereafter, precarious workers). I defined precarious employment as wage workers
who obtain labor contracts but who are employed indirectly by labor dispatch agencies,
are paid on non-regular basis, or are employed as a part time worker. In measuring the
total size of informal employment, I aggregated the number of all these three types of
informal employment.
The analysis from the two rounds of survey shows that informal employment ex-
plains a large part of the Chinese economy (See Figure 4.1). In 2012 (CLDS), only 27.88%
(weighted) of the total employment is formal employment and 28.3% in 2014 (CLDS).
According to the survey, the size of total informal employment has slightly decreased
from 72.12% in 2012 to 71.7% in 2014. Yet both the shares of employees in informal
sectors (self-employed) and non-contract workers in urban employment have increased.
The share of self-employed has risen from 15.04% in 2012 to 24.83% in 2014. The share
of non-contract workers has increased from 35.61% to 38.91%. While the decrease in
the size if informal employees in formal sector from 57.07% in 2012 to 46.87% in 2014 is
mainly due to the decrease of precarious employment positions. The survey shows that
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the share of precarious workers has decreased from 21.46% in 2012 to 7.96% in 2014. The
rapid decrease in the size of precarious workers is attributable to the revision of the LCL
of 2013, which restricted the use of dispatch workers.
Figure 4.1: The Composition and Size of Urban Employment in China (2012, 2014)
Source: China Labor Dynamic Survey 2012, 2014
Among the three different types of informal employment, non-contracted employ-
ment explains the largest share of informal employment. In 2012, slightly less than a
half of entire informal employment (49.1%) is non-contracted employment in the formal
sector. The share of non-contract worker in informal employment has increased to 54.2%
in 2014.
The aggregated share of informal employment is larger in Chinese inland provinces
than in coastal provinces with high state capacity, developed economy, and better en-
forcement (See Figure 4.2). It shows the finding from previous research that informality
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is less prevalent in more developed, coastal cities (Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Fuzhou)
compared to interior cities is not just limited to these localities. (Park et al., 2012).
Figure 4.2: Share of Informal Employment in Urban Employment by Provinces
Note: The shaded areas indicate missing information on the share of informal employ-
ment
Source: CLDS 2012, 2014
Not only the size of informal employment differs, but also the major source of in-
formal employment varies across localities. The stack bars in Figure 4.3 indicates the
composition of informal employment by sources. In developed areas, the major source
of labor informality is informal employment in the formal sector (either in forms of pre-
carious or non-contracted employment). In underdeveloped inland areas, on the other
hand, as is indicated by the light grey bars, a large share of informal employment comes
from informal sectors as a form of self-employed. In Shanghai in 2014, for example, only
8% of informal employment comes from informal sector as a form of self-employed. In
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Anhui in 2014, on the other hand, 56.71% of informal employment is in informal sector
as a form of self-employed.
Figure 4.3: Informal Employment by Sources
Even when comparing two Chinese coastal and inland provinces with a similar size
of informal employment, a larger share of informal employment comes from informal
sectors in inland provinces. In 2014, the share of informal employment in urban em-
ployment was 70.81% and 71.61% of local employment in Zhejiang and Hunan, respec-
tively. Yet only 8.01% of informal employment in Zhejiang comes from informal sectors
while 40.73% of informal employment in Hunan arises from informal sector in forms
of self-employed. The Chinese inland provinces’ policy support for return migration
and entrepreneurship has contributed to the rise of the self-employed in these localities
(Liang, 2016). The policy support from local authorities has encouraged a large number
of migrant workers to return to their home localities, start a business in inland provinces,
and reunite with their family members.
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4.4 Labor Mobility and Labor Informality: the Two Layers
of Market Stratification
As discussed, the local v.s. non-local divide has risen as an important cleavage that
affects one’s welfare entitlement in China. An informal worker (labor market outsider)
is further marginalized from welfare provision (and becomes a welfare outsider) if the
individual is not a legitimate member of a geopolitical community (local worker). The
extent to which the two outsiders overlap, however, varies across Chinese localities due
to diverging patterns of labor mobility. In Chinese coastal localities, a significant portion
of informal employment has been passed onto these inter-provincial migrant workers.
In Chinese inland localities, to the contrary, informal employment positions have been
filled more by workers from within the same province. The different level at which
non-local workers overlap with informal workers create different types of ‘outsiders’.
In this section, I examine how the pattern of labor mobility has differed across regions
and how one’s migrant status has different meaning in predicting one’s employment
status across regions with different patterns of labor mobility.
4.4.1 Different Patterns of Labor Mobility: Labor Mobility within or
across Province?
The scale of within-country migration has been increasing since the market reform in
the late 1980s. Inter-provincial migration, in particular, has become one of the prevalent
modes of migration. The share of inter-provincial migration in all inter-county migration
rose rapidly from 27.7% in 1990 to 45.9% in 2015 (Su et al., 2018). Yet the flow of inter-
provincial migrant workers has been unidirectional (Fan, 2002, 2005; Su et al., 2018).
While developed provinces located in the coastal area have attracted a large number
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of inter-provincial migrant workers coming underdeveloped inland localities in China,
inland provinces have hosted only a small number of inter-provincial migrant workers.
The 2010 national population census data show that inter-provincial migrants as a share
of all non-local migrants (those workers whose hukou is not in the current place) is
larger in coastal provinces than in inland provinces (See Figure 4.4). The analysis from
the CLDS of 2012 and 2014 also shows the similar pattern of inter-provincial migration.
(See Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.4: The Share of Inter-Provincial Migrant in Total Migration
Source: 2010 Population Census (National Bureau of Statistics)
While labor mobility is growing rapidly in inland provinces as well, most of mi-
gration occurs in form of intra-provincial movement (See Figure 4.5). The volume and
scope of intra-provincial migration has grown rapidly in recent years.3 In particular, in
3 It is important to note that this trend is not confined to inland provinces. In coastal areas, as well, the
use of intra-provincial migrant workers has been growing. While a large number of migrants are still from
inland rural areas in the 1980s and 1990s, increasing number of migrants in the coastal cities are from the
towns and cities of the inland provinces in the new millennium (Shen and Wang, 2016).
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Sichuan and Henan—the main exporters of inter-provincial migrant workers, the num-
ber of intra-provincial migrants has out-numbered that of out-going migrants.4
Figure 4.5: The Share of Intra-Provincial Migrant in Total Migration
Source: 2010 Population Census (National Bureau of Statistics)
Due to the different patterns of labor migration, the extent to which informal em-
ployment is passed onto workers of non-local workers has also varied. In Chinese labor
importing localities located in coastal provinces, many of informal jobs are external-
ized to inter-provincial migrant workers. According to the 2012 CLDS, among all non-
contracted workers in Tianjin, 47.36% were from other provinces. 62.83% and 63.33%
of all non-contract workers in Shanghai and Zhejiang were from other provinces. The
high overlap between inter-provincial migrant workers and informal workers has further
reinforced the segregation between insiders and outsiders.
The informal, non-standard, and precarious employment positions taken by inter-
provincial migrant workers have also lowered coastal provincial government’s incentives
to incorporate inter-provincial migrant workers into the public welfare system. In con-
4 https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/chinas-migrant-workers-boon-and-challenge (Last Accessed
Date : April 10, 2018)
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sequence, coastal provincial governments have developed ways to incorporate non-local
workers selectively based on their merits, ability to contribute to local economy, and so-
cial economic status. The point system adopted in Guangdong province epitomizes how
coastal provincial government restricts the permanent settlements of inter-provincial mi-
grant workers with lower income and skill levels (Chan and Buckingham, 2008; Song,
2014).
Figure 4.6: Share of Interprovincial Migrant Workers in All Migrant Workers by Province
Source: CLDS 2012, 2014
In Chinese underdeveloped labor sending localities with fewer inter-provincial mi-
grant workers, on the other hand, informal employment positions are not necessarily
reserved for inter-provincial migrant workers. The growing number of informal employ-
ment of various forms are taken by local or intra-provincial migrant workers. Among all
non-contracted workers in Hubei and Hunan, nearly 90% were coming from within the
same province.
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Intra-provincial informal workers in inland provinces are similar to inter-provincial
informal worker in coastal provinces in that they do not enjoy the same benefits as their
formal counterparts. Yet the two groups of informal workers are different in that intra-
provincial migrant informal workers are also more likely to be perceived as permanent
residents of the locality and have a greater intention and ability to settle down in their
destination cities (Shen and Wang, 2016; Su et al., 2018). Also, as China moves from
its export-oriented development model to domestic-consumption based model, many
inland governments have striven to design policies to retain workers from within the
same localities. In the past, local officials in labor sending localities used to visit factories
in labor receiving provinces, such as Guangdong, to persuade them to hire workers
from their localities. Now party officials in many labor sending localities visit local
factories for this purpose and to make sure many employment positions go to locals.5
Having more workers from within the province, inland provincial governments have
been in better place to pursue social inclusion policies based on local residency (Yang and
Gallagher, 2017). The more stable residency status of intra-provincial migrant workers
contributes to the local economy by making these workers supply their labor for a longer
period, acquire new skills, and consume more goods and services (Su et al., 2018; Meng,
2014).
4.4.2 The Impact of Migrant Status on One’s Employment Position
Whether and how a worker’s migrant status affects his or her employment status
has been an important issue in understanding the Chinese labor market structure. It
is not a secret that local governments have reserved good—formal, stable, and perma-
nent—employment positions for their own populace and imposed a discriminatory hir-
5 Welcome Home, The Economist (Feb 25, 2012), Available at
https://www.economist.com/node/21548273 (Last Access Date: April 10, 2018).
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ing policy against non-locals (Chen and Chan, 2018, 5). Yet only a few studies examine
whether one’s local citizenship status has an effect in determining one’s employment
positions. A recent study of labor informality in China finds that migrant workers are
more likely to become self-employed than to become non-contracted workers compared
to urban (local) workers (Liang et al., 2016). Yet this research defines migrant worker
as those who hold rural hukou and does not distinguish local workers from non-local
workers. Nor does it explore how the impact of migrant status differs across localities of
diverging labor mobility patterns.
To overcome the limitation of previous research, I conducted a multinomial analysis
of determinants of informal employment. I explored whether and how individual’s lo-
cal residency status affects his or her likelihood of working as a labor market outsider
(an informal worker) in two types of Chinese provinces—labor importing provinces and
labor exporting provinces. The dependent variables are dummies of different forms
of employment position—formal employees, self-employed (in informal sector), non-
contracted workers, and precarious workers. The main interest variable of this research
is the local citizenship status of a worker. I classified a worker’s migrant status by
three types—interprovincial migrant workers, intra-provincial migrant workers, and lo-
cal workers. For controls, I added the hukou type (rural hukou coded as 1 and urban
hukou as 0), education level, gender, age, and industry type.
Individual workers’ migrant status is likely to be associated more strongly with infor-
mal employment of various forms in labor importing areas that attract a large number
of non-citizen workers from other localities and externalize less-desired employment to
outsiders. In Chinese labor-exporting areas, on the other hand, local residency status
is not likely to lower one’s chance of working as an informal employee. The statisti-
cal outcome reported in the table below provides limited yet important support for the
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hypothesized relationship between one’s migrant status and employment positions in
different localities.
As can be seen by the table 4.1 and table 4.2, in Chinese labor-exporting localities lo-
cated in Chinese inland provinces, local workers are no less likely than inter-provincial
workers to work as either form of informal employee in 2012. In Chinese labor-importing
localities located in Chinese coastal areas, on the other hand, being a local worker de-
creases one’s change of being a precarious worker.
Table 4.1: Determinants of Informal Employment by Region (CLDS 2012)
Inland 2012 Coastal 2012
Variables self-emp Noncontract Precarious self-emp Noncontract Precarious
Migrant Status (Baseline: Interprovincial nonlocal worker)
Local 0.235 0.034 0.634 0.094 0.083 -0.932***
(0.460) (0.503) (0.752) (0.336) (0.263) (0.242)
Intra-provincial -0.340 -0.517 0.011 -0.607 -0.310 -0.519
(0.547) (0.450) (0.798) (0.428) (0.298) (0.317)
Rural hukou 2.409*** 1.615*** 2.141*** 1.138*** 0.711*** 0.646***
(0.296) (0.227) (0.279) (0.313) (0.240) (0.226)
Age 0.153** 0.010 -0.055 0.019 -0.140** -0.079
(0.068) (0.055) (0.055) (0.069) (0.058) (0.066)
Age squared -0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education (Baseline: Elementary and below)
Middle School -0.727** -0.637** -0.506* -0.661** -1.007*** -0.633***
(0.315) (0.264) (0.256) (0.291) (0.243) (0.218)
High school -1.686*** -1.053*** -0.740** 2.044*** -2.151*** -1.257***
(0.381) (0.311) (0.282) (0.297) (0.248) (0.285)
College and above -2.627*** -1.265*** -1.864*** -2.971*** -2.538*** -1.680***
(0.416) (0.312) (0.376) (0.477) (0.307) (0.279)
Female -0.343 0.151 0.235 -0.371** -0.021 0.106
(0.228) (0.166) (0.218) (0.181) (0.122) (0.157)
Industry Sector (Baseline: Primary Industry)
Secondary Industry 0.785 0.794 -2.420*** -0.446 -0.130 -2.921***
(0.528) (0.565) (0.367) (0.691) (0.598) (0.496)
Tertiary Industry 1.973*** 0.849* -2.579*** 0.664 -0.299 -3.706***
(0.525) (0.506) (0.373) (0.695) (0.552) (0.510)
Constant -6.488*** -1.263 0.844 -3.178* 3.146** 4.989***
(1.574) (1.381) (1.301) (1.586) (1.403) (1.393)
Observations 2,783 2,783 2,783 2,629 2,629 2,629
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: CLDS 2012, 2014
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The diverging employment pattern between inter and intra-provincial workers in
Chinese inland and coastal provinces becomes more prominent in 2014. In Chinese la-
bor exporting localities, local workers or migrant workers from within the same province
are no less likely than inter-provincial migrant workers to work as informal employ-
ees. In Chinese coastal provinces, on the other hand, local workers or migrant workers
from within the same province are less likely to work as precarious workers than inter-
provincial migrant workers.
Table 4.2: Determinants of Informal Employment by Region (CLDS 2014)
Inland 2012 Coastal 2012
Variables self-emp Noncontract Precarious self-emp Noncontract Precarious
Migrant Status (Baseline: Interprovincial nonlocal worker)
Local -0.133 0.099 0.587 0.745* 0.342 -0.646***
(0.504) (0.523) (0.743) (0.397) (0.305) (0.209)
Intra-provincial -0.343 -0.125 0.364 0.607 0.257 -0.738**
(0.534) (0.503) (0.672) (0.439) (0.298) (0.289)
Rural hukou 1.587*** 0.940*** 0.087 0.996*** 0.448* 0.186
(0.269) (0.189) (0.286) (0.289) (0.245) (0.289)
Age 0.065 -0.104*** 0.048 0.059 -0.223*** -0.017
(0.043) (0.039) (0.065) (0.046) (0.038) (0.065)
Age squared -0.001 0.001*** 0.001 -0.000 0.003*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Education (Baseline: Elementary and below)
Middle School -0.828*** -0.615*** -0.093 -0.694*** -0.726*** -0.228
(0.237) (0.227) (0.331) (0.218) (0.198) (0.316)
High school -2.173*** -1.648*** -0.562 -1.983*** -1.681*** -0.962**
(0.258) (0.209) (0.348) (0.242) (0.237) (0.420)
College and above -3.155*** -1.796*** -0.536 -3.183*** -2.558*** -1.555**
(0.374) (0.256) (0.407) (0.353) (0.270) (0.652)
Female -0.041 0.250* -0.136 -0.433** -0.012 0.088
(0.188) (0.149) (0.235) (0.159) (0.135) (0.185)
Industry Sector (Baseline: Primary Industry)
Secondary Industry -0.123 0.747** 0.514 -0.707 -0.092 0.648
(0.423) (0.358) (0.493) (0.527) (0.451) (0.864)
Tertiary Industry 1.017*** 0.663** -0.521 0.485 -0.237 -0.153
(0.356) (0.308) (0.461) (0.457) (0.469) (0.851)
Constant -1.488 2.458** -1.977 -4.098*** 4.150*** -1.548
(1.033) (0.981) (1.573) (1.215) (1.063) (1.634)
Observations 3,410 3,410 3,410 3,425 3,425 3,425
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: CLDS 2012, 2014
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While rural hukou workers are more likely to be informal workers of various forms
in both 2012 and 2014, the importance of rural hukou in predicting one’s employment
sector has decreased in 2014. In 2014, for example, rural hukou workers are no more
likely than urban hukou workers to be employed as precarious workers.
While being older seems to affect inland worker’s probability of working as self-
employed in 2012, the effect does not remain in 2014. Aging does not have any signifi-
cant association with one’s likelihood of working as a precarious worker in both inland
provinces and coastal provinces. Yet, the negative association between the age variable
and non-contracted workers and the positive association between the quadratic form age
variable and non-contract workers imply that younger and older workers are less likely
than middle-aged workers to be employed as non-contracted workers in both coastal and
inland areas. More years of education lowers one’s probability of working as informal
employees of any forms.
4.5 Conclusion and Summary
This chapter examines the divide between formal versus informal employment posi-
tions and the divide between local versus non-local workers as the main social categories
that stratify workers and make an individual as ‘welfare outsiders’. These social cate-
gories are not new to the Chinese society. They have long existed since the pre-reform
era and divided Chinese workers. As China went through marketization, however, the
stratification between labor market insiders (formal workers) and outsiders (informal
workers) has become even more apparent, institutionalized, and segmented. With the
growing labor mobility and institutional changes, the local versus non-local division has
risen as an important social category that determines one’s welfare entitlement. This
chapter also finds that, in certain Chinese regions, non-local workers are more likely to
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be employed as informal workers. The interaction and overlap of the two social cat-
egories can further consolidate one’s position as labor market outsiders and welfare
outsiders.
This finding resonates with the argument that the extent to which labor informaliza-
tion leads to welfare dualization or political dualization differs across countries depend-
ing on each country’s welfare system and political structure (Häusermann and Schwan-
der, 2012; Schwander and Häusermann, 2013). In China, it is the locally divided citizen-
ship institutions, differing patterns of labor mobility, and political systems that nurture
local favoritism that influence the extent to which labor informalization leads to welfare
dualization.
The next chapter discusses how the emergence of different types of ‘outsiders’ created
by the differing level of overlap between the two outsiders (non-local workers and infor-
mal workers) influences local government’s pension expansion strategies and explains
the emergence of locally dualized pension regimes.
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Chapter 5
Why Do the Two Pensions Develop
Unevenly: Sub-national Variation in
Pension Coverage
5.1 Introduction
The Chinese central government’s effort to cover a broader segment of society has
been partially successful. It is successful in a sense that the aggregated pension cover-
age has increased rapidly in all localities in China. Yet, it is not entirely successful in a
sense that the two Chinese pension programs—the employment-based pension program
and the residency-based pension program—have not expanded evenly across different
localities in China. This sub-nationally different pension expansion has resulted in the
establishment of two distinctive pension regimes in the country—a narrowly targeting
yet generous employment-based pension regime and a broadly encompassing yet mod-
est residency-based welfare regime. How does the pension expansion pattern differ sub-
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nationally and what explains the sub-national variation? What explains the emergence
of the two distinctive pension regimes in China?
This chapter seeks an answer to these questions by examining sub-national variation
in pension coverage among China’s 31 provinces during the period of 2005-2015. In
Chapter 2, I argued that structural changes that stratify the Chinese labor market—labor
informalization and labor mobility—influence local states’ welfare provision strategies
by altering the composition of pivotal groups that local governments try to co-opt using
social policies. Using a unique cross-sectional dataset compiled from two rounds of
nationally sampled survey data and various Chinese statistical yearbooks, this chapter
tests hypotheses generated from this theory: the relationship between labor informality,
labor mobility, and pension expansion patterns.
This chapter is organized as follows. I begin by describing the locally diverging
pension expansion patterns in China. The next section examines how previous literature
explains development of different social insurance programs focusing mainly on the
level of labor informalization and discusses why it is important to look at the joint
effect of labor informalization and labor mobility in explaining the local variation in
Chinese pension expansion. The following two sections provide empirical evidence for
the hypotheses generated from the theoretical discussion. The final section concludes
with a summary of findings and broader significance of the research.
5.2 Dual Pension Regimes in China: Sub-national Varia-
tion in Pension Coverage
Over the past few years, the Chinese central government has placed a greater em-
phasis on increasing its social insurance coverage. The shift of its development strategy
from the export-oriented model to the domestic-consumption oriented model, the end
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of demographic dividend, and a growing need for sustainable urbanization (urban-rural
integration) have all increased the central government’s aspiration for universal social
insurance coverage.
To achieve the goal, the Chinese central government has increased the subsidies for
local social security expenditure (Lin, 2015; Lin and Tussing, 2016) and set the pension
coverage of a locality and the amount of social security expenditure as important criteria
by which local officials are evaluated (Mok and Wu, 2013). With these changes, the
number of Chinese citizens covered by either of the two pension schemes has increased
extensively over the few years (See Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: Overall Pension Expansion by Province (2010-2014)
Legend
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Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook ; China Statistical Yearbook (2010-2014).
Seen from the overall pension coverage, every Chinese province seems to make a
step forward to universal pension coverage. Yet the breakdown of the overall pension
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Figure 5.2: Dualized Pension Expansion Patterns in China (2010-2014)
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coverage by programs shows that the two pension programs have not developed in a lo-
cally balanced way. As discussed in Chapter 3, the two pension programs serve different
groups of population and have widely different re-distributive implication. Hence, even
when two regions have the same overall pension coverage, the re-distributive implica-
tion and the type of workers covered by the social insurance program can widely differ
depending on the breakdown of the pension coverage by program.
In Chinese inland provinces, overall pension coverage has improved mainly due
to the rapid expansion of the residency-based pension program. The coverage of the
residency-based pension program has soared rapidly in this region and is higher than
those of coastal provinces. In Chinese coastal provinces, on the other hand, the residency-
based pension coverage has not expanded much and remains lower than those of inland
provinces. Conversely, when it comes to the coverage of the employment-based pension
program, inland provinces has not made much progress. In coastal provinces, on the
other hand, much of their pension coverage is explained by the high coverage rate of the
employment-based pension program (See Figure 5.2).
Not only does the type of dominant pension program differ by locality, but also the
pace at which each pension coverage expands varies widely across localities (See Figure
5.3). In many inland provinces, the coverage of the residency-based pension scheme has
increased more rapidly than that of the employment-based pension scheme over the past
five years. In wealthy coastal provinces, on the other hand, the residency-based pension
program has remained stagnant.
What explains the emergence of the dual pension regimes in China? Why do Chinese
coastal provinces continue to maintain the employment-based pension regime when they
have an alternative pension scheme that places less financial burden on employees, em-
ployers, and the state? Why do Chinese inland provinces develop the residency-based
pension program rapidly while they remain stagnant in increasing the coverage of the
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employment-based pension scheme? The next section provides a theoretical framework
to explain the local variation.
Figure 5.3: Varying Paces of Pension Expansion in China (2010-2015)
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Note: The charts are listed in the order of local GDP per capita (from richest to poorest).
The red vertical line indicates the year the Social Insurance Law is implemented.
5.3 Explaining Sub-national Variation in Pension Cover-
age
The rise of universal social insurance program is not a phenomenon seen uniquely
in Chinese inland provinces. Many developing countries in Latin America have expe-
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rienced the rise of the citizenship-based universal social insurance scheme or a replace-
ment of the existing employment-based social insurance scheme with the citizenship-
based social insurance scheme. Previous studies of social policies in developing coun-
tries focus on the role of labor informalization in explaining the rise of citizenship-based
social insurance program in explaining the changes in Latin American social policies.
According to the literature, labor informalization induces the rise of universal social
insurance programs by making workers form a coalition supporting the adoption of
social insurance program that distributes social welfare benefits on the basis of citi-
zenship, not on the basis of one’s employment position. While those who enjoy high
employment-security—formal workers—prefer employment-based social insurance pro-
gram to citizenship-based universal social insurance program, labor informalization in-
centivizes them to update their preferences by making them see themselves as future
beneficiaries of universal social insurance programs. (Carnes and Mares, 2013b, 2015).
In China, as well, labor informalization has induced a major change in its social
insurance systems. Yet an explanation focusing on bottom-up mobilization impact of
labor informalization does not sufficiently elucidate the sub-national variation in pension
coverage in China.
First, in China, labor informalization exerts its power less by changing workers’ wel-
fare preferences or mobilizing the bottom-up coalition of workers. As discussed in the
theory chapter, in authoritarian China, structural changes induce policy changes more
by changing the composition of worker groups local state actors try to co-opt using so-
cial policies and thereby altering state actors’ welfare preferences and welfare provision
strategies.
Moreover, labor informalization alone does not sufficiently explain how the compo-
sition of the pivotal worker group changes. As discussed in the previous chapter, labor
informalization is happening not just in Chinese inland provinces but also in Chinese
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coastal provinces, although variation exists. In addition, unlike in a democratic context
where workers are stratified mainly by their employment positions, Chinese workers are
stratified not only by their employment positions but also importantly by their local cit-
izenship status. As discussed in Chapter 4, informal workers in certain regions (coastal
provinces) are more likely to overlap with non-local workers. These non-local informal
workers are further marginalized from social provision because they are outsiders in
both political and economic terms.
I argue that the key to understanding the divergent pension expansion patterns in
Chinese inland and coastal provinces lies not only on their different levels of labor in-
formalization but also on the differing extent to which each locality relies on non-local
workers—the level of labor importation. The interaction of the two mechanisms influ-
ences the pension expansion pattern of a locality by changing the type and composition
of groups that the local government mainly concerns about. Three hypotheses are gen-
erated from this theoretical discussion.
In Chinese localities where there only few workers are imported from other locali-
ties, labor informalization mainly affects the political insiders—local workers. A large
number of local residents would lose their positions as labor market insiders (formal
workers) and become labor market outsiders (informal workers) with unstable employ-
ment positions. Yet it is still important for local governments to embrace these labor
market outsiders (informal workers) as they still maintain their positions as political
insiders (local residents). To incorporate them into the social safety net, local authori-
ties are incentivized to develop an alternative social protection program that does not
necessitate formal employment position as a qualification for social insurance enroll-
ment—the residency-based pension program. The provision of modest yet universal
social benefits through the expansion of the residency-based pension program improves
the legitimacy of local governments by building the image of benign and caring local
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authorities and improving the livelihood of local residents who experience employment
insecurity. Moreover, by promoting the residency-based pension program, local gov-
ernments can increase the overall pension coverage rapidly and thereby make a good
impression to upper-level governments.
Hypothesis 1A: In localities with a limited level of labor importation, labor infor-
malization increases the coverage of the residency-based pension program.
Expanding pension coverage through the employment-based pension program, on
the contrary, is not an effective option for many local governments experiencing la-
bor informalization. Not only it is hard to encourage informal workers to enroll in the
employment-based pension program but also it discourages firms from investing in their
localities by increasing firms’ responsibility in providing social insurance for workers. In
fact, in an effort to lower enterprises’ financial burden on providing social security for
their workers, some local governments have even encouraged their local informal work-
ers to enroll in the residency-based pension program instead of the employment based
pension program.1 Some evaluate local governments’ promotion of the residency-based
pension program as a strategy to reduce the financial burden on enterprises and pass
the responsibility for welfare onto individual workers (China Labour Bulletin, 2016). In
sum, in localities where the level of labor importation is low and where the shock of
labor informalization is mainly absorbed by political insiders—local resident, labor in-
formalization will contribute to the expansion of the residency-based pension programs
and to the shrinkage of the employment-based pension program
1 In Zhengzhou city in Henan province, for example, the local government makes it possible for the par-
ticipants of the employment-based pension program to transfer to the residency-based pension program.
See http://www.3gus.com/YangLaoBaoXian/103083.html.
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Hypothesis 1B: In localities with a limited level of labor importation, labor infor-
malization decreases the coverage of the employment-based pension program
Contrary to labor exporting localities that experience “localized” labor informaliza-
tion, localities that import a large number of workers from other localities can externalize
the shock of labor informalization to non-citizen workers. In these localities, political in-
siders—local residents—are less affected by labor informalization as non-local workers
buffer them from the shock of labor informalization. As political insiders (local resi-
dents) retain their position as labor market insiders (formal workers), these localities
find few incentives to develop the residency-based pension program in response to la-
bor informalization. Some might argue that the growing level of labor shortage and
labor protests initiated may incentivize local officials to grant non-local workers mini-
mal access to social welfare policies by developing the residency-based pension program.
Yet unlike local state actors in labor-exporting areas where most workers are permanent
residents, local state actors in labor importing areas can always expel non-local workers
when they make a political or social fuss. Moreover, under the current system that ties
the entitlement of the residency-based pension program to local residency, it is not easy
for non-local workers enroll in the residency-based pension program of their hosting lo-
calities. Consequently, in localities where a large number of workers are imported from
other localities, labor informalization is not likely to contribute to the expansion of the
residency-based pension program.
Hypothesis 2: In localities with a high level of labor importation, labor informal-
ization does not increase the coverage of the residency-based pension program.
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Labor importing localities also have fewer incentives to transform the existing employment-
based pension program. First, local governments can coopt their core supporters—political
insiders who maintain their positions as labor market insiders at the same time—more
effectively and efficiently through the narrowly targeting employment-based pension
program. Moreover, the employment-based pension program is a useful institution that
effectively segregates non-local workers with insecure employment status from non-
local workers with secure employment, whom local governments are willing to em-
brace as permanent residents in the long run. Chinese local governments have used
the employment-based pension program as a tool to attract and retain skilled non-local
workers to their localities (Rickne, 2013). Consequently, in labor-importing localities, the
coverage of the employment-based pension program will not shrink even when labor
informalization deepens.
Hypothesis 3: In labor-importing localities, labor informalization does not decrease,
and may even increase, the coverage of the employment-based pension program.
5.4 Empirical Evidence from Provincial-Level Data
5.4.1 Data and Measurement
To test the above-mentioned hypotheses, I conduct a linear regression analysis of
the coverage of the employment-based and residency-based pension programs in 31
provinces in China. I examine how labor informalization affects the coverage of the
two different pension programs and how its effect is conditioned by the level of labor
importation by using two different data sources. First, I used the data drawn from
the CLDS of 2012 and 2014. The data enable a more direct measuring of independent
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variables, such as the proportion of informal workers and non-local (inter-provincial)
workers. Since the survey data do not provide much information about the macro-
economic conditions of each provinces, such as the fiscal revenue, I matched the data
with the information collected from official statistics of 2012 and 2014. Another caveat of
the analysis with the survey data is that they cover only two years (2012 and 2014). The
summary statistics and correlation matrix of the covariates are in the appendix (See Table
A.1. and Table A.2). To take advantage of large cross-provincial variation over a longer
period of time, I constructed a panel data-set of 31 Chinese provinces compiled from
various Chinese official statistical yearbooks (2005-2015). While the data-set provides
abstract measures of the concepts of interest, it enables us to observe and analyze cross-
provincial variation over a longer period of time. The summary statistics and correlation
matrix of the covariates are in the appendix (See Table A.3. and Table A.4).
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables of the analysis are coverage of the employment-based and
residency-based pension programs. For analysis with the survey data, the dependent
variables are measured by the number of participants in each pension program as a
share of total workers in each province in the survey data. For analysis with the of-
ficial statistics, the dependent variables are measured as the number of participant in
each pension program as a share of total local population. The denominator in the
provincial-level analysis differs from the survey because official statistics do not provide
an accurate measure of the number of working population or the number of workable
age population (Dorfman et al., 2012). Instead, I used the number of total local popu-
lation, which includes both local residents and non-local migrant residents in a given
locality, as the denominator.2 The official statistics provide the number of participants in
2 While the number of the total local population is not an ideal denominator, it is the most related vari-
able that could be used as a denominator and is also used as a denominator by other research measuring
social insurance coverage. See, for example (Huang, 2015).
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the residency-based pension program only after 2010. This is because the central gov-
ernment merged rural and urban residency-based programs in 2010. The information
about the employment-based pension program coverage, on the other hand, is available
from 2005 onward.
Independent Variables
The first independent variable of the analysis is the size of informal employment in
a province. For analysis with the survey data, it is measured by the number of infor-
mal workers normalized by the number of total workforce population in each province.
For analysis with the provincial-level panel data, I used the aggregated proportion of
employees in private enterprises and the self-employed to total urban registered em-
ployment as a primary measure of the size of informal employment in each locality.
Chinese informal employment comes from different sources; 1) the private economy and
2) self-employed sectors, and 3) informal employment not captured by official statistics.
The measure used in this analysis captures the size of informal employment in the first
two categories. While assuming all private sector workers as informal workers can be
problematic, many scholars argue that the private economy should be considered as an
informal sector, as it is mostly composed of small-scale private enterprises (Hu and Zhao,
2006). Survey reports also show that Chinese private enterprises are often unregulated
and employ a large number of informal employees (Park and Cai, 2011).
The second variable of interest, which is expected to mediate the impact of labor
informalization, is the level of labor importation. For the analysis with the survey
data, labor importation level is measured by the share of inter-provincial migrant work-
ers (employees who work in different provinces than their places of birth) in a given
province. For analysis with the panel data, I used the share of the population who hold
different township, town, and street community household registration status than their
current places of residence. This measurement includes both intra- and inter-provincial
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migrants. While it would be ideal to calculate the share of inter-provincial migrants only,
the official statistics do not provide a breakdown of the “non-local” workers by admin-
istrative levels. Some use the difference between the total population and the registered
population in a given province to calculate the number of inter-provincial workers, but
this measure is problematic as half of this measurement provides negative values.3 Nor
does it capture the concept this research is interested—the level of labor importation. As
this paper is mainly interested in the level of labor importation rather than the level of
labor mobility (which does not distinguish between incoming and outgoing population),
I used the measurement mentioned above.
Control Variables
Local GDP per capita is controlled to control the confounding effect coming from
different economic scales of each locality. In democracies, support for social policies
with limited yet universal benefits comes mainly from lower income citizens (De La
and Ana, 2013; Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2009; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Solinger
and Hu, 2012). High income workers, on the other hand, are likely to oppose univer-
sal redistributive social insurance programs out of concern for the potential tax increase
for universal social insurance programs that primarily benefit those who barely con-
tribute—lower income workers (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber et al., 2008; Meltzer and
Richard, 1981). A similar bottom-up dynamics may influence the policy-making pro-
cesses of local authoritarian leaders in China.
Different fiscal structures can also motivate local officials to develop different pen-
sion programs. To control the confounding effect of fiscal structures, the models also
include the size of local fiscal revenue and fiscal transfer as controls. Studies of Chi-
3 The negative value is generated because some provinces have more outgoing than incoming popula-
tion. Researchers who use this residual method in measuring the level of labor mobility adopt various
ways to deal with negative values. Huang(2015), for example, takes absolute values of the measure to
measure the level of labor mobility. Trieu (2013) turns all negative values to zero. Neither of the measures,
however, captures the level of labor importation.
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nese pension expansion have addressed how pension (mostly the employment-based
contributory pension) funds are used as local non-budgetary revenues and are often
misused by local governments suffering from insufficient revenue (Frazier, 2010). A
study of Chinese health insurance expansion for migrant workers also shows that lo-
calities with revenue deficits are more likely to establish health insurance programs for
migrant workers in order to funnel their contributions toward minimizing deficits (Trieu,
2013). Hence, local governments with lower fiscal revenue or transfer may have more
incentives to develop the employment-based pension program and encourage workers
(especially migrant workers) to enroll in the program. On the other hand, studies find
that provinces with more fiscal resources, (either fiscal revenue and fiscal transfers from
the central government), are more capable of providing generous and broad social in-
surance benefits to their residents (Dickson et al., 2016; Huang, 2015). Moreover, fiscal
transfer from the central government is a major source for funding the residency-based
pension program for many local governments. In this regard, local governments with
more fiscal revenue and fiscal transfer are more likely to cover a broader segment of
society by the residency-based pension program. To control the effect of local revenue
and fiscal transfer from the central government, I include both local government revenue
(as a share of local GDP) and central-to-local fiscal transfer as a share of local GDP.
Local state’s welfare provision strategies can also be affected by the type of firms
investing in the localities. The employment-based welfare system began in the socialist
era as SOEs provided their workers with generous welfare benefits, including housing,
pension, health insurance, and retirement benefits. Localities relying heavily on SOEs
have a longer and stronger tradition of the employment-based social insurance system,
which may make them develop the employment-based pension program further than
other localities. To account for the difference in the levels of reliance on the state-owned
economy, the amount of investment from state-owned enterprises as a share of total
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fixed investment is included in the model (SOE investment). The aggregated amount
of investment from foreign firms and China circle firms as a share of total investment is
also added as a control (Foreign Investment).
Literature on welfare policies emphasizes the skill level of workers as an important
factor explaining the development of divergent welfare regimes (Iversen and Cusack,
2000). High skill workers are likely to have a stronger bargaining powers to force local
governments and firms to provide the most beneficial social insurance programs for
workers. Hence, localities in demand of high skilled workers may develop different
social insurance policies than localities dominated by low-skilled workers. To account for
the effect of skill level, I added the percentage of workers above college level education
as a control (Skilled Labor).
The rising level of social instability has also been discussed as a main force that urges
local governments to increase social insurance coverage (Huang, 2015) and develop uni-
versal social insurance programs for poverty reduction, in particular (Ratigan, 2017).
Whether social instability influences the development of the two different pension pro-
grams in the same way, however, has not yet been discussed. To account for the effect
of social instability and to examine if it affects the two distinct pension programs dif-
ferently, I controlled the dependency ratio and the level of labor dispute in the model.
Dependency ratio is measured by the ratio of population aged above 65 to the working
population (ages 15-65). I normalized the annual count of labor disputes that occurred
in a province by the number of urban employees and added it as a control in the model.
5.4.2 Model Specification
Given the different data structure, I used two different estimators to test the hypothe-
ses. As the data drawn from the survey and matched with the official statistics cover only
two years (2012 and 2014), I used a simple linear regression estimator with robust stan-
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dard errors. All models include year-fixed effects and provincial-fixed effects.4 For the
panel data compiled from provincial-level statistical yearbook (2005-2015), I used a linear
regression model with provincial and year-fixed effects but this time I adopted panel-
corrected standard errors to correct the contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedas-
ticity in the error structure (Beck and Katz, 1995). Below is the model specification for
the analysis with the panel data.
Pension coverageit
= α+ β1(Labor Informalizationi,t) + β2(Interprovincial Labor Mobilityit)
+β3(Labor Informalizationit × Interprovincial Labor Mobilityit)
+βcControl Variablesit + τt + γi + eit
where γi and µt indicate provincial fixed effects and year fixed effects, respectively.
Table 5.1 summarizes the expected signs of the independent variables.Given the hy-
potheses, I expect to see a positive main effect of labor informality. It captures the
impact of labor informalization given no incoming migrant workers. I also expect to see
a negative sign on the interaction term of labor informality and labor importation for
the coverage of the residency-based pension program, implying that the positive effect
of labor informality will diminish as labor importation level increases. I expect to see a
negative main effect of labor informality on the coverage of the employment-based pen-
sion program. It captures the impact of labor informalization given localities with zero
incoming migrant workers. A positive sign on the interaction term of labor informality
and labor importation would imply that the negative impact of labor informalization
4 Adding provincial fixed effect inflates the R-squares as provincial fixed effects explain a lot of the
variation in my dependent variable. While I acknowledge the trade-off it might bring, adding regional-
fixed effect and the year-fixed effect is inevitable to account for potential omitted variable bias.
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on the coverage of the employment-based pension program would be alleviated or even
turn positive as the level of labor importation grows.
Table 5.1: Expected Effects of Independent Variables
Variable Residency-basedPension Coverage
Employment-based
Pension Coverage
Labor Informalization + −
Labor Informalization × Labor Importation − +
While linear regression models are widely used in testing hypotheses with depen-
dent variables that vary from 0 to 100, such as vote share, percentage, and pension
coverage, they may not be the best models to test the hypotheses with dependent vari-
ables distributed from 0 to 1. To address these concerns, I re-tested the hypotheses by
employing the negative binomial model. Negative binomial regression is appropriate
for modeling count variables that are over dispersed. I used a time-series cross-section
of annual counts of pension participants as the dependent variable for the negative bi-
nomial model. Columns 4 to 7 in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 report the results from the negative
binomial analysis. Note that the GDP per capita level and the percentage of skilled
workers are dropped due to their high correlation with one of the independent variables
in both the regression model and the negative binomial model (See Appendix for the
correlation matrix table).
5.4.3 Results
The analysis with the survey measures provides empirical support for the hypotheses
(See Table 5.2). As is expected by Hypothesis 1, labor informalization has a positive effect
on the residency-based pension coverage and a negative effect on the employment-based
pension coverage.
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Table 5.2: Labor Informalization, Labor Importation, and Pension Expansion (CLDS
2012, 2014)
Residency-based Pension Coverage Employment-based Pension Coverage
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variables
Informal Worker (%) 0.849*** 0.794** 0.785* -1.382*** -1.277*** -1.210***
(0.303) (0.328) (0.375) (0.295) (0.264) (0.281)
Migrant Worker (%) 2.119*** 2.275** 3.254*** -1.541** -1.565** -1.800**
(0.678) (1.044) (1.050) (0.683) (0.728) (0.800)
Informal × Migrant Worker -0.0438** -0.0488** -0.0601*** 0.0301** 0.0289** 0.0318***
(0.0158) (0.0198) (0.0202) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0105)
Control Variables
GDP per capita (in log) -30.48 -39.71 32.32 20.82
(58.03) (67.14) (44.41) (57.64)
Fiscal Transfer -1.914 -3.332 0.410 0.200
(2.568) (2.437) (1.780) (1.850)
Revenue -114.2 80.44 -376.6** -435.4
(311.0) (298.9) (137.7) (255.8)
SOE investment 0.761 0.842 -0.387 0.0748
(0.950) (1.261) (0.569) (0.763)
Foreign Investment 1.242 3.707 0.162 0.548
(2.174) (2.824) (1.349) (2.141)
Skilled Labor (%) -0.149 0.679
(1.034) (0.776)
Dispute size 0.381 0.214
(0.372) (0.139)
Dependency -0.358 -0.307
(2.567) (1.694)
Constant -13.02 315.3 398.1 118.1*** -184.8 -78.85
(20.31) (595.5) (713.2) (19.76) (477.4) (632.5)
Observations 56 56 55 56 56 55
R-squared 0.811 0.827 0.876 0.933 0.956 0.960
Provincial Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: CLDS 2012, 2014; China statistical yearbook (various years)
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The main effect of labor informalization on the coverage of the residency-based pen-
sion program is positive and significant, implying that labor informalization increases
the residency-based pension coverage, given no incoming migrant workers in a province.
The main effect of labor informalization on the coverage of the employment-based pen-
sion program is negative and significant, suggesting a negative effect of labor informal-
ization on the coverage of the employment-based pension program in provinces with no
incoming migrant workers.
Yet, the negative and significant coefficients of the interaction term (migrant worker
× informal worker) for models 1-3 suggests that the the positive effect of labor informal-
ization on the coverage of residency-based pension program weakens in localities with
a large number of migrant workers. It supports hypothesis 2 that labor informalization
does not contribute to the residency-based pension expansion in localities with high lev-
els of labor importation. The positive and significant coefficients of the interaction term
for models 4-6 provide empirical support for Hypothesis 3. It suggests that the nega-
tive effect of labor informalization on the expansion of the employment-based pension
program weakens as the level of labor importation increases. The effects of independent
variables are not interrupted by the inclusion of control variables in the model.
Figure 5.4 visualizes the changing marginal effects of labor informalization on differ-
ent pension programs across provinces with different levels of labor importation, based
on models 3 and 6 in Table 5.2. The histogram in the graph shows the percentage dis-
tribution of provinces with different levels of labor importation. The horizontal line
indicates zero marginal effect of labor informality on each pension coverage. The graph
on the left shows the marginal effect of labor informality on the coverage of residency-
based pension programs while the graph on the right shows the marginal effect of labor
informality on the coverage of employment-based pension programs. It shows the effect
of labor informalization changes depending on the level of labor importation. Labor in-
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formalization has a positive effect on the coverage of residency-based pension programs
in localities with a small amount of interprovincial migrant workers. This positive ef-
fect, however, is nullified as the size of incoming interprovincial migrant workers grows.
When it comes to employment-based pension programs, labor informalization decreases
the coverage of the employment-based pension program in provinces with fewer incom-
ing migrant workers. Yet, the negative effect weakens as the size of incoming inter-
provincial migrant workers increases.
Figure 5.4: Average Marginal Effects of Labor Informality on Pension Coverage (CLDS
2012, 2014)
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Table 5.3 reports the relationship between independent variables and the residency-
based pension coverage, while Table 5.4 reports the effect of independent variables on
the employment-based pension coverage. The results from both the linear regression
model and the negative binomial model provide support for Hypothesis 1, that labor
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informality increases the coverage of the residency-based pension program. The negative
yet non-significant coefficients of the interaction term in the linear regression model
(Columns 1 to 3) provide limited support for Hypothesis 2, that the positive effect will
be diluted in provinces with high levels of labor importation (See Table 5.3).
Although the interaction term is insignificant, the marginal plot of the regression
model shows that the positive effect of labor informality on the coverage of the residency-
based pension program is shown only in provinces with fewer migrant workers (See
Figure 5.5).
Figure 5.5: Average Marginal Effects of Labor Informality on Pension Coverage (NBS
statistics 2005-2015)
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Table 5.3: Labor Informalization, Worker Importation, and Residency-based Universal
Pension Coverage (NBS Statistics 2010-2015, Provincial-level Analysis)
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Table 5.4: Labor Informalization, Labor Importation, and Employment-based Pension
Coverage (NBS 2005-2015, Provincial-level Analysis)
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The coefficients of the interaction term for the residency-based pension program in
the negative binomial model is negative and significant, providing support for the hy-
pothesis that the positive effect of labor informality on the coverage of the residency-
based pension program is likely to be mitigated as the level of labor importation grows.
Among the controls, fiscal revenue has a significantly negative effect whereas fiscal
transfer has a weak and inconsistent effect on the expansion of the residency-based pen-
sion program. It implies that local governments with limited revenue are more likely to
expand the residency-based pension scheme to a broader segment of society. It might be
due to local government’s scheme to create an extra-budgetary source by encouraging a
number of workers to contribute to their individual accounts, which are managed by the
local government. The weak positive relationship between fiscal transfer and the cover-
age of the residency-based pension program suggests that fiscal transfer from the central
government may play an important role in expanding the universal pension program.
The SOE investment also has an inconsistent and weak impact on the expansion of the
residency-based pension coverage. Foreign investment is significantly and negatively
correlated with the residency-based pension program. This implies that localities with
a higher reliance on foreign investment are less likely to expand the residency-based
universal pension program, despite the fact that this program does not add any financial
burden on foreign employers. Contrary to the expectations of the previous literature,
social instability, as measured by the level of the demographic dependency ratio and the
labor dispute level, does not contribute to the expansion of the residency-based pension
program. None of the predictors are significantly correlated with the dependent vari-
able.
When it comes to the coverage of the employment-based pension program, both the
linear regression model with the panel-corrected standard errors and the negative bino-
mial model provide empirical support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 (See Table 5.4).
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The negative and significant main effect of labor informality imply that labor informality
has a negative effect on the coverage of the employment-based pension program, given
low level of labor importation. Yet, the positive and significant coefficient of the inter-
action term suggests that the negative effect will weaken in provinces with high levels
of labor importation, thus providing empirical support for Hypothesis 3. The marginal
plot of the regression model also shows that the negative effect of labor informality on
the employment-based pension coverage is shown only in provinces with fewer migrant
workers (See Figure 5.5).
Among the controls, foreign investment has a negative effect on the expansion of
the employment-based pension program. It echoes Frazier (2004)’s point that foreign
invested firms, especially China circle firms, are notorious for dodging social insurance
fees. Fiscal revenue has a positive effect on the coverage of employment-based pension
program, implying that localities with more revenue are more likely to have higher pen-
sion coverage. This is in contrast with residency-based pension coverage where revenue
has a negative effect. It implies that localities with enough revenue are likely to de-
velop the employment-based pension program more than the residency-based pension
program that guarantees higher benefits. This counters the expectation from the pre-
vious literature which has suggested that localities with a fiscal deficit are more likely
to expand the employment-based social insurance program (Trieu, 2013). Fiscal transfer
level has a negative effect on the expansion of employment-based pension programs.
The contrasting effect of fiscal transfer and fiscal revenue shows that the effect of fiscal
capacity can vary depending on the source of the fund. While the dependency ratio has
a negative effect on the expansion of the employment-based pension program, labor dis-
pute has no significant effect on its expansion. This shows that potential social instability
is less an important factor in explaining the expansion of pension coverage.
Empirical results from both survey measures and official statistical measures suggest
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that the impact of labor informalization on the development of different pension pro-
grams varies depending on the level of labor importation. In provinces with lower levels
of labor importation, labor informalization increases the coverage of residency-based
pension programs and decreases the coverage of employment-based pension programs,
benefiting the growing number of local (informal) workers with modest but universal
benefits. In provinces importing a large number of workers from other localities, on
the other hand, labor informalization neither increases the residency-based pension cov-
erage nor decreases the coverage of the employment-based pension program. Labor
informalization has no effect in these provinces because the shock of labor informaliza-
tion is externalized and is absorbed by migrant workers imported from other localities.
This changing effect of labor informalization on the two pension programs explains why
coverages of both programs vary widely across different localities in China and why the
two pension programs fail to develop in tandem.
5.5 Robustness Checks
I rely on two methods to test the robustness of my empirical findings. First, I replicate
the findings at the provincial level using a city-level data set compiled from various year-
books. Second, I use the correlation coefficient of informal workers and interprovincial
workers at the city-level drawn from the CLDS as an independent variable of analysis
to directly test if it is the overlap between informal worker and imported workforce that
explains the expansion of different pension programs. To address potential endogeneity
problems, I also replicate the findings at the provincial level using year-lagged indepen-
dent variables.
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5.5.1 City-Level Analysis
While the Chinese central government has struggled to upgrade the pension pool-
ing level at the provincial level, many localities in China still pool and manage the
employment-based pension funds at the municipality level. Hence, a municipal (city)
level of analysis can provide a more accurate support for the hypotheses mentioned
above. I tested whether the patterns observed at the provincial level are also found at
the municipal level by using municipal-level data of 288 municipalities in China from
2011 to 2013. These statistics, however, are limited in that municipal-level data do not
provide as detailed information as provincial-level data do. First, municipal-level data
provide information regarding pension coverages only after 2011. The most recent avail-
able municipal-level statistical yearbook is that of 2013. Hence, it covers a relatively
short time span. Also, municipal-level data do not report the number of residency-based
pension participants. Hence, with the municipal-level data, hypotheses regarding the
coverage of residency-based pensions could not be tested. In addition, the municipal-
level data do not provide information for many of the control variables, such as the
dependency ratio or the size of labor disputes.
As the municipal-level data cover only short periods of time, I tested the hypothe-
ses with the negative binomial model instead of linear regression model with panel-
corrected standard errors. The dependent variable of the analysis is the count of indi-
viduals enrolling in the employment-based pension program. The independent variables
are the level of labor informality measured as the percentage of employees in private en-
terprises and self-employed. The level of labor importation is measured as the level
of inter-provincial labor mobility normalized by the number of local total population.5
5 The number of residents holding different township, town, and street community household regis-
tration status, the measure that was used in the provincial-level analysis to calculate the level of labor
importation, is not available in the city-level data.
165
The inter-provincial labor mobility is measured as the difference between the local per-
manent population and local registered population. Cities where outgoing population
outnumbers incoming population have negative values for the inter-provincial labor mo-
bility.
For controls, I added local revenue, foreign investment, and the amount of social wel-
fare expenditure. Note that the amount of foreign investment and the amount of China
circle investment as a share of total investment are added separately as the measures of
the two variables are not significantly correlated with each other at the municipal level.
The GDP per capita is dropped as it was highly and significantly correlated with the in-
dependent variable. All models include year- and provincial-fixed effects. The first three
models (columns 1-3) used the city provincial effect and the next three models (columns
4-6) adopted the provincial-fixed effect. The summary statistics and correlation matrix
are in the appendix. (See Table A.5. and Table A.6)
Overall, the results from city-level negative binomial analysis are consistent with
that of the provincial-level regression/negative binomial. Although the main effect of
labor informality is not significant given no incoming migrant workers, the interaction
effect of labor informality and labor informality is positive and significant, implying
that the negative effect of labor informalization on the coverage of employment-based
pension programs is mitigated or changes from negative to positive as the level of labor
importation increases (See Table 5.5).
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Table 5.5: Labor Informalization, Labor Importation, and Employment-based Pension
Coverage (NBS 2011-2013, City-level Analysis)
DV: Employment-based Pension Participants
(Negative Binomial Regression)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent Variables
Labor Informality 0.0009 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0018
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019)
Labor Importation -0.0063** -0.0060* -0.0060* 0.0186*** 0.0117** 0.0180***
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053)
Informality × Importation 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Control Variables
Revenue -0.0092 -0.0100 0.0121 0.0252**
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0118) (0.0124)
Foreign Investment -0.0045 0.0240***
(0.0065) (0.0037)
China Circle Investment -0.0003 -0.0010
(0.0058) (0.0043)
Social expenditure 0.0075 0.0047 0.0076 0.0125
(0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0081) (0.0083)
Trade Openness -0.0013 -0.0016
(0.0021) (0.0011)
Constant 2.5244*** 2.5063*** 2.5139*** 6.0715*** 5.3033*** 5.6990***
(0.1907) (0.2028) (0.3001) (0.3411) (0.4033) (0.4211)
Log-likelihood -3106.329 -3104.712 -3028.605 -3994.036 -3969.786 -3914.081
Observations 822 822 805 822 822 805
City-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes No No No
Provincial-fixed effect No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.5.2 Correlation-Based Explanation
While the interaction effect of the level of labor importation and labor informalization
shows how the effect of labor informalization changes depending on the level of labor
importation, it does not directly test whether it is the externalization of informal labor
that explains the locally diverging development patterns of the two different pension
programs.
In localities where those who are hit by labor informalization are mostly the im-
ported workers (in other words, if informal workers are highly correlated with migrant
workers), the residency-based pension program is not likely to expand. Instead, the
employment-based pension program may develop as it helps exclude imported informal
workers more efficiently from the local welfare system and benefit the local formal work-
ers with more generous benefits. On the other hand, in localities where labor informality
is dispersed to local workers and where imported migrant workers are somehow more
likely to work in formal sectors (in other words, if the correlation between labor worker
and migrant worker is low), the opposite would be observed. Hence, the higher labor
informality correlates with migrant workers, the lower the coverage of the residency-
based pension programs and the higher will be the coverage of the employment-based
pension programs.
In order to test whether the distribution of labor informality across different worker
groups (e.g., migrant worker and local worker) affects the type of pension programs
developed more in a locality, I measured the correlation coefficient of labor informality
and migrant workers in a given municipality using the CLDS of 2012, and used it as the
independent variable of an analysis in which the dependent variable is the coverage of
each pension program in each province. Migrant workers are defined as those whose
household registration place is different from the city in which the worker is employed.
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It includes both intra-province and inter-province migrant workers. The summary statis-
tics and correlation matrix of the covariates are in the appendix. (Table A.7 and Table
A.8)
Table 5.6: Informality-Migration Correlations and Pension Coverage (CLDS 2012 & City-
level Statistics, 2012)
Residency-based
Pension Coverage
(CLDS 2012)
Employment-based
Pension Coverage
(CLDS 2012)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corr(inter-city migration, labor informality) 4.673 8.181 7.809 65.601*** 61.910* 65.965*
(31.725) (36.667) (22.352) (23.396) (33.717) (32.714)
GDP per capita (in log) 1.788 2.141 -1.512 2.658
(7.967) (7.546) (6.862) (9.488)
Foreign Investment -0.070 -0.174 0.672** 0.549
(0.289) (0.421) (0.318) (0.519)
China Circle Investment 0.258 0.241 0.400 0.369
(0.299) (0.409) (0.513) (0.441)
Social Expenditure 0.291 1.598
(1.429) (1.903)
Revenue 0.735 0.744
(2.007) (2.651)
Provincial city 13.456 11.196
(23.828) (16.341)
Constant 38.623*** 18.690 -11.692 50.037*** 43.791 -38.525
(1.377) (87.218) (90.580) (1.015) (77.987) (105.040)
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61
R-squared 0.542 0.552 0.555 0.606 0.717 0.730
Provincial-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: CLDS 2012, China City Statistical Yearbook 2012, China Regional Economy Statistical Yearbook 2012
The analysis provides limited but important support for the hypotheses (See Table
5.6). The correlation between labor informality and migrant workers has no significant
relationship with coverage of the residency-based pension scheme, implying that the
high correlation between informal workers and migrant workers does not necessarily
lead to the expansion of the residency-based pension coverage. Yet, the correlation be-
tween labor informality and migrant worker is significantly and positively related with
the coverage of the employment-based pension scheme. This implies that the higher
informal labor is correlated with non-local migrant workers and the higher labor infor-
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mality is likely to be externalized, the stronger the welfare regime would develop based
on the employment-based pension program.
5.5.3 Endogeneity
While labor informality seems to affect the expansion of different pension programs,
it is possible that the type of workforce employed in a region can be influenced by a
locality’s social insurance policies. When local governments enforce the social insurance
law too strictly and promote workers to enroll in the employment-based pension pro-
gram, for example, firms may have incentives to employ more informal migrant workers
so as to evade paying pension contributions for workers. Considering that firms or
governments have control over who are employed as informal workers or what type
of workers are employed, it is possible that the type of workforce (formal or informal,
local or non-local) may be a consequence of local social insurance policies that facilitate
the expansion of certain pension programs. Moreover, depending on the social insur-
ance programs developed in a locality, workers can also rearrange their labor market
status. Previous literature on labor economics, for example, has extensively discussed
how social security benefits workers’ employment allocation strategies. A study of Latin
American health care service, for example, argues that the development of employment-
based pension programs has incentivized workers to participate in the labor market as
formal workers and thereby reduce informal employment (Bérgolo and Cruces, 2011;
Camacho et al., 2013). In countries where welfare benefits are distributed independently
of one’s employment position, workers have little incentive to forego the flexibility of the
informal sector for the rigidity of the formal market (Wibbels and Ahlquist, 2011).
One common approach to deal with the potential of endogeneity is to lag the sus-
pected variables by one period. Although this approach does not entirely rule out the
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potential for reverse causality problems, the provincial-level analysis with lagged ex-
planatory variables provides preliminary and a minimum defense against the endogene-
ity issue. Table 5.7 shows that the relationships between main independent variables and
pension coverage remain similar, even when lagged explanatory variables are used.
Table 5.7: Lagged Independent Variables and Pension Coverage (NBS 2005-2015)
Residency-based Pension
Coverage (2010-2015
Employment-based Pension
Coverage (2007-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Independent Variables
Labor Informalityt−1 0.450*** 0.532*** 0.500*** -0.358*** -0.288*** -0.273*** -0.229***
(0.147) (0.149) (0.100) (0.064) (0.057) (0.056) (0.054)
Labor Importationt−1 -0.237 -0.022 -0.245 -0.196 -0.065 -0.107 0.003
(0.355) (0.349) (0.300) (0.125) (0.142) (0.143) (0.133)
Labor Informalityt−1 × Labor Importationt−1 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 0.010*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Control Variables
Revenue -0.799*** -1.235** 0.335*** 0.261** 0.158
(0.291) (0.521) (0.105) (0.106) (0.134)
Fiscal Transfer 0.425** 0.494** -0.118*** -0.136*** -0.135***
(0.166) (0.212) (0.028) (0.032) (0.034)
FDI -1.432*** -1.726*** -0.312** -0.271** -0.282*
(0.402) (0.514) (0.124) (0.122) (0.144)
Dependency -0.504 -0.460*** -0.540***
(0.530) (0.131) (0.132)
Dispute size 0.046 0.001
(0.046) (0.012)
Constant 4.408 12.747* 25.613* 17.389*** 13.611*** 20.887*** 21.726***
(7.234) (6.733) (13.390) (2.595) (2.325) (3.563) (4.074)
Observations 186 186 155 310 309 309 278
R-squared 0.908 0.917 0.912 0.958 0.962 0.964 0.964
Provincial/Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.6 Conclusion and Implications
This paper examines how and why the two Chinese pension programs develop in
a locally fragmented, creating two divergent pension regimes—a narrowly targeting
yet generous pension regime based on the employment-based pension program and
a broadly encompassing yet modest pension regime based on the residency-based pen-
sion program. Using an original provincial level dataset, I provide empirical support for
the hypotheses derived from the theory introduced in Chapter 2 that structural changes,
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such as labor informalization and labor mobility, alter the composition of group that
local government co-opts through social policies.
Localities with a limited level of labor importation are more likely to expand the
residency-based pension program as they experience labor informalization. In these
localities, due to the limited of labor importation, the shock of labor informalization
is absorbed mainly by local workers. As the growing number of labor market out-
siders (informal workers) still maintain their position as political insiders, local states
are incentivized to develop social insurance program that embraces the growing num-
ber of local informal workers. In localities with a high level of labor importation, on
the other hand, localities have fewer incentive to embrace informal workers through the
residency-based pension program or make a transition from the employment-based to
the residency-based pension regime. It is because a large number of informal employ-
ment positions are externalized to those who local governments consider as outsiders of
the local community—non-local workers.
The local variation in pension regimes discussed in this paper echoes the findings
from previous research on Chinese localized welfare regimes. The Chinese east coastal
area is known to place more emphasis on welfare programs that increase market pro-
ductivity, such as education, while the Chinese inland areas is known to invest more on
social programs aiming at poverty reduction, such as the minimum livelihood guarantee
program (dibao) (Ratigan, 2017). These locally distinctive policy priorities can also be
found within a same social policy area, as can be seen by the establishment of locally di-
vergent pension regimes: The east coastal localities develop the employment-based pen-
sion program that help them attract and retain skilled, highly-educated, formal workers,
while the Chinese inland localities develop the residency-based pension program that
can provide universal social benefits to a broader segment of workers. These local diver-
gences suggest that the way local governments co-opt their implicit supporters, repro-
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duce their local political legitimacy, manage urbanization, and provide public goods for
local constituents varies depending on their local conditions and the pre-existing local
welfare institutions.
Local government’s diverging policy responses to labor informalization depending
on the level of labor importation implies that local citizenship remains an important
criterion for institutional exclusion in China. This is contrary to the expectation that
the Chinese institutional exclusion mechanism will gradually shift from the citizenship-
based exclusion to economic status-based exclusion (Wang, 2005), or that the concern
for bottom-up rebellion from internal migrant workers will motivate Chinese officials to
expand citizenship to its migrant workers (Solinger, 1999).
China is unique in that it stratifies its own domestic workers by (local) citizenship and
in that some localities can externalize the burden of labor informalization to these non-
citizen workers. Yet welfare exclusion based on local citizenship itself is not unique to
China. An increasing number of countries around the world are developing citizenship-
based welfare systems to protect domestic workers against immigrants, who are blamed
to take domestic workers’ employment positions. While most democracies develop or
expand universal welfare programs to protect workers exposed to labor informaliza-
tion, they may further consolidate the existing employment-based welfare systems if the
growing number of informal employment positions can be externalized to workers with
differential citizenship. If this pattern of welfare expansion is observed in democratic so-
cieties, it may raise the possibility that the politics of exclusion is not too different across
democratic and authoritarian regimes experiencing permissive labor mobility and grow-
ing labor informalization.
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Chapter 6
Who Remains Uncovered?
Individual-level Determinants of
Pension Participation
6.1 Introduction
Previous chapter shows that Chinese localities use different pension programs in
incorporating their core supporters whose composition varies by the level of labor infor-
malization and labor mobility. Yet it leaves another important puzzle unanswered: de-
spite the constant expansion of the two pension programs, why can’t China achieve the
universal pension coverage? Who remains uncovered? How, at the individual level, is
worker’s pension participation pattern determined? This chapter addresses these ques-
tions empirically by examining Chinese workers’ pension participation pattern using
two rounds of individual-level survey data.
In China and elsewhere, workers’ social insurance participation pattern varies widely
by their employment positions. Finding the employment-based social insurance pro-
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gram financially onerous to enroll, informal workers tend to to enroll in the (residency-
based) universal social insurance program than enroll in the employment-based pension
program. Yet Chinese workers’ pension participation is stratified not only by their em-
ployment position but also by their local citizenship status. Due to these dual discrimi-
nation mechanisms, Chinese informal workers are more likely to enroll in the residency-
based pension program only when they are permanent residents of a locality they are
working in. Non-local informal workers, on the other hand, are more likely to remain
uncovered by any of the pension programs.
In the next section, I browse how previous literature discusses the relationship be-
tween labor informality, social insurance preference, and social insurance pattern. This
discussion is followed by a description of Chinese workers’ social insurance partici-
pation status. In the next section, I propose several hypotheses elucidating Chinese
workers’ pension participation patterns—participation in the employment-based pen-
sion program, residency-based pension program, and non-participation. The following
section tests the hypotheses by conducting a multinomial logit analysis of individual
pension participation. The final section then concludes with a summary of findings and
broader significance of the research.
6.2 Labor Informality and Social Insurance Participation
Previous studies of social policies in developing countries have focused on the role of
labor informalization in diversifying individual’s welfare preference (Carnes and Mares,
2013a,b; Häusermann and Schwander, 2012; Margalit, 2013; Rueda, 2006). This section
reviews the previous discussion and examines how this discussion provides an impor-
tant yet limited insight in accounting for Chinese workers’ diverging social insurance
participation status.
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6.2.1 Between Individual Welfare Preference and Social Insurance Par-
ticipation
Research on individual’s social insurance preferences finds that labor market insid-
ers (formal workers) have widely different social insurance preferences than labor mar-
ket outsiders (informal workers) (Carnes and Mares, 2013b,a; Hausermann et al., 2014;
Rudra, 2007; Sane and Thomas, 2013). The diverging welfare preferences between formal
and informal workers are derived from two main differences between the two worker
groups—employment security and income level.
Most formal workers enjoy higher employment security and earn more income than
informal workers. Formal workers’ high employment security makes them confident
about their ability to complete the contribution requirement imposed by the employment-
based pension program (Hausermann et al., 2014; Rueda, 2006). Conversely, informal
worker’s volatile employment position makes them less confident about their ability
to complete their contribution requirement of employment-based social insurance pro-
grams. In consequence, informal workers are likely to support universal social insurance
programs that are financed through general tax revenues and distribute welfare benefits
universally as a part of citizenship right, irrespective of participants’ employment status
(Moene and Wallerstein, 2002; Rehm, 2009; Rehm et al., 2012).
The income gap between formal and informal workers further consolidates the diver-
gence in welfare preferences between the two worker groups. High income earners do
not prefer universal social insurance program as the adoption of the universal social in-
surance program levies them a higher tax in exchange for standardized modest benefits
shared evenly across different income groups. They are also less likely to be intrigued
by the meager and standardized benefits coming from universal social insurance pro-
gram. Conversely, lower income earners prefer universal social insurance programs as
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they can benefit from the program without paying high taxes (Esping-Andersen, 1990;
Huber et al., 2008; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Having a higher average income, formal
workers are likely to reinforce their preferences for the employment-based pension pro-
gram. To the contrary, informal workers, who are mostly likely to be in lower income
level, will further reinforce their preferences for the (residency-based) universal social
insurance program.
To what extent does this diverging preference of the two worker groups inform us
about their actual social insurance participation patterns? The discussion on the individ-
uals’ social insurance preference may enrich our understanding of individual workers’
social insurance participation pattern considering that those who prefer a certain social
insurance programs are more likely to participate in the program. Nevertheless, an at-
tention paid exclusively to individual’s social insurance preference only incompletely
explains individual workers’ diverging social insurance participation pattern.
First, individual workers’ actual social insurance participation status does not always
align with their social insurance preferences. Supporters of certain social insurance pro-
gram are more likely to participate in the social insurance program only when they
are eligible to enroll in whichever social insurance program they prefer. In many de-
veloping non-democracies, however, individuals’ social insurance preferences and their
actual participation pattern may not resonate as workers’ social rights to enroll in social
insurance programs are often denied or restricted. It is not a coincidence that most of lit-
erature examining the impact of labor informalization on individual’s welfare preference
is grounded in (emerging) democracies. Many informal workers in developing countries
are left uninsured due to their middling economic positions and the underdevelopment
of adequate social insurance programs to cover them (Handayani, 2016; Dartanto et al.,
2016). In China, as well, around a half of non-agricultural workers belong to this non-
participant group, despite the increasing social insurance coverage.
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Considering the size and importance of non-participants, especially in the context of
developing non-democracies, a direct examination on workers’ actual social insurance
participation is necessary. In the following section, I examine Chinese workers’ pension
participation pattern by making a sensitive distinction between participants of the two
pension programs and non-participants.
Second, the existing measurement of social insurance preference makes only an in-
complete and inaccurate distinction between the supporters of different social insurance
programs (Berens, 2015b). Most of studies measure individual’s support for universal so-
cial insurance programs (as opposed to support for employment-based social programs)
by asking individuals whether they believe it is the state responsibility to provide welfare
to the retirees (Berens, 2015a; Carnes and Mares, 2013a). This approach stems from the
fact that, in many Latin American states, employment-based social insurance programs
have been (re)launched with welfare privatization while universal social insurance pro-
grams have been ran by the state.
Yet, there are countries (even among Latin American states) where the state inter-
venes heavily both in employment-based and universal social policy programs. In China,
for example, the (local) state has intervened heavily in managing both the residency-
based pension program and the employment-based pension program. As discussed in
Chapter 3, the local state has played a pivotal role in managing the pension fund pooled
at the local level. Moreover, while increasingly more Chinese workers see the provision
of pension benefits as the state’s responsibility (Frazier, 2010) and find the legitimacy of
the state from the state provision of welfare to the citizens (Dickson et al., 2016), it does
not necessarily mean Chinese workers have opted out from the employment-based pen-
sion program or their support for and participation rate of the residency-based pension
program has increased.
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6.2.2 Chinese Workers’ Pension Participation Patterns
How do Chinese workers’ welfare participation patterns look like? To answer this
question, I examine Chinese non-agricultural employees’ pension participation patterns
using two rounds of national sample survey data, the CLDS conducted in 2012 and 2014.1
I examine Chinese workers’ pension participation pattern by classifying individual work-
ers as three separate groups by their social insurance participation status—universal
social insurance participants, employment-based social insurance participants, and non-
participants.
A cross tabulation of labor informality and pension participation status show that
around a half of formal workers enroll in the employment-based pension program.
Conversely, only a small proportion of Chinese informal workers participates in the
employment-based pension program. Many informal workers remain uncovered or en-
roll in the residency-based pension program (See Table 6.1). While around a half of in-
formal employees remain uncovered, a third of informal worker enroll in the residency-
based pension program. Among all residency-based pension participants, 68.48% and
79.05% were informal workers in 2012 and 2014, respectively. It resonates with the find-
ings from previous literature that informal workers are more likely than formal workers
to support (and hence are more likely to participate in) universal pension programs.
Yet contrary to their enthusiasm for state redistribution of welfare and their increas-
ing consciousness of their social rights, around a half of Chinese workers do not enroll
in any pension program at all (See Table 6.1). According to the survey, the proportion
of non-participants has been growing. In 2012, for example, 40.23% of Chinese non-
agricultural workers report that they are not enrolled in any pension program at all. The
size of nonparticipants has increased in 2014 to 57.87% of the Chinese non-agricultural
1 In order to get the point estimate and standard errors right, I considered the weighting, clustering,
and stratification of the survey design by using svyset command in Stata.
179
workers, implying that there can be more employees who are not enrolled in any pension
program than employees participating in either of the two pension programs. Of course,
the proportion of non-participants are higher among informal worker groups. 85.08%
and 82.21% of non-participants were informal workers in 2012 and 2014, respectively.
Table 6.1: Pension Participation by Workers with Different Employment Positions (CLDS
2012, 2014)
CLDS 2012 CLDS 20124
Formal Informal Total Formal Informal Total
No Pension 17.55 52.01 40.23 31.78 59.59 51.54
Employment-based Pension 52.66 14.37 27.46 48.94 10.86 21.87
Residency-based Pension 29.79 33.62 32.31 19.28 29.56 26.59
100 100 100 100
Un-weighted Calculation
Why do some Chinese informal workers remain uncovered by any of the pension
programs and while other informal workers enroll in the residency-based pension pro-
gram? I argue that it is because the Chinese labor market stratifies workers not only on
the basis of workers’ employment position as in democracies, but also based on their
local citizenship status. The interaction between local citizenship and employment po-
sition explains the misalignment between welfare preferences and actual participation
patterns, as well as the high proportion of Chinese workers uncovered by either of the
pension programs.
6.3 Hypotheses
The Chinese social insurance law itself does not prevent informal workers to enroll in
the employment-based pension program. In practices, however, like in informal workers
elsewhere, Chinese informal workers often find the employment-based pension program
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onerous to enroll. The vulnerable employment position and lower wages of informal em-
ployees in the formal sector further refrain them from enrolling in the employment-based
pension program. Instead of contributing to a certain portion of their wages for more the
fifteen years, the informally employed would rather want to save the money for them-
selves. Some Chinese workers who are informally employed in the formal sector bargain
with their employers to get pay increase in exchange for their non-participation to the
employment-based social insurance program (Park et al., 2012). Under the new social in-
surance law, the self-employed can voluntarily enroll in the employment-based pension
program. However, it is even more onerous for the self-employed (than the informally
employed in the formal sector) to enroll in the employment-based pension program as
they have no employer to pay employer contributions for them (Wu, 2013). For these
reasons, Chinese workers are less likely to participate in the employment-based pension
program as their employment position changes from formal to informal.
Hypothesis 1: Chinese workers, both local and non-local, are less likely to partici-
pate in the employment-based pension program as they become informal workers.
If the employment-based pension program is less likely to embrace informal workers,
how does the social insurance participation of informal workers look like?
For many Chinese workers, the residency-based pension program functions as an
alternative to or an escape from the employment-based pension program. Under the
Chinese labor law and social insurance law, all workers employed in firms are obliged
to enroll in social insurance programs. Many informal workers enroll in the residency-
based pension program in order to get an exemption for the costly employment-based
pension program. While the expected benefits of the residency-based pension are mod-
est, the requirement for this pension program is a much less onerous for informal work-
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ers. An interview with a local labor bureau official conducted in 2016 confirmed this
point.2
“When firms hire part-time workers, they first make sure that the workers are
enrolled in the residency-based pension program. They know that a worker cannot
enroll in two pension programs simultaneously and that the state cannot force firms
to have their workers enroll in the employment-based pension program if the workers
are already enrolled in the residency-based pension program. It’s a win-win strategy
for both firms and workers. Workers do not want to pay money for a pension and
firms also want to save money for social insurance.”
Yet, not all informal workers find the residency-based pension program as an ap-
pealing option. Informal workers are comprised of extremely heterogeneous groups
with different income levels, educational attainment, and social cleavages (Portes and
Hoffman, 2003; Trager, 1987; Tokman, 1989). Informal workers with certain character-
istics have lower expectations toward the state redistribution of welfare either because
they have little experience benefiting from state redistribution or because they have been
systemically discriminated from receiving the social benefit.
In China case, one of the most important cleavage that stratifies workers’ social in-
surance participation status and affects informal workers’ expectations regarding the
state’s welfare redistribution is their local citizenship status. Compared to local informal
workers who can easily enroll in and benefit from the residency-based pension program,
non-local workers are no more likely to resort to the residency-based pension program
even when they experience labor informalization. It is because the state institutions
make it hard for them to enroll in and benefit from the alternative social insurance pro-
gram—the residency-based pension program. In consequence, workers coming from
2 subject # 11, Interview with a labor bureau official, Shanghai, March 9, 2016.
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different localities are more likely to remain uncovered by social insurance programs as
they experience labor informalization.
In the Chinese localized welfare regime, non-local workers—who came from differ-
ent cities or provinces—have to process more bureaucratic red tapes in order to enroll
in the residency-based pension program. First of all, they cannot directly enroll in the
residency-based pension program at the localities where they work. Those who want
to participate in the residency-based pension program have to register to the residency-
based pension program of their hometown. However, this administrative hassle and
inconvenience coupled with non-substantial benefit of the residency-based pension pro-
gram often discourage non-local informal workers enrolling in the residency-based pen-
sion program. Moreover, as urbanization deepens, an increasing number of these work-
ers want to settle in the cities of employment instead of returning to their hometown.
Not knowing where they will settle in the future, non-local workers see less benefits in
enrolling in a residency-based pension program. Hence, for non-local workers, a shift of
their employment position from formal to informal one would not dramatically change
a worker’s pension participation pattern from the employment-based to the residency-
based.
The positive impact of labor informalization on increasing one’s chance of enrolling
in the residency-based pension program will be shown only among local workers. Local
informal workers can easily enroll in the residency-based pension program at a very low
stake and have a higher expectation to benefit from the program. Local government also
encourages local workers’ enrollment in the residency-based pension program, either
because local leaders are genuinely concerned about local informal worker’s social se-
curity status or because they want to increase social insurance coverage while deterring
local workers from placing more pressure on employers by enrolling in the employment-
based pension program. In other words, the impact of labor informalization on one’s
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likelihood of enrolling in the residency-based pension program will be conditioned by
one’s local citizenship status. Based on the theoretical discussion, the two following
hypotheses are generated:
Hypothesis 2A: Non-local workers are no more likely to enroll in the residency-based
pension program as they experience labor informalization.
Hypothesis 2B: Local Workers are more likely to enroll in the residency-based pen-
sion program as they experience labor informalization.
On the other hand, Chinese informal workers’ lack of experience of benefiting from
state welfare provision and low level of trust in government may discourage them from
enrolling in any pension programs of the country. Moreover, unlike noncontributory
universal social programs adopted in many other developing countries, the Chinese
residency-based pension program requires its participant to pay pension premiums to
benefit from the program. While the defined contribution of 15$ per year may not be an
onerous requirement for general informal workers in China, they may find no reason to
waste the money for an ineffective pension program. Hence, workers experience changes
in their employment position from formal to informal are likely to remain uninsured.
Hypothesis 3A: Workers are more likely to be uninsured as their employment po-
sition changes from formal to informal ones.
Because non-local workers are less likely to find the residency-based pension pro-
gram as an appealing pension option, they are even more likely to remain uninsured
as they experience a shift of employment position from formal to informal ones. This
implies that non-local informal workers are most likely to be marginalized from the
Chinese social safety net.
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Hypothesis 3B: Non-local workers are even more likely than local workers to re-
main uninsured as their employment position changes from formal to informal ones.
6.4 Empirical Analysis
6.4.1 Measurement and Model
This section tests the above-mentioned hypotheses by making a sensitive to the dis-
tinction to different types of pension participation options—participation in the Urban
Employment-based Basic Pension (UEBP), Urban and Rural Residency-based Pension
(URRP), and non-participation. I coded the dependent variable 0 if a worker does not
participate in any pension program at all, 1 if a worker participates in the employment-
based contributory pension program, and 2 if a worker participates in residency-based
pension programs. Since the dependent variable is multinomial, a multinomial logistic
regression model is applied to this analysis.
The independent variables of this analysis are individual’s employment position and
local-citizenship status. Following the definition made in Chapter 4, I coded a worker as
informal if the worker is self-employed, is not paid on monthly basis, is hired indirectly
by labor dispatch, does not work as a full-time worker, or lacks a labor contract. I
assigned a value of 1 for informal labor, and 0 for formal labor. The percentage of
informal workers was 67.5% and 71.7% in 2012 and 2014, respectively, when measured
by the broader definition of informal labor. When it comes to informal employment in
the formal sector, defined as employment lacking labor contract, 50.32% and 51.7% of
formal sector employees were informal in 2012 and 2014, respectively.
185
Another important variable of interest is workers’ local citizenship status. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 4, worker mobility has different forms—workers can move across
different cities within a province or move across different provinces. In China, workers
coming across different provinces are the most severely discriminated among all non-
local workers (Davies and Ramia, 2008; Nielsen and Smyth, 2008). I coded a worker as
non-local if the province the worker is working in differs from the province where his or
her hukou is registered (Inter-Prov).
While the Chinese central government attempts to urge local governments to have
a unified social insurance system that can be administered at the provincial level, most
pension programs are still administered at the city level. While workers coming from
different cities within the same province may have lower institutional barriers than inter-
provincial migrant workers, they may also encounter some difficulty in enrolling in and
benefiting from the residency-based pension program of the cities in which they work.
I used an alternative measure for non-local workers and re-conducted the analysis for
a robustness testing by coding workers as non-local if their hukou registration place is
different from the cities in which they currently live. (Inter-City). This measure includes
both workers coming from different cities within the same province and workers coming
from different provinces.
Along with independent variables, I also included a battery of individual-level con-
trol variables, such as the hukou type, income level, gender, age, education level, and
employment sector.
Hukou type I included a dummy for different hukou type to differentiate agricul-
tural and non-agricultural hukou workers. Although the gap between types of welfare
benefits across different hukou types has been shrinking (Chan and Buckingham, 2008),
agricultural hukou workers are still marginalized from getting urban-based social wel-
fare. In the past, hukou type (agricultural and non-agricultural) used to determine the
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type of social benefits an individual worker could receive. Agriculture hukou holders
used to be excluded from the state provision of welfare and were expected to use land
as their last resort. Most of non-agriculture hukou workers, on the other hand, used to
be employed by state-owned enterprises and were provided with various welfare ben-
efits—such as pensions, health insurance, and other fringe benefits. Although the gap
between different hukou types is shrinking and the merger between the rural residency-
based pension programs and urban residency-based program has removed some barriers
for agricultural hukou workers, the employment-based pension program is still, for the
most part, biased toward urban citizens who hold non-agricultural hukou. To control the
effect of hukou, I coded workers who hold agricultural hukou as 1 and workers holding
non-agricultural hukou as 0.
Urban/ rural residency Aside from hukou type, the type of place workers reside in
also affects the type of pension program workers choose. In urban areas, workers are
more likely to be aware of their social rights and are more likely to need social insur-
ance to guard against uncertainty in the future. In the rural areas, however, workers
may have limited knowledge and may not see the importance of social insurance. Aside
from the importance of urban-rural divide in China originating from its unique house-
hold registration system (hukou), the impact of type of place (i.e. urban or rural) on
one’s likelihood of participating in social insurance programs has been discussed widely
by previous literature grounded on other countries (Onwujekwe et al., 2010). I coded
workers living in urban area as 1 and workers living in rural area as 0.
Income level Classical theories on welfare and social insurance preference emphasize
how individual welfare preference differs by income level (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
A large portion of the literature demonstrates a linear negative relationship between in-
come level and support for universal noncontributory social insurance programs, and a
positive relationship between income level and support for employment-based social in-
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surance programs (Carnes and Mares, 2013b; Hausermann et al., 2014; Rehm et al., 2012).
A recent research on social insurance participation in developing countries also confirms
the positive and significant effect of income on one’s social insurance participation (On-
wujekwe et al., 2010). In order to control for the effect of income level on individuals’
pension participation patterns, I included a log of individual workers’ annual incomes.
Age Pensions differ from other types of social insurance programs in that they re-
quire a longer time frame for participants to receive the actual benefits of the program.
In China, in order to receive employment-based pension benefits, workers have to con-
tribute for more than fifteen years. Those who retire before completing the contribution
requirement must make up the balance to get the full benefit from the employment-
based social insurance program. Not seeing the immediate benefit of enrolling in the
pension program, younger workers are less likely to participate in pension programs
than older workers. Older workers nearing their retirement age are also less likely to
enroll in pension programs. As social insurance laws and systems have been reformed
only recently, older workers are less likely to benefit from the reformed social insurance
programs. Hence, it is likely that older workers are less likely than middle-age workers
to participate in pension programs. I used an age variable and the quadratic form of age
to account for the effect of age on one’s pension participation pattern.
Gender While the wage gap between female and male workers is one of the low-
est in China among many other East Asian countries, female workers have constantly
earned lower income than male workers. Moreover, female workers in China have been
forced into early retirement during the economic reform and SOE restructuring pro-
cesses (Cooke, 2008). The unfair treatment in labor market and discriminatory labor
conditions for female workers may have lowered female workers’ likelihood of partic-
ipating in the employment-based social insurance program. The fact that women are
more likely to be employed as informal employees also contributes to the diverging so-
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cial insurance participation status between women and men. To control the effect of
gender on one’s likelihood of enrolling in pension programs, I coded female workers as
1 and male workers as 0.
Education level The relationship between education level and preferred type of pen-
sion program has been much discussed in the previous literature on welfare policies
(Hausermann et al., 2014; Rehm, 2009; Rehm et al., 2012). Literature based on welfare
policies in developed countries expects a negative relationship between education and
support for universal social insurance programs. Higher educational attainment and
skills protects workers from labor market instabilities and makes educated workers cer-
tain about the possibility that their human capital will be compensated for in the market
(Rehm, 2009; Hausermann et al., 2014). Education thereby reduces one’s need for univer-
sal social insurance programs and increases individual’s support for employment-based
social programs. In addition, educated workers have higher level of legal knowledge and
are likely to claim their social rights more actively than non-educated workers. A recent
study of informal worker’s social insurance participation in Indonesia’s health insurance
program also finds that lack of knowledge is the main obstacle to the expansion of health
insurance programs among informal workers (Dartanto et al., 2016). Hence, skilled and
educated workers are more likely to participate either in the employment-based pension
program or in the residency-based universal pension program than less educated work-
ers. I classified education level as four types: 1) primary school and below, 2) middle
school, 3) high school, and 4) college and above.
Ownership type The divide between the state and the non-state sector is another
salient labor market cleavage that affects workers’ preference regarding welfare poli-
cies (Huang, 2013). Since the socialist era, state sector workers have benefited from
employment-based social policy programs and have resisted the attempt to change the
status quo social policies Frazier (2010). In this regard, the previous literature argues
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that employees in the state sector prefer the existing employment-based contributory
pension program, while employees in the private sector lack incentives to enroll in the
employment-based contributory pension program unless the government provides them
with extra incentives to do so (Huang, 2013). Research on Chinese health insurance par-
ticipation patterns reveals that employees in private enterprises are less likely to enroll
in the employment-based health insurance program versus commercial health insurance,
when compared with their state-sector counterparts (Huang, 2013). In order to control
the effect of employment sector on workers’ pension participation patterns, I included
the dummies of firm ownership in the model. I grouped employees in government, party,
public sector, and state-owned enterprises into a category, (SOEGov) as they are likely
to be the proponents and beneficiaries of the status quo employment-based pension pro-
grams. I also added the dummies for foreign enterprises (foreign), private enterprises
(private), and collective enterprises (collective). I collapsed workers in other firms into a
group and used it as the baseline of the analysis (others).3 Table A.9 shows the summary
statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
6.4.2 Analysis and Results
Table 6.2 reports the full result of the analysis. The coefficients in the multinomial
logit only contain information about the relative choice between two of the three pension
options. For a more intuitive account for the effect of each covariate, I visualized the
marginal effect of the main independent variable, labor informality, on the predicted
probability of participation in each pension option (See Figure 6.1). The plots show how
a shift from formal to informal worker changes the probability of local and non-local
3 These unspecified types of firms are suspected to be a major source of informal employment. For
more detailed discussion see Park A and Cai F. (2011) The informalization of the Chinese labor market.
In: Kuruvilla S, Lee CK and Gallagher M (eds) From iron rice bowl to informalization: Markets, workers,
and the state in a changing China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
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workers to participate in each pension option. For this substantive plot, variables other
than informality and migrant status are held constant.4 The red vertical line indicates
no marginal impact of labor informality on each pension participation mode.
Figure 6.1: Marginal Impact of Labor Informality on Pension Participation
Local
Non-local
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Employment-based Pension Residency-based Pension No Pension
CLDS 2012 (Confidence level: 90%)
Local
Non-local
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Employment-based Pension Residency-based Pension No Pension
CLDS 2014 (Confidence level: 90%)
Source: CLDS 2012, 2014.
As discussed, labor informality decreases workers’ probability of enrolling in the
employment-based pension program for both local and informal workers (Hypothesis
1). Local workers are less likely to enroll in the employment-based pension program
as they experience labor informalization. Local informal workers’ lower likelihood of
enrolling in the employment-based pension program is partly explained by their higher
likelihood of participating in the residency-based pension program.
4 Income, age, and education level are held at means. Hukou status is held as urban and firm type is
held as private.
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For non-local workers, a shift of employment position from formal to informal does
not significantly increase their likelihood of enrolling in the residency-based pension
program (Hypothesis 2A). For local workers, on the other hand, a shift of employment
position to informal workers increases their likelihood of enrolling in the residency-
based pension program (Hypothesis 2B). It shows how the impact of labor informaliza-
tion is conditioned by the local citizenship status of workers.
For both local and non-local workers, labor informalization increases their likelihood
of uninsured by any of the pension programs (Hypothesis 3A). The impact of labor
informalization on increasing workers’ likelihood of remaining in the non-participants
group is even more extensive for non-local workers (Hypothesis 3B).
To sum up, the impact of labor informalization on workers’ social insurance participa-
tion is not homogeneous. Local workers are more likely to enroll in the alternative social
insurance scheme—the residency-based pension program as they experience changes in
their employment position from formal to informal, while non-local workers are more
likely to be uncovered by the public pension program.
6.4.3 Discussion
Workers having agricultural hukou are more likely to remain uninsured than par-
ticipating in the employment-based pension program. Having agricultural hukou also
increases one’s likelihood of enrolling in the residency-based pension program versus
the employment-based pension program. This demonstrates that the employment-based
pension program is still biased toward non-agriculture hukou workers and that agricul-
tural hukou acts as a barrier for workers to enroll in the employment-based pension
program.
Similarly, urban residents are less likely to enroll in the residency-based pension
programs relative to the employment-based pension program. Living in urban area also
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Table 6.2: Pension Participation, Inter-Provincial Migrant, and Informality (CLDS 2012,
2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
UEBP
v.s.
No pension
URRP
v.s.
No Pension
URRP
v.s.
UEBP
UEBP
v.s.
No pension
URRP
v.s.
No Pension
URRP
v.s.
UEBP
Independent Variables
Informal Employee -1.605*** -0.751*** 0.853*** -1.591*** -0.435*** 1.156***
(0.134) (0.173) (0.153) (0.141) (0.151) (0.177)
Inter-province migrant 0.158 0.153 -0.005 -0.288 -0.348 -0.061
(0.252) (0.303) (0.217) (0.282) (0.295) (0.352)
Informal × Interprov -0.309 -1.132*** -0.823** 0.373 -0.422 -0.795*
(0.301) (0.312) (0.327) (0.376) (0.349) (0.432)
Control Variables
Argicultural Hukou -0.983*** -0.029 0.954*** -0.602*** 0.132 0.734***
(0.227) (0.226) (0.179) (0.193) (0.160) (0.218)
Urban 0.349 -0.617** -0.967*** 0.066 -0.800*** -0.867***
(0.291) (0.251) (0.266) (0.277) (0.168) (0.298)
Income (in log) -0.009 0.129 0.138 0.118*** 0.039* -0.079**
(0.151) (0.114) (0.167) (0.037) (0.022) (0.039)
Age 0.142*** 0.144*** 0.002 0.194*** 0.137*** -0.057
(0.046) (0.040) (0.041) (0.032) (0.030) (0.038)
Age squared -0.001** -0.001** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
education Baseline : Primary school or below
Middle School 0.486** 0.174 -0.312 0.729*** 0.295** -0.433**
(0.186) (0.137) (0.197) (0.171) (0.125) (0.189)
High School 0.865*** 0.352** -0.513** 1.501*** 0.443** -1.058***
(0.207) (0.164) (0.251) (0.228) (0.177) (0.243)
College & above 0.709*** 0.368* -0.341 1.763*** 0.489** -1.274***
(0.241) (0.211) (0.288) (0.244) (0.245) (0.294)
employment sector Baseline : Other firms
SOE/Gov 2.054*** 0.472** -1.582*** 0.289 -0.281 -0.570**
(0.287) (0.180) (0.279) (0.219) (0.179) (0.257)
Collective 2.173*** 0.835*** -1.338*** 1.474*** 0.570** -0.904***
(0.370) (0.306) (0.303) (0.192) (0.258) (0.254)
Foreign Enterprises 2.744*** 0.639** -2.105*** 1.972*** 0.033 -1.939***
(0.291) (0.292) (0.286) (0.509) (0.297) (0.530)
Private Enterprises 1.372*** 0.051 -1.322*** 0.911*** 0.006 -0.904***
(0.250) (0.144) (0.268) (0.188) (0.122) (0.226)
Female 0.250** 0.129 -0.121 0.156 0.219*** 0.063
(0.109) (0.099) (0.125) (0.095) (0.080) (0.115)
Constant -4.704*** -3.317*** 1.387 -7.293*** -4.292*** 3.001***
(1.061) (0.912) (0.890) (0.651) (0.744) (0.883)
Observations 8,592 8,592 8,592 11,929 11,929 11,929
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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significantly decreases one’s likelihood of enrolling in the residency-based pension pro-
gram over no pension at all in in both 2012 and 2014. It implies that urban residents are
still more likely than rural residents to rely on the employment-based pension program,
ceteris paribus.
Income level does not show any significant impact on the choice between the residency-
based pension program and the employment-based pension program in 2012. In 2014,
however, income increases the odds of participating in any of the two pension programs
versus remaining uninsured. The positive relationship between income level and the
likelihood of enrolling in any of the pension program (versus nonparticipation) implies
the regressive characteristics of the Chinese pension programs—those who have lower
income and hence are in need of more welfare benefits are actually more likely to remain
uninsured than being covered by the public social insurance programs. As individuals’
income level increases, one is less likely to enroll in the residency-based pension program
over the employment-based pension program. It is partly consistent with the argument
from the classical theory expecting a negative relationship between income-level and
support for re-distributive universal social programs.
Age has a non-linear relationship when it comes to participation in either of the
pension program versus non-participation. An increase in age first increases a worker’s
likelihood of enrolling in any of the two pension programs over not enrolling in any
pension program at all. After a certain point, however, increase in age reduces the
likelihood of participating in any of the two pension programs (versus not enrolling in
any pension program). It means that middle aged workers are most likely to participate
in any of the two pension programs, while younger or older workers are more likely
to remain uninsured at all. This tendency is understandable, considering that younger
workers are less interested in preparing for their retirement and older workers are less
aware of their social rights.
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Education, in general, increases one’s chance of enrolling in either of the pension pro-
grams versus non-participation in any of the pension programs. In particular, those with
a higher educational attainment are more likely to participate in the employment-based
pension program than the residency-based pension program. The relationship is am-
biguous in 2012; but in 2014, the effect of higher educational attainment on individual’s
pension participation status is more substantial and significant.
Employment sector has a significant impact on workers’ pension participation pat-
terns. Compared to those work in other (independent) enterprises, those work in col-
lective, foreign, or private firms are more likely to participate in the employment-based
pension program than enrolling in the residency-based pension program or not enrolling
in any of the two pension programs. Compared to workers employed in independent
firms, those work in collective firms are also more likely to enroll in the residency-based
pension program than remaining uncovered.
Gender has a less coherent and substantial impact on individuals’ pension participa-
tion pattern. In 2012, female workers are more likely to enroll in the employment-based
pension program than remaining uncovered by any of the two pension programs, but
female workers are no more likely to enroll in the employment-based pension program
in relative to the residency-based pension program. In 2014, female workers are more
likely to enroll in the residency-based pension program than remaining uncovered by
any of the two pension programs. While the results are inconsistent, it at least shows
that female workers are no less likely, if not more likely, than male workers to participate
in the public pension program of the country.
6.4.4 Robustness Checks
In chapter 4 of this dissertation, I argue that the possession of labor contract does
not necessarily make a worker as a formal employee and those who have various forms
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of precarious employment position should also be counted as informal workers. Previ-
ous studies of Chinese labor informality with more traditional approach, however, do
not count precarious workers who have labor contracts as informal workers (Park and
Cai, 2011). To see if the relationship between labor informality, local citizenship, and so-
cial insurance participation pattern holds even when labor informality is defined in this
traditional way, I replicated the analysis by using a measure of narrowly defined labor in-
formality. Informal workers in this replication indicate either self-employed (in informal
sectors) or formal sector workers employed in the absence of labor contract. So-called
‘precarious workers’ whose labor market status is vulnerable despite their possession of
labor contracts were not counted as informal workers in this alternative measure.
Figure 6.2: Marginal Impact of Narrowly Defined Labor Informality on Pension Partici-
pation
Local
Non-local
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Employment-based Pension Residency-based Pension No Pension
CLDS 2012, Confidence level: 90%
Local
Non-local
-.5 0 .5 -.5 0 .5 -.5 0 .5
Employment-based Pension Residency-based Pension No Pension
CLDS 2014, Confidence level: 90%
Source: CLDS 2012, 2014.
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The marginal effect of each variable remains generally the same as the one from
the analysis with a broadly defined labor informality (See Figure 6.2). Most impor-
tantly, local workers who experience labor informalization is more likely to participate
in the residency-based pension program. Non-local workers whose employment posi-
tions have shifted form formal to informal ones, however, are no more likely to enroll
in the residency-based pension program. It shows that relationship between local cit-
izenship, labor informality, and social insurance participation holds even when labor
informality is narrowly defined.
As most pension programs are administered at the municipal level, discrimination
against non-local workers may not be confined to inter-provincial workers but may also
affect intra-provincial workers coming from different cities. As a robustness check, the
same model is tested with an alternative measure of non-local workers—workers coming
from different cities (intercity).
While the joint effect of labor informality and workers’ migrant status is not signif-
icant in the analysis with the 2012 survey data, the relationship between labor infor-
mality, workers’ migrant status, and pension participation patterns remains the same as
the analysis with the 2014 survey data. Informal workers are more likely to enroll in
the residency-based pension program than enrolling in the employment-based pension
program in general. For non-local informal workers, however, the positive impact of la-
bor informality in increasing their likelihood of enrolling in the residency-based pension
program as opposed to the employment-based pension program is alleviated (Column
6 in Table 6.3). Informal workers are less likely to enroll in the residency-based pension
program than remaining uninsured, but the negative impact of labor informality is even
more outstanding for non-local informal workers (Column 5 in Table 6.3).
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Table 6.3: Pension Participation, Inter-city Migrant, and Informality (CLDS 2012, 2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
UEBP
v.s.
No Pension
URRP
v.s.
No pension
URRP
v.s.
UEBP
UEBP
v.s.
No Pension
URRP
v.s.
No Pension
URRP
v.s.
UEBP
Independent Variables
Informal Employee -1.628*** -0.852*** 0.776*** -1.561*** -0.350** 1.211***
(0.139) (0.170) (0.152) (0.147) (0.142) (0.163)
Inter-city Migrant -0.460** -0.594** -0.134 -0.129 0.055 0.184
(0.222) (0.260) (0.227) (0.255) (0.329) (0.383)
Informal × Inter-city -0.176 -0.326 -0.150 0.067 -0.832** -0.899**
(0.296) (0.267) (0.301) (0.334) (0.360) (0.407)
Control Variables
Agricultural hukou -0.865*** 0.089 0.953*** -0.574*** 0.163 0.737***
(0.224) (0.222) (0.186) (0.200) (0.156) (0.220)
urban 0.472* -0.506** -0.978*** 0.105 -0.736*** -0.841***
(0.281) (0.251) (0.272) (0.272) (0.173) (0.285)
Income (in log) 0.032 0.163 0.131 0.120*** 0.041* -0.079**
(0.151) (0.112) (0.166) (0.037) (0.021) (0.039)
Age 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.001 0.192*** 0.135*** -0.056
(0.046) (0.040) (0.041) (0.031) (0.030) (0.037)
Age squared -0.001** -0.001** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
education Baseline : Primary school or below
Middle School 0.483** 0.189 -0.294 0.724*** 0.306** -0.419**
(0.185) (0.137) (0.197 (0.171) (0.126) (0.189))
High School 0.852*** 0.365** -0.487* 1.493*** 0.459** -1.034***
(0.212) (0.162) (0.251) (0.229) (0.180) (0.246)
College & above 0.706*** 0.391* -0.316 1.758*** 0.500** -1.258***
(0.241) (0.212) (0.288) (0.243) (0.248) (0.296)
Employment sector Baseline : Other firms
SOE & Gov 2.023*** 0.423** -1.599*** 0.295 -0.280 -0.574**
(0.286) (0.176) (0.278) (0.218) (0.176) (0.257)
Collective 2.132*** 0.777** -1.355*** 1.476*** 0.559** -0.917***
(0.375) (0.302) (0.302) (0.191) (0.258) (0.257)
Foreign Invested Enterprises 2.825*** 0.670** -2.154*** 1.983*** 0.048 -1.935***
(0.300) (0.299) (0.281) (0.504) (0.303) (0.527)
Private 1.381*** 0.025 -1.356*** 0.915*** 0.012 -0.903***
(0.250) (0.142) (0.267) (0.188) (0.123) (0.228)
Female 0.227** 0.104 -0.122 0.161* 0.218*** 0.057
(0.109) (0.099) (0.125) (0.093) (0.080) (0.113)
Constant -4.667*** -3.236*** 1.431 -7.319*** -4.380*** 2.939***
(1.050) (0.906) (0.885) (0.654) (0.731) (0.873)
Observations 8,592 8,592 8,592 11,929 11,929 11,929
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6.5 Conclusion
Using two rounds of individual-level survey data, this chapter finds that the impact
of labor informality on individuals’ social insurance participation can be heterogeneous.
It also discusses how workers’ social insurance preference and their actual participa-
tion pattern might not align in societies where workers are stratified not only by their
employment positions but also by other exclusion mechanisms.
In China case, the other layer that stratifies workers is worker’s local citizenship
status. While labor informalization in general discourages informal workers from par-
ticipating in social insurance programs, its impact is even stronger for workers com-
ing from different localities. Both local and non-local workers are less likely to partici-
pate in the employment-based pension program when their employment status changes
from formal to informal. Yet, only local workers are more likely to participate in the
residency-based pension program than their non-local counterpart as their employment
status changes from formal to informal. As a result, non-local workers are more likely
to remain uninsured by any of the social insurance programs of the country, creating an
important stratification within informal worker groups.
This discrimination and the restrictions imposed on internal migrant workers coming
from different localities is analogous to those imposed on international migrant workers
in other countries.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary of Findings
Why do some authoritarian (local) states provide welfare benefits more universally
than other authoritarian (local) states? What explains the different patterns of welfare
inclusion and exclusion in authoritarian (local) welfare states? This dissertation project
provides an answer to these questions, focusing on a top-down logic of authoritarian
welfare provision. This dissertation starts from the assumption that authoritarian lead-
ers are held accountable to their political insiders even in the absence of electoral mecha-
nisms. The concept of political insiders remotely approximates ‘winning coalition’ in the
selectorate model in a sense that support from political insiders is crucial for state actors
to stably govern the community and that they have right to political representation and
participation within a geopolitical community. Yet unlike the membership of winning
coalition assumed to be set constant by the leader selection institution of a country, I
argue that the membership composition of political insiders are subject to change de-
pending on the structural conditions. As the scope and composition of political insiders
change, authoritarian leaders use different welfare inclusion strategies. In many author-
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itarian regimes (including China in the pre- and early reform period) where the political
insiders are by and large the same population as labor market insiders,state actors adopt
a narrow, exclusive, and selective welfare provision strategy based on the employment-
based welfare programs. In authoritarian regimes where the membership of the political
insiders is dispersed across different labor market sectors, however, a more universal,
broader, yet shallow welfare provision strategy centered on the citizenship(residency)-
based welfare programs develops. I examine sub-nationally different pension expansion
patterns and coverage in an authoritarian country, China, to illustrate how local states’
welfare provision strategies differ as the scope and composition of political insiders
change.
In China, two divergent pension programs—the employment-based pension program
and the residency-based pension program—coexist, while expanding at sub-nationally
different patterns. The two pension programs target different groups of workers and
provide different levels of benefits. While local state actors do not have power to change
the general structure of the social insurance system, they can strategically choose how to
implement the social insurance policies to accomplish their goals. Their first and utmost
goal is to maximize their chance of career promotion. This political incentive makes
local state actors to be held accountable to local residents and increase social insurance
coverage. Their second goal is to maximize the revenue. This economic incentive has
made local state actors resist the central government’s attempt to centralize the pension
system and further expand the pension coverage. Local state actors have taken strategic
approaches in implementing pension policies in order to show off their accountabil-
ity to local residents by increasing social insurance coverage on the one hand and to
maximize their revenues by holding their grip on pension fund on the other hand. Local
state actors’ strategic implementation of pension policies has resulted in the sub-national
fragmentation of the Chinese pension system (Chapter 3).
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In the past, the Chinese pension regime was based mainly on the employment-based
pension program which selectively benefited local SOE workers. The localized citizen-
ship institutions defined by the hukou system made workers with a legitimate member-
ship of the local geopolitical community as political insiders who have (implicit) political
influence on local governance. The secure and permanent employment positions as SOE
workers made them as labor market insiders as well. The high overlap between the po-
litical and labor market insiders incentivized the regime to maintain the narrow welfare
regime that selectively targets the local SOE workers. The growing labor mobility and
labor informalization, however, have broken the long maintain overlap between local
urban workers (political insiders) and formal SOE workers (labor market insiders). The
interaction of the two structural factors consolidates, intensifies, or mitigates the inter-
nal division between labor market insiders and outsiders and changes the scope and
composition of the groups local state actors are held accountable to (Chapter 4).
The locally diverging membership composition of political insiders induce local gov-
ernments adopt different pension expansion strategies. In Chinese inland localities with
limited level of labor importation, labor informaliation directly affects the employment
positions of the political insiders (local workers). Local state actors develop universal so-
cial insurance programs so that they can protect the increasing number of labor market
outsiders who still maintain their positions as political insiders. In Chinese coastal lo-
calities with a plenty of non-local workers imported from elsewhere to absorb the shock
of labor informalization on behalf of local workers, the overlap between political insid-
ers (local workers) and labor marker insiders (formal workers) remains intact despite
the growing labor informalization. In this case, local governments maintain the narrow
and exclusive welfare regime, evidenced by the high coverage of the employment-based
pension program (Chapter 5).
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The similar pattern stands out at the individual-level as well. Individuals who are
labor market outsiders (informal workers) are less likely to enroll in the employment-
based pension program. Yet informal workers’ pension participation pattern diverges
by their local citizenship status. Those informal workers who are local resident are more
likely to enroll in the residency-based pension program and receive modest yet mean-
ingful welfare benefits from the state as a legitimate member of the local community.
Those informal workers who are non-local residents, however, are more likely to remain
uninsured (Chapter 6).
The changes and divergences in pension coverage at the national, local, and indi-
vidual levels suggest that the way authoritarian (local) states reproduce their political
legitimacy, control social instability, and manage urbanization through welfare provi-
sion varies depending on the composition and scope of the political and labor market
“insiders”. The deepening labor market dualization, rise of the gig economy, growing
labor mobility, and urbanization are expected to further consolidate the locally frag-
mented welfare regimes in China. The emergence and persistence of localized welfare
regimes may have helped local governments to better serve their “insiders” or at least
help them build the image of benign and caring governments. At the same time, how-
ever, the diverging welfare provision patterns and the dualized welfare regime may have
exacerbated rampant inequalities between labor market insiders and outsiders and be-
tween local and non-local workers. It may have also aggravated the chronic regional
inequalities of the country. Whether the dualized welfare expansion patterns will help
the regime maintain social stability or create an obstacle to stable urbanization and bal-
anced growth remains to be seen.
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7.2 Future Directions
In this dissertation, I presented a theoretical framework for understanding varia-
tion in authoritarian welfare regimes and applied it to China case. Many of the steps
suggested in this dissertation project, however, leave further works to be done. In the
concluding paragraphs, I will discuss the limitation of the current project and outline
some directions for future efforts that can fill in the gaps.
First, this dissertation describes Chinese local residents as political insiders who have
implicit or explicit power to influence local governance and the legitimacy of the local
states. As discussed, Chinese local state leaders are incentivized to take care of local resi-
dents and prioritize local residents over non-local workers. The career evaluation system
that nullifies every other achievement of local state actors in case of local social instabil-
ity incentivizes local state actors listen to local resident’s demands and carefully monitor
where discontents come from (Manion, 2014). Local state actors also improve public
good provision to increase public support and trust in local state institutions (Dickson
et al., 2016). Yet both this dissertation project and previous research do not sufficiently
delve into how the upper-level governments monitor and reward local state actors’ ac-
countability to local residents and and through what mechanisms local state actors ac-
commodate local residents’ policy preference in the absence of electoral mechanisms.
Chapter 4 of this dissertation also discusses that the way local state actors recognize a
citizen as a ‘local’ or a legitimate member of the geopolitical community reshapes as
the social insurance system or hukou institutions change. Yet it does not scrutinize how
specifically local state actors’ concept of ‘local residents’ or ‘political insiders’ shapes and
how their political accountability to local residents changes. More through qualitative
research is needed to examine these mechanisms. Gathering more information about the
political dynamics between local state actors and local residents will not only lay a foun-
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dation for a more generalizable theory of authoritarian welfare inclusion and exclusion
but also will improve our understanding of political accountability and responsibility in
authoritarian regimes.
Second, although empirical evidence has shown that there are links between labor
mobility, labor informalization, and pension coverage in each locality (in Chapter 5
and 6), this dissertation does not discuss in detail the substantial policy variation across
localities. Several policy areas may show local governments’ diverging approaches to
welfare expansion and their changing welfare preferences. First, localities have taken
different approaches in integrating the social insurance programs fragmented along the
rural-urban divisions and administrative levels. Although the urban and rural residency-
based pension programs have been rapidly integrated with the implementation of the
social insurance law of 2011, some places have been more active in integrating the ru-
ral and urban (residency) social insurance programs than the others. The rural-urban
integration has invited a high level of bureaucratic struggle in some localities, but has
contributed to the expansion of the residency-based social insurance programs by in-
corporating not only uninsured urban residents but also rural residents into the social
safety net. Some Chinese localities, on the other hand, have pursued the within-program
integration by upgrading the social pooling level of social insurance programs scattered
across different sub-national units and accomplished a unitary management of the so-
cial insurance funds by upper-level local governments. These policy changes might have
been triggered by the increasing labor mobility within the same sub-national units (e.g.
intra-provincial migration) and the increasing demand to broaden the concept of ‘locals’
(or political insiders).
Chinese local governments also have different policies and regulations for the in-
corporation of non-local workers into the local social safety net. While some localities
guarantee non-local workers’ participation in the local employment-based pension pro-
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gram and enact local regulations regarding the inter-provincial transferability of the
pension funds, other localities do not have relevant policies for them. Looking at the
specific policy variation can reveal how local governments’ welfare inclusion strategies
differ and how they actually pursue their welfare inclusion strategies while effectively
excluding irrelevant workers outside the local social welfare system. In future works,
I will examine more closely how the changing composition of political insiders affect
the specific local social insurance policies, including the pension integration policies and
migrant incorporation policies.
Third, focusing mostly on the state’s welfare inclusion strategies, this dissertation
falls short of uncovering how business interests are intertwined in designing and im-
plementing pension policies. Given the heavy financial burden imposed on employers
in funding the employment-based pension program, many employers may have exerted
a political pressure on local states to lower the contribution rates for the employment-
based pension program or to give them permission to skip social insurance payment.
According to an interview conducted by the author, due to the varying regulations and
industrial policies, enterprise-level compliance to the social insurance laws varies widely
across localities.1 Some even interpret the recent expansion of the residency-based pen-
sion program as an attempt to transfer the financial burden imposed on employers under
the pension regime based on the employment-based pension program to individuals and
the state (China Labour Bulletin, 2016). Despite the importance of employers in shaping
social insurance policies, the role of employers or the impact of state-business relations
in shaping welfare policies has been under-discussed. This is partly due to a lack of pub-
licly available enterprise-level data showing employers’ welfare preferences. Although
the World Bank conducted enterprise-level surveys in China in 2005 and 2012 respec-
tively, they do not provide information on Chinese employers’ welfare preferences or so-
1 subject # 21, Interview with a research associate, Beijing, December 14, 2017.
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cial insurance compliance levels. Another reason why employers’ welfare preferences are
under-discussed is because all Chinese employers are assumed to resist welfare expan-
sion, fearing the rising financial burden and labor costs. In fact, research has suggested
a possibility that employers have heterogeneous welfare preferences. Firms of larger
size and firms in need of skilled workers, for example, are likely to embrace the social
insurance costs imposed on them if the employment-based welfare provision helps them
to retain skilled workers and improve worker skills and qualifications (Mares, 2005).
Given the deepening labor shortage of skilled workers and high turnover rates, employ-
ers of some Chinese firms are likely to play an important role in the expansion of the
employment-based pension program in certain regions. In future works, I will examine
how business interests affect the local welfare expansion policies and how employers’
welfare preferences vary by local political economy.
Fourth, in discussing how structural changes influence authoritiarian welfare pro-
vision strategies, this dissertation project focuses mainly on labor informalization and
growing labor mobility. Another important, yet under-discussed, structural factor that
influences local government’s labor and welfare policies is (perception of) labor short-
ages. Scholars have debated over whether China has reached a point where unskilled
rural labor has already been depleted and the Chinese government worries about labor
shortages (Cai and Du, 2011; Golley and Meng, 2011; Zhang et al., 2011). While a large
number of academic studies contend that Chinese rural surplus labor has already been
exhausted and resulted in labor shortages in the urban sector (Cai and Du, 2011; Du
and Wang, 2010), others refute that there still are plenty of rural surplus workers who
cannot migrate to urban areas due to the institutional restrictions—hukou—that pre-
vent migrant workers’ from accessing to urban social welfare (Golley and Meng, 2011;
Meng, 2012; Wang, 2014). Deepening labor informalization and labor mobility further
complicates out understanding of the nature of Chinese labor shortages. The growing
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labor market flexibility by labor informalization, and more recently labor automation, is
considered to make the Chinese policymakers worry less about a growing level of labor
shortages. The unidirectional movement of labor from the underdeveloped inland areas
to the developed coastal areas has, however, exacerbated the labor shortage in inland
areas. The shortage of skilled labor in inland provinces has further been exacerbated as
the exclusive yet generous welfare provision in labor receiving areas make the coastal
provinces as more attractive places for skilled labor. Depending on the type and scale of
labor shortages, local governments may design different labor and social insurance poli-
cies to attract workers. Understanding how the interaction of the two structural factors,
labor informalization and labor mobility, influences the actual level of labor shortages
and local policymakers’ perception of labor shortage would deepen our understanding
of how structural factors change and shape local policymakers’ welfare preferences and
welfare provision strategies.
Last but not least, the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation project
can be applied to other country cases. The structural dynamics that reshuffle the com-
position and scope of “insiders” are happening not only in China but also many other
countries. The growing level of labor mobility across border and increase of non-citizen
workers have reshaped the concept of “welfare states” by blurring the division between
who should and should not be protected by the state (Faist et al., 2015). The trend of
growing labor immigration and influx of non-citizen workers have coupled with labor
informalization in many societies. The concentration of these non-citizen workers in
low-skilled, precarious, and non-standard employment sector has linked to the rise of
populist politics and welfare backlash, evidenced by the withdrawal of the United King-
dom (UK) from the European Union (EU), the rise of far-right parties in many European
countries, and the election of a president in support of anti-immigration policies, Donald
Trump, in the United States. Even one of the most inclusive and tolerant welfare states,
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Sweden, has recently followed the common trend that marginalizes the growing number
of low-skilled immigrants from welfare protection and emphasizes the possession of na-
tional citizenship as the main qualification for welfare entitlement (Schierup and Ålund,
2011). Like non-local informal workers in China, immigrant workers of precarious em-
ployment positions lack both political and economic power to create political pressure on
the governments of the hosting countries. This trend might suggest that the theoretical
framework proposed in this dissertation project can be applied to other county settings.
It also suggests that the logic of welfare inclusion and exclusion may not fundamentally
differ between democracies and autocracies in that both selectively incorporate political
and labor market insiders, leaving outsiders of the welfare system. Whether we can see
the pattern seen in China case in other country cases can provide us important insight
in understanding varieties of welfare regimes, changes of welfare configurations across
countries, and global inequalities.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Summary Statistics: CLDS 2012-2014
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Employment-based pension coverage from CLDS (%) 24.925 13.06 4.37 69.03 56
Residency-based pension coverage from CLDS (%) 28.549 11.336 9.6 55.28 56
Migrant worker (%) 9.706 9.379 0 41.1 58
Labor Informality (%) 59.48 14.049 17.77 86.67 58
GDP per capita (in log) 10.672 0.411 9.882 11.564 62
Fiscal Transfer (as a share of GDP) 15.216 20.174 2.058 115.633 62
SOE investment (as a share of total investment) 28.772 11.653 11.792 68.837 62
Foreign Investment (as a share of total investment) 4.65 4.172 0.084 18.494 62
Trade Openness 29.05 31.85 2.72 136. 27 62
Skilled labor (%) 19.75 10.17 7.99 57.27 59
Dependency (%) 12.504 2.66 7.5 20.04 62
Labor Dispute size (%) 20.615 15.934 1.878 77.594 62
year 2013 1.008 2012 2014 62
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Table A.2: Cross-correlation Table : CLDS 2012-2014
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Table A.3: Summary statistics: NBS statistics 2005-2015
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Residency Pension Coverage (%) 28.054 15.103 1.255 55.955 186
Employment Pension Coverage (%) 14.584 9.26 1.579 54.698 341
Residency-based Pension Participants 1301.921 1209.674 24.7 4855.2 186
Employment-based Pension Participants 634.729 634.604 4.5 4613.2 341
Labor Informality (%) 42.254 9.372 18.18 66.091 341
Labor Importation 16.836 12.387 0.313 65.118 341
GDP per capita (in log) 10.263 0.623 8.541 11.59 341
Revenue 14.832 4.251 6.2 32.1 341
Fiscal Transfer 13.96 18.17 1.837 129.744 341
SOE investment 32.324 12.165 11.449 80.981 341
FDI 5.904 5.112 0.084 24.319 339
Labor Disputes 22.04 21.2 1.878 182.128 310
skilled 12.4 8.9 0.9 57.3 302
Source: NBS Statistics 2005-2015
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Table A.4: Cross-correlation Table: NBS statistics 2005-2015
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Table A.5: Summary statistics: City Statistics 2011-2013
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Employment-based pension participants 88.475 143.001 0 1342.98 864
Informal labor (%) 45.951 13.188 0 81.320 864
Labor Importation -2.467 16.528 -45.95 77.614 822
GDP per capita (in log) 10.495 0.612 8.773 13.056 864
Revenue (as a % of GDP) 7.67 2.869 2.961 19.121 864
Foreign investment (as a % of total investment) 7.811 9.393 0 50.553 864
China circle investment (as a % of total investment) 5.771 7.461 0 42.385 864
Social expenditure 11.972 3.98 0.745 44.275 864
Trade openness 20.024 32.807 0.029 237.766 844
Source: China city statistical yearbook, China Regional Economy Statistical Yearbook 2011-2013
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Table A.6: Cross-correlation table: City Statistics 2011-2013
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Table A.7: Summary statistics: 2012 CLDS & City Statistics 2012
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Residency-based pension coverage 33.778 20.637 0 89.59 94
Employment-based pension coverage 22.622 20.549 0 79.33 92
Corr (Interprovincial migrant, informality) 0.011 0.19 -0.693 0.304 66
Corr (Intercity migrant, informality) 0.066 0.171 -0.288 0.438 61
GDP per capita (in log) 10.57 0.584 9.084 11.722 115
Foreign Investment (%) 10.288 11.364 0 48.85 115
China Circle Investment (%) 8.199 9.125 0 39.934 115
Social expenditure 11.048 3.207 2.672 19.193 115
Revenue (as a share of GDP) 8.177 3.071 3.613 18.552 115
Sources: CLDS 2012 & City Statistical Yearbook 2012
Table A.8: Cross-correlation Table: 2012 CLDS & City Statistics 2012
Variables Corr(Prov) Corr(City) GDP ForeignnInvest
China
circle
Social
Exp Revenue
Corr (interprov) 1.000
Corr (intercity) 0.399 1.000
(0.002)
GDPpc (in log) 0.341 0.201 1.000
(0.005) (0.120)
Foreign Investment 0.179 0.177 0.632 1.000
(0.150) (0.172) (0.000)
China Circle Investment 0.051 0.012 0.288 0.583 1.000
(0.683) (0.927) (0.002) (0.000)
Social Expenditure -0.182 -0.254 -0.400 -0.380 -0.290 1.000
(0.145) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Revenue 0.118 0.010 0.376 0.410 0.104 -0.297 1.000
(0.344) (0.939) (0.000) (0.000) (0.268) (0.001)
Sources: CLDS 2012 & City Statistical Yearbook 2012
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Table A.9: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
2012
Pension Option 0.89 0.868 0 2 6495
Informal Labor 0.658 0.474 0 1 5066
Informal Labor (Narrow) 0.566 0.496 0 1 5061
Non-local (inter-province) 0.155 0.362 0 1 6495
Non-local (Inter-city) 0.175 0.38 0 1 6495
Rural Hukou 0.601 0.49 0 1 6495
Income (in log) 1.214 0.6 0 5.994 6300
Age 38.941 11.417 15 83 6494
Education 2.486 1.035 1 4 5660
SOE/Gov 0.258 0.438 0 1 6495
Collective 0.031 0.174 0 1 6495
Foreign Enterprise 0.048 0.214 0 1 6495
Private Enterprise 0.35 0.477 0 1 6495
Urban 0.531 0.499 0 1 6495
Female 0.426 0.495 0 1 6495
2014
Pension Option 0.742 0.854 0 2 8324
Informal Labor 0.687 0.464 0 1 8210
Informal Labor (Narrow) 0.607 0.488 0 1 8215
Non-local (inter-province) 0.096 0.295 0 1 9458
Non-local (inter-city) 0.154 0.361 0 1 9447
Rural Hukou 0.65 0.477 0 1 8194
Income (in log) 9.819 2.234 0 15.596 9458
Age 40.39 11.606 15 114 9391
Education 2.528 1.05 1 4 9442
SOE/Gov 0.227 0.419 0 1 9458
Collective 0.077 0.267 0 1 9458
Foreign Enterprise 0.038 0.192 0 1 9458
Private Enterprise 0.328 0.47 0 1 9458
Urban 0.565 0.496 0 1 9458
Female 0.423 0.494 0 1 9458
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